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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Social investments have gained importance in recent years (LUXFLAG (ed.), 2010a, 1). 
In particular, private and institutional investors consider social investments as interest-
ing opportunities because of their two-fold return structure (social and financial). Mi-
crofinance is part of the social investment sector. The primary goal of microfinance is to 
facilitate access to funds in the world’s least developed regions by means of the provi-
sion of so-called microcredits1 (Felder-Kuzu, 2004, 19). Such microcredits represent op-
portunities to empower small-scale entrepreneurs in implementing their business ideas 
and improving their living standards. The concept is based on a reasonable belief in the 
borrowers’ ability to repay the loans and to manage the funds in a trustworthy manner, 
leading to a self-supporting standard of living despite their impoverished back-
grounds. At the same time, microfinance is a profitable and sustainable business that is 
gaining the interest of investors. This duality expresses the so-called double bottom 
line of the microfinance concept, achieving both social and financial returns. Besides 
the provision of loans, some institutions offer other financial services such as savings 
and insurance (Armendáriz / Morduch, 2010, 169). The long-term goal of microfinance 
is the development of a fully-fledged financial sector that provides daily financial ser-
vices to the whole population (responsAbility (ed.), 2011b; CGAP (ed.), 2004). 
However, to date the “Microfinance“ asset class2 is still at an early stage. While the val-
ue of assets invested in microfinance is rising constantly, reaching USD 7 billion in 
2011, transparency is lacking (MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 4). This lack of transparency and 
timely data availability for microfinance institutions (MFIs) and microfinance invest-
ment vehicles (MIVs) in particular, represents the greatest challenge for research 
(O’Donohoe et al., 2009, 1; J.P. Morgan / CGAP (ed.), 2010a, 1). Directly related to the 
problem of missing data, there are no generally accepted key performance indicators 
(KPIs) or benchmarks for the microfinance investment sector (Goodman, 2007, 15). 
Missing performance information is particularly prevalent for microfinance invest-
                                                 
1  Microcredits amount to between USD 50 and USD 5,000 depending on region and type of institution. 
2  Microfinance sometimes is indicated as an asset style or part of the “socially responsible investments” 
asset class rather than being a distinct asset class (see Dorfleitner et al., 2011, 138). 
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ments because the duality of social and financial factors makes the assessment of re-
turns complex. At the same time, the use of recent data to attract new clients and inves-
tors is important in this rather innovative sector. Given the attributes of alternative as-
set classes, diversification effects on portfolios are expected. However, risk is difficult 
to assess because microfinance investments are less diversified than standard funds 
(e.g. currency, country risk) (Abrams, 2008, 2). Another significant issue is the weak-
ness of reporting and governance standards (Pouliot, 2005, 149), which leads to chal-
lenges when comparing investments. The level of transparency varies among the 
funds, as some vehicles regularly provide investors with information by means of fact-
sheets; however, it is difficult to evaluate and interpret the information provided be-
cause of the lack of benchmarks and regulation.  
To sum up, non-transparency in microfinance is an important issue as it complicates 
research and alienates investors. Demand from investors for more transparent products 
increased as a result of the crisis that hit the financial markets around 2008. This dispar-
ity between transparency and investors’ expectations lies at the root of the present re-
search project. 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
International investors interested in microfinance often make use of so-called micro-
finance investment intermediaries (MIIs) rather than directly investing in MFIs. Almost 
half of all microfinance funding is channelled through MIIs in the form of MIVs, hold-
ing companies and peer-to-peer lending platforms3 (El-Zoghbi, 2011, 2). Investing in 
MIVs rather than directly in MFIs or projects brings several advantages, including the 
diversification of risks between institutions and countries, the availability of more flex-
ible instruments and financial discipline, among others (Goodman, 2007, 34).4 MIVs can 
be separated into investment funds and structured products (Hechler-Fayd’herbe / 
Lüscher, 2008, 1). The focus of this paper is on microfinance investment funds (MFIFs).  
When it comes to decision-making, existing and potential investors typically rely on 
benchmarks, such as the Money Market Index, MSCI World, MSCI Emerging Markets 
                                                 
3  e.g. Kiva or Babyloan.  
4  Additionally, traditional reasons for the use of investment companies rather than direct investing are 
important (see 5.2.1). 
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and others. Furthermore, an index facilitates the comparison of different investment 
possibilities within an asset class as well as correlation analyses with other asset classes 
(Lhabitant, 2006, 488). Performance benchmarks support the measurement of the in-
vestment performance of institutional fund managers and provide stakeholders with 
reference points for monitoring their investments (Lhabitant, 2006, 509). However, in 
the field of microfinance the only available index is the Symbiotics Microfinance Index 
(SMX). The SMX exhibits certain shortcomings, which will be outlined in detail. The 
aim of this analysis is to calculate one or more preferably homogeneous indexes includ-
ing all the existing funds that agree to contribute data. The index calculation is based 
on the description of different fund structures and the elaboration of particular qualita-
tive attributes of the microfinance investment universe. A detailed overview of the mi-
crofinance investment sector accompanied by an efficient benchmark will reveal the 
potential of this asset class to institutional as well as retail customers. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the calculated index with the existing SMX illustrates differences and 
possible shortcomings or disadvantages of one or the other. 
Due to the specific nature of microfinance, two additional aspects besides financial re-
turn are of interest to the investors. First, alternative asset characteristics may offer the 
potential for diversification effects when a microfinance fund is added to an existing 
portfolio. This effect is investigated by comparing the calculated index with several 
socially responsible investment (SRI) indexes and traditional5 indexes.  
Second, from an investor’s point of view, the social return of the investment is interest-
ing as well as its relationship to the financial return. Microfinance investors start to 
base their investment decisions not only on financial but also on social factors 
(Urgeghe, 2010, 80; CGAP (ed.), 2012, 2). However, it is not clear how social factors in-
teract with financial return. Following the calculation of the indexes, a second empirical 
part of this thesis therefore assesses the relationship between financial and social return 
from an investor’s point of view. 
                                                 
5  In this paper, “traditional” is used to describe investments or indexes apart from SRI that pursue 
financial return (sometimes also referred to as commercial).  
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The lack of transparency in the industry accompanied by the potential for diversifica-
tion effects and the investors’ interest in the interaction between financial and social 
return lead to the following research questions: 
 How can microfinance investment funds be benchmarked by one or more prefera-
bly homogeneous indexes? 
 Might including microfinance in a traditional portfolio lead to diversification pos-
sibilities? 
 How does the consideration of social return relate to the financial performance 
from an investor’s point of view? 
In summary, this paper aims to provide existing and potential investors with infor-
mation on the special features and possible benefits of investments in microfinance. A 
comprehensive picture of the market includes both financial and social performance 
aspects. This analysis can only capture the current market situation in a young industry 
that is developing and changing rapidly.  
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The thesis has three main sections (see Table 1.1). The first part gives a brief overview 
of the fundamentals and forms a basis for the following two parts. Part II provides a 
broad theoretical overview and investigates the asset allocation process for socially re-
sponsible investments and microfinance, the special characteristics of microfinance in-
vestment funds and the performance measurement. The empirical study in part III fo-
cuses on the calculation of indexes and the interaction between social and financial re-
turn. Following the description of data selection and classification of funds, the results 
of the index calculation, the comparison with other indexes and the econometric analy-
sis of the relationship between social and financial performance are presented. 
  
1. Introduction 7 
 
Table 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
Part I: Fundamentals 
 Introduction 
 Socially Responsible Investments 
 Fundamentals of Microfinance 
Part II: Brief Theoretical Background 
 Asset Allocation for Socially  
Responsible Investments 
 Microfinance Investment Funds 
 Performance Measurement of  
Microfinance Investment Funds 
Part III: Empirical Study 
 Data Selection 
 Classification of Funds 
 Index Calculation and Comparison 
with Socially Responsible /  
Traditional Indexes 
 Econometric Analysis: Social versus  
Financial Return 
 Conclusion 
 
The sections are divided into the following Chapters: 
 
Part I Fundamentals 
After the introduction, the second Chapter gives a short overview of socially responsi-
ble investments in general. Chapter 3 then presents details about microfinance, its his-
tory, an overview of the loan market, the social impact and current developments. 
 
Part II Brief Theoretical Background 
Theoretical foundations of the analysis are based on SRI or traditional investments be-
cause not much theory exists so far for the microfinance market. This is why even the 
theoretical part is somewhat based on empirical results. The responsAbility Global Mi-
crofinance Fund is the source most often referred to for illustrative practical examples. 
Chapter 4 examines asset allocation processes and challenges for SRI and microfinance 
in more detail. Chapter 5 focuses on microfinance investment funds, current develop-
ments and the classification of the funds. Chapter 6 reviews microfinance investment 
funds’ performance measurement approaches, while focusing on financial and social 
performance and methodologies to calculate microfinance investment fund indexes.  
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Part III Empirical Study 
The empirical study is divided into two parts, the first one focusing on microfinance 
investment funds, and the second on microfinance institutions. The data selection pro-
cess used for both parts of the empirical study is described in Chapter 7. For the first 
analysis, a survey is conducted to compile data on microfinance investment funds. The 
second part is based on a data file from Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX), a 
microfinance data provider focussing on microfinance institutions. Chapter 8 develops 
the classification of the funds based on the results of the survey as well as information 
on the funds’ portfolio (MFIs). In Chapter 9 the index is elaborated and compared with 
traditional and socially responsible indexes. Chapter 10 describes the empirical method 
of the second empirical analysis, the regression model and the results from the estima-
tion. In conclusion, Chapter 11 discusses the main results and particular limitations and 
describes possible further research. 
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2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS 
2.1 DEFINITION OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
Socially responsible investments, also known as sustainable investments6, differ from 
standard investments in that they focus not only on financial returns but also on envi-
ronmental, social and governance factors. The origins of socially responsible investing 
go back hundreds of years, when, for religious reasons, some investors avoided invest-
ing in companies that focused only on financial success. In the United States (US), the 
roots of the current trend to social investments lie between 1970 and 1990, when several 
incidents increased the sensitivity to social responsibility (just to name a few: the war in 
Vietnam, the Cold War, apartheid in South Africa and environmental issues such as 
Chernobyl) (Schueth, 2003, 190).  
When it comes to defining socially responsible investments, the term “sustainability” 
plays a decisive role.  
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (under the presi-
dency of Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1987) defines sustainability as follows: 
“Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs“ (WCED, 1987; Staub-Bisang, 2011, 20). 
The European Sustainable Investment Forum (Eurosif) claims the following definition 
for “sustainable financial investments”: 
“Sustainable and responsible investing is a generic term covering any type of investment pro-
cess that combines investors’ financial objectives with their concerns about environmental, so-
cial and governance (ESG) issues” (Eurosif (ed.), 2010, 8). 
According to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI): 
“As institutional investors, we have a duty to act in the best long-term interests of our benefi-
ciaries. In this fiduciary role, we believe that environmental, social, and corporate governance 
(ESG) issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios (to varying degrees across 
companies, sectors, regions, asset classes and through time). We also recognize that applying 
                                                 
6  Socially responsible investments and sustainable investments are used interchangeably here, in 
common with other researchers (Renneboog et al., 2008, 1723; Wittwer, 2011, 4). 
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these principles may better align investors with broader objectives of society” (UNPRI Online, 
13.08.2012). 
Focusing on socially responsible investments in the US, Schueth defines SRI as “The 
process of integrating personal values and societal concerns into investment decision-making”. 
These different definitions for sustainable investments or socially responsible invest-
ments show that both are broad terms being applied to diverse approaches that mostly 
include the consideration of ESG criteria, which comprise environment (E) (the conser-
vation of natural resources in the broadest sense), social concerns (S) and good corpo-
rate governance (G). 
According to Eurosif, socially responsible investments can be classified corresponding 
to different selection strategies into “core SRI” and “broad SRI” (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 SRI Strategies7 
Name Type 
Core 
SRI 
 
 Positive Screening 
 Negative Screening: Norms and Value-/ Ethics-Based Exclusions 
(Three or More Criteria) 
 Best-in-Class 
 SRI-Thematic Funds, e.g. Microfinance Investment Funds 
Broad 
SRI 
 
 Negative Screening: Simple Screening (One or Two Exclusion Criteria, 
Norms or Value-/ Ethical-Based) 
 Integration of ESG-Criteria  
 Engagement 
Source: own research, based on Eurosif (ed.), 2010, 8. 
In this context “core” stands for investments that are strongly aligned with sustainabil-
ity whereas “broad” is a less strict denotation that considers only one or two norms or 
values. Besides simple screening methodologies, broad SRI includes the integration of 
ESG-criteria into investment processes or active shareholder-engagement (Staub-
Bisang, 2011, 37). In Europe, broad SRI still dominates, although starting in 2002 the 
                                                 
7  Another possibility is to divide SRI into direct (engagement) and indirect strategies (positive and 
negative screening) (Globalance (ed.), 2012, 18). Eurosif ceased to use the classification of SRI into 
core and broad, as mentioned in their report in 2012, by arguing that the cultural and historical diver-
sity of Europe influences the countries’ and organisations’ definition of SRI and therefore the consen-
sus of a unified definition of SRI is difficult (Eurosif (ed.), 2012, 12).  
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fraction of core SRI rose, reaching approximately EUR 1,000 billion in 2009 (see Figure 
2.1). For the US, besides screening and shareholder advocacy, a third strategy of social-
ly responsible investing is presented, namely Community Investing. This strategy de-
scribes investments with the expectation of a repayment in form of a financial return 
while at the same time following the purpose of helping poor and underserved people 
(SIF Foundation (ed.), 2010b, 4). Nevertheless, in this paper the classification by Eurosif 
will be elaborated, as it uses a broader approach (Community Investments are covered 
within SRI-thematic investments).  
Figure 2.1 Core and Broad SRI in Europe, 2002-2009 (in Billions of Euros)8 
 Source: Eurosif (ed.), 2010, 11. 
2.1.1 CORE SRI 
Eurosif defines positive screening strategies as well as stronger forms of negative 
screening as core SRI. Positive screening involves the choice of a particular investment 
according to a specific positive criterion. Core negative screening strategies comprise 
three or more criteria for excluding investments, such as involvement in tobacco, alco-
hol and animal testing. Table 2.2 shows common examples of criteria used in negative 
and positive screening strategies for SRI. 
                                                 
8  The number of participating European countries increased from 8 in 2002 to 14 in 2009. 
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Table 2.2 Common Examples for Screening Criteria in SRI 
Screens Type Criteria 
Labour Relations / Workplace Conditions Positive Social 
Human / Animal Rights Positive Social 
Renewable Energy Positive Ecological 
Environment Positive Ecological 
Corporate Governance Positive Ethical 
Tobacco Negative Ethical 
Alcohol Negative Ethical 
Gambling Negative Ethical 
Weapons / Nuclear Power / Firearms Negative Ethical 
Pornography Negative Ethical 
Abortion / Birth Control Negative Ethical 
Animal Testing Negative Ethical 
Source: based on Geczy et al., 2005, 30; Renneboog et al., 2008, 1729; Staub-Bisang, 2011, 26. 
Best-in-class SRI funds aim to include companies and investments from all industries 
and sectors while choosing the best ones among them relative to social responsibility 
criteria. This means that best-in-class choices would include, for example, the oil / pe-
troleum company, that performs best against a defined catalogue of social responsibil-
ity criteria. This approach is criticised for including all industry sectors: BP is included 
in the DJSI World9 in 2009, and in 2010 the company became responsible for one of the 
worst environmental crises with the explosion of their oilrig “Deep-water Horizon” 
(Schadwinkel, 23.10.2012; BP (ed.), 2010). However, best-in-class approaches may con-
tribute to increased competition regarding sustainability criteria, leading to improved 
social responsibility within sectors that would otherwise be excluded from social 
screening processes (Staub-Bisang, 2011, 31). 
An example of a strong positive screening strategy is when a fund invests exclusively 
in companies / funds that support a certain issue (e.g. human rights, the environment). 
                                                 
9  Dow Jones Sustainability Index World. 
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Such SRI-thematic investments belong to the category of impact investing, meaning 
that a concrete ecological or social / sustainable gain is pursued without any regard for 
diversification. After a decline in 2009, SRI-thematic investments experienced strong 
growth in Europe resulting in EUR 48 billion in 2011 (Eurosif (ed.), 2012, 13). 
Figure 2.2 Breakdown of European Impact Assets by Category 2012 
Source: Eurosif (ed.), 2012, 23. 
Microfinance investments are one example of impact investment strategies, in Europe 
accounting for the largest part of impact assets with 55% (see Figure 2.2). Other exam-
ples include assets in social businesses, community investments or investments related 
to water, carbon, timber or addressing climate change. One specific example of a SRI-
thematic fund is the Pictet-Water-Fund-P10, which exclusively invests in companies 
that operate in the water sector (Staub-Bisang, 2011, 33).  
2.1.2 BROAD SRI 
Broad screening strategies include on the one hand the exclusion of investments based 
on one or two criteria, and on the other hand the integration of ESG-criteria or en-
gagement of the investor.  
                                                 
10  See http://www.pictetfunds.com. 
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Integration means the direct inclusion of sustainability aspects into an investment poli-
cy, which results in the inseparable combination of financial and ESG factors being as-
sociated with investment decisions. One way to facilitate the integration of ESG criteria 
is subscribing to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI), an approach 
that is mostly used by investors focusing on financial return but aiming to learn about 
ESG criteria by integrating them for risk purposes. 
Engagement means active contact between an investor and the management of the 
company invested in. By means of a usually friendly dialogue or the exercise of voting 
rights at general meetings, a single investor or a group of investors have the opportuni-
ty to voice their concerns about environmental or social shortcomings (Staub-Bisang, 
2011, 39). Examples of active engagement are the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) or 
engagements by the Ethos-Foundation.  
Broad SRI can be criticised on account of the weakness of the terms and conditions that 
are applied (Wittwer, 2011, 17ff.). A fund that excludes companies according to one or 
two criteria (for example gambling and alcohol) could be classified as SRI in the broad 
sense. However, as only one or two criteria are taken into account, there remain many 
possibilities for companies or funds to behave without regard for social responsibility 
in other respects.  
2.2 BENCHMARKING SRI 
2.2.1 BENCHMARKING FINANCIAL RETURN 
Some categories of SRI, especially those based on broad screening strategies, are al-
ready well established and their transparency is comparable with traditional invest-
ments.11 For these investments, existing benchmarks are useful for evaluating and 
comparing the financial returns of different investment possibilities. 
The Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) were launched in 1999 in collaboration be-
tween Dow Jones Indexes and SAM12 (Dow Jones Indexes / SAM, 2011, 2). These in-
dexes track the stock performance of the leading sustainability-driven companies 
worldwide. To date, five different DJS indexes exist, comprising a World Index and 
                                                 
11  See Chapter 4.1. 
12  Investment Boutique in Zurich: http://www.sam-group.com/. 
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four regional ones covering Europe, North America, Asia Pacific and Korea. The in-
dexes follow a best-in-class approach, screening companies according to different sus-
tainability key performance indicators (KPIs) (Dow Jones Indexes / SAM, 2011, 1). Fur-
thermore, sub-indexes exist that apply only parts of the criteria defined. Industry su-
per-sectors are defined and a list of the top companies in each super-sector is pub-
lished annually. SAM’s corporate sustainability score includes environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) dimensions, which are evaluated using an online questionnaire 
filled in by the companies and crosschecked by SAM using documentation provided 
by the companies (Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes / SAM, 2011, 10). This infor-
mation is analysed using SAM’s Sustainability Information Management System 
(SIMS) that uses a pre-defined scoring and weighting structure (Dow Jones Sustaina-
bility Indexes / SAM, 2011, 13). The results obtained identify the top 10 percentages 
among companies from all sectors in terms of sustainability (Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes / SAM, 2011, 17). Foreign currency stock prices are converted into US Dollars 
using the latest available exchange rates (Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes / SAM, 
2011, 22). The DJSI is a free-float market-capitalisation-weighted index. Free-float de-
fines the portion of the total number of shares outstanding less block ownership; where 
block ownership is defined as the sum of all holdings greater than 5% (excluding 
shares held by investment companies and funds) (Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes / 
SAM, 2011, 24). 
The Ethibel Sustainability Index comprises the shares of the top performing companies 
in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). There are two indexes: one account-
ing for European countries alone, while the other takes a global approach (Europe, 
North America and Asia Pacific). The Ethibel Sustainability Index Excellence Europe 
chooses the 200 top companies, starting with A-ratings, B-ratings and finally, C-
ratings.13 The companies included must have a market capitalisation that is greater 
than 0.05% of the index market capitalisation and an adequate balance of industries is 
sought. The Ethibel Sustainability Index Excellence Global requires all included shares 
to have an A or B rating and their free-float market capitalisation must be higher than 
EUR 10 million. Forum ETHIBEL uses research information on data collection, perfor-
                                                 
13  A stands for pioneers, B for best-in-class companies, C for companies with average performance. 
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mance rating and industry benchmarking provided by the European rating agency 
Vigeo (Vigeo (ed.), 2010, 5). Companies are analysed on 38 criteria in the following 
domains: 
 Human Rights 
 Human Resources 
 Environment 
 Business Behaviour 
 Corporate Governance 
 Community Involvement. 
The companies are free-float market capitalisation weighted. Two calculation methods 
exist: one includes multipliers with the aim of equalising the weight of a given sector in 
the total market capitalisation, while the other one does not. 
ING (a global financial institution of Dutch origin) calculates the ING Socially Responsi-
ble Investments Index based on the performance of 50 socially responsible stocks. ING 
selects the stocks based on their potential to outperform a global universe of socially 
responsible companies (HOLT Crédit Suisse Online, 04.06.2012). 
The approach of the CALVIN (Calvert Social Index) is based on the exclusion of certain 
companies by applying negative screening strategies. The index includes 660 large US-
based companies that follow sustainable and responsible policies (Calvert Online, 
04.06.2012). 
The FTSE4Good Policy Committee manages the FTSE4Good Index by including only 
companies that meet several social responsibility criteria according to a comprehensive 
ESG-rating methodology. The FTSE4Good Index is weighted using the free-float capi-
talisation of the stocks. The largest companies are included in the index first, and a li-
quidity rule ensures that each company has a certain minimum percentage turnover 
from its free-float adjusted shares (FTSE Online, 29.05.2012). 
The service provider MSCI is in charge of several different indexes that are grouped 
into the following categories: best-in-class, value-based, universal owner, environmen-
tal and custom indexes (MSCI Online, 29.05.2012). The indexes are based on 20 years of 
work by the research company KLD, which became part of MSCI in 2010. The often-
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cited Domini 400 Social Index is also based on work by former KLD Research & Analyt-
ics and has now been transferred into the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index. 
Figure 2.3 Overview on Socially Responsible Indexes 
Indexes Screening Strategy ESG Data used 
DJSI Best-in-Class SAM’s Corporate  Sustainability Score 
Ethibel Sustainability Positive Screening Vigeo 
ING Socially Responsible Positive Screening ING 
Calvert Social Negative Screening Calvert Social Research  Department 
FTSE4Good Positive Screening FTSE4Good Policy  Committee  
MSCI 
Best-in-Class/Value 
Based/Universal Own-
er/Environmental and Custom 
Index 
KLD/MSCI 
Source: own research. 
To summarise, the indexes mentioned represent the most important ones in the indus-
try, but do not include any microfinance investments. Rather they include regular 
companies, excluding some due to insufficient ESG valuation. The indexes are not 
comparable regarding the criteria for social responsibility as the screening strategy and 
the measurement approach is not standardised. The mentioned companies use differ-
ent scores and databases as well as diverse criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of cer-
tain securities (see Figure 2.3). Therefore, the financial index returns are not necessarily 
comparable in terms of direct benchmarking. 
Furthermore, none of these indexes specifically accounts for social performance 
measures. While the eligibility criteria are based on social factors, once a company is 
included in the index, financial performance is the only attribute that is measured.  
2.2.2 BENCHMARKING SOCIAL RETURN 
The measurement and disclosure of social or sustainability components of an invest-
ment can be applied using various different methodologies. For funds, for example, 
ESG criteria are evaluated, allowing the investor to compare different investment op-
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tions from a sustainability perspective. The Zürcher Kantonalbank (ZKB) has devised a 
classification methodology to value the sustainability component of investments, 
awarding grades between A (highest score) and G (lowest score). A single criterion is 
defined per dimension: 
 Environment: CO2-emissions in relation to total revenue 
 Social: indicator for reputation risk 
 Corporate Governance: corporate governance rating. 
This approach does not result in a quantitative measure; each potential investment is 
marked with a colour from red (low score) to green (high score), resulting in an ordinal 
scale and therefore not allowing the calculation of an index. Several companies special-
ise in analysing investments according to ESG criteria and classifying them (e.g. oekom 
research AG / INrate AG), enabling investors to compare potential investment possi-
bilities. The German stock exchange (www.boerse-frankfurt.de) provides sustainability 
information online in a numerical format allowing the asset universe to be scanned for 
investment opportunities according to ESG criteria (Deutsche Börse Online, 29.05.2012). 
The possibility exists, therefore, to create an index representing sustainability of com-
panies by combining these methodologies in equal or weighted proportions. 
Summing up, to date no index exists that combines financial and social factors of so-
cially responsible investments. Furthermore, existing SRI indexes do not include micro-
finance investments and are therefore not meaningful for benchmarking purposes re-
lated to microfinance. 
2.3 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SRI 
Evidence shows that the value of professionally administered socially responsible in-
vestments in the US rose more than 380% over a fifteen-year period (1995-2010) (SIF 
Foundation (ed.), 2010a; Schueth, 2003, 189); in Europe the compounded annual growth 
rate reached 27.3% between 2003 and 2006 (Dieckmann, 2007, 3). Eurosif found that 
total SRI assets under management in Europe had reached EUR 5 trillion as of Decem-
ber 2009 (Eurosif (ed.), 2010, 11), whereas by the same time, the value approached USD 
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3 trillion in the US (SIF Foundation (ed.), 2010a).14 In Switzerland, the sum of sustaina-
ble funds, mandates and other financial products rose from EUR 23.0 billion in 2009 to 
EUR 33.6 billion in 2010. One possible explanation for the tremendous growth rates is 
the changes in regulation regarding the disclosure of information on ESG-factors by 
pension funds and regulated companies (especially in Europe) (Renneboog et al., 2008, 
1730). Interestingly, the crisis in 2008 may have had a positive impact on the sector as 
investors became aware of the importance of integrating ESG-criteria to downsize risk 
(Eurosif (ed.), 2010, 7, SIF Foundation (ed.), 2010a). However, sustainable investment 
market volume in funds and structured products decreased in Switzerland in 2011 
(Knoepfel / Imbert, 2012, 8). 
SRI is still not common among retail investors (Eurosif (ed.), 2012, 26). Possible reasons 
include the lack of specific information and communication that is needed, and cus-
tomer service representatives in banks who are not used to providing SRI advice. With-
in the European Union, institutional investors are currently well ahead of retail inves-
tors with a 94% share of all investments in SRI (Eurosif (ed.), 2012, 25). In Switzerland 
institutional investors account for a 96% share of SRI investments, and private inves-
tors mostly belong to the category of high net worth individuals (HNWIs15). The most 
popular strategy for sustainable investment by financial service providers in Switzer-
land is norms or value based exclusion (64.9%), followed by best-in-class (55.3%), and 
thematic funds (39.4%)16 (Dittrich et al., 2011, 33 ff.). 
SRI is a broad term that is applied to different approaches by investment managers. 
Particularly since the implementation of the United Nations Principles of Responsible 
Investment, some funds are labelled as SRI when they include investments in compa-
nies that manage certain risks in more efficient ways (resources, renewable energy etc.). 
Experts usually differentiate between funds pursuing a risk-strategy and funds follow-
ing an opportunity path. The first of these invest in companies that handle certain risks 
in an optimised way (for example risks related to water); the latter, however, deliber-
                                                 
14  Because the size of the SRI market is larger in Europe, the focus of this Chapter is on the situation in 
Europe. 
15  HNWI are defined, according to a study by Capgemini & Merrill Lynch, as private investors with 
available assets of more than USD 1 million (Capgemini/Merrill Lynch (ed.), 2011, 4). 
16  These percentage numbers do not sum to 100 as some financial service providers exhibit more than 
one screening strategy at the same time. 
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ately invest only in companies that act within the particular sector (so-called impact 
investments; for example, companies providing solutions to solve the water problem). 
Some asset managers, including Bank Sarasin & Cie. and Vontobel Group, even claim 
that in the future, all investments proposed to clients will be in some way sustainable. 
These asset managers describe the sustainability component as being comparable to the 
quality of management. This would imply that the addition of a sustainability con-
straint to an investment universe would definitely result in optimised portfolios by 
considering only companies with good management quality.17  
The next chapters will go on to discuss possible methods for benchmarking invest-
ments in microfinance, based on the analysis of the more established SRI asset class. 
However, investments in microfinance as part of SRI are somewhat different from tra-
ditional SRI investments (see Chapter 4.4). It is therefore reasonable to assume that SRI 
indexes will not be more suitable for benchmarking of microfinance investments than 
convenient indexes are.  
                                                 
17  According to experts’ statements at the “Friends of Funds” panel in Zurich on Dec. 13, 2011. 
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3. FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROFINANCE 
3.1 HISTORY OF ORIGIN 
Early examples of approaches to facilitate people’s access to financial markets include 
the German cooperative banking system in the 19th century, which comprised two sets 
of institutions: one associated with Schulze-Delitzsch and the other with Friedrich Raif-
feisen (Ghatak / Guinnane, 1999, 196; Guinnane, 2011, 80). Another example is the Irish 
loan funds, which were granted to around 20% of all Irish households in the mid-
nineteenth century (Hollis / Sweetman, 1996, 3). 
The roots of microfinance go back to about 1976, when Mohammed Yunus started his 
first projects, which resulted in the foundation of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh a few 
years later (1983) (Yunus, 2003; Armendáriz / Morduch, 2010, 12; Grameen Foundation 
Online, 16.05.2012). His idea was to give poor entrepreneurs (especially women), with 
no access to the financial system, a chance to facilitate their business ideas, providing a 
powerful tool for financial inclusion and an effective trigger for many regions to help 
overcome poverty (Yunus, 2007). Among other awards, Muhammad Yunus and the 
Grameen Bank were granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for their pioneering work in 
fighting global poverty through access to financial services (Grameen Foundation 
Online, 12.09.2011). At around the same time (circa 1980), ACCION International start-
ed to develop similar microcredit models in Latin America (ACCION Online, 
16.5.2012).  
The basic concept of microcredits is to provide entrepreneurs in developing and emerg-
ing markets with business loans without requiring standard collateral (Morduch, 1999). 
Instead, institutions often use dynamic incentives, regular repayment schedules18 and 
collateral substitutes to guarantee high repayment rates (Morduch, 1999, 1579). In 
many countries less than 15% of the population have access to a formal financial insti-
tution where, for example, they can open a deposit account (see Figure 3.1). The tradi-
tional microfinance regions emerged as a direct response to this situation. Often the 
following regions are differentiated (according to the definition by the World Bank): 
                                                 
18  Unlike traditional loans, repayment of microfinance credits usually starts a few weeks after dis-
bursement in weekly collections (Morduch, 1999, 1584). 
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Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) or Africa19, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia 
(SA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and Northern America & Others (NA&Other). 
Figure 3.1 Financial Access around the World: Percentage of the Population 
Having an Account at a Formal Financial Institution (2012) 
 
Source: Demirguc-Kunt / Klapper 2012. 
The United Nations (UN) declared 2005 as international year of microcredit, which 
helped microfinance to become a globally respected topic in both its science and prac-
tice.20  Microfinance can be described as the support of low-income individuals through 
the provision of access to financial services. The general public’s awareness of micro-
finance is typically limited to the issuing of microcredits by microfinance institutions in 
developing countries. However, MFI customers are also often offered savings possibili-
ties, micro-insurance and pension solutions (Armendáriz / Morduch, 2010, 169). Be-
sides financial intermediation, microfinance institutions often also provide their cus-
tomers with so-called social intermediation, such as training in financial literacy and 
management competences. This means that microfinance goes beyond banking by rep-
resenting a development tool (Ledgerwood, 1999, 1). 
                                                 
19  Within this paper, whenever possible Africa is used as term and stands for both SSA and Africa. 
20  http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org. 
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This research focuses on microcredits rather than on other services provided by MFIs, 
because it is assumed that loans are the part of the MFI’s activities influencing their 
earnings most and therefore of particular interest to investors. 
3.2 LOAN MARKET OVERVIEW 
Microloans were originally business loans made with the intention to support and ad-
vance business ideas or income-generation in a broader sense. However, in recent 
years, a trend towards the issuing of consumer credits has been observed (responsAbil-
ity (ed.), 2008a, 1). The distinction between the two forms of credit is important, as the 
traditional business loan is used for productive purposes, whereas consumer loans are 
not. It is therefore important to ensure that credit analysis procedures and product 
characteristics match (responsAbility, 2012, 2). Recently the issuance of loans for small 
and medium entities (SMEs) has become more popular for MFIs (Symbiotics (ed.), 
2012a, 14). 
Stakeholders of the microcredit market can roughly be divided into several main 
groups (see Figure 3.2) (Dreher et al., 2010, 30; Goodman, 2007). Microfinance custom-
ers and microfinance institutions are present in developing countries. Besides accepting 
deposits, MFIs ask for credit either within local markets or with international funders 
to finance loans requested by clients. Because the resources of local funders such as de-
velopment financial institutions (DFIs) and governments are limited, access to interna-
tional financial markets is important and is provided by microfinance investment vehi-
cles. However, the proportion of MFIs that are refinanced by international investors is 
small. According to one estimate, it amounts to approximately 25% (Becker, 2010, 55). 
Access to capital is a challenge for MFIs as traditional banks hesitate to serve these 
markets, mostly due to a lack of efficiency and profitability (Symbiotics (ed.), 2012a, 
31). Nevertheless, some MFIs succeed to refinance the loans only by accepting savings 
(e.g. the Grameen Bank in 2012). This thesis focuses on international investors in micro-
finance rather than considering other sources such as savings, local funders or gov-
ernments. 
Microfinance, as a relatively new market, relies on so-called service providers. Market 
participants gather information from third parties such as data and information pro-
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viders (e.g. MIX, Symbiotics, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and Mi-
croRate) and traditional rating agencies (e.g. Fitch). Furthermore, numerous special 
service providers support MFIs with technical assistance.21 
Figure 3.2 Market Overview 
 
Source: own research, according to Goodman, 2007. 
A description of the processes and the relationships between the stakeholders helps to 
understand the microfinance market.  
The entrepreneurs usually live in developing countries and have a business idea or 
seek support for an existing business. MFIs use different approaches to lend money to 
them (Cull et al., 2007, F115): 
 solidarity or group lending techniques: a whole self-defined group is responsi-
ble for the repayment or administration of the loans 
 village banking: for larger groups but similar to group lending 
 individual-based lending: involving a standard bilateral relationship between 
the institution and the customer. 
Lending techniques impact the repayment behaviour of customers. Group lending in 
particular has many advantages, such as for example, a reduction in information prob-
                                                 
21  Some examples: Credit Suisse (https://www.credit-suisse.com/responsibility/en/initiatives/ 
microfinance/capacity_building_initiative.jsp); Business and Financial Consulting 
(http://bfconsulting.com/); in India: http://www.edarural.com; EIF (www.eif.org); PlaNet Finance 
(http://www.planetfinancegroup.org/); Omtrix Inc (http://www.omtrixinc.com/en/omtrix.html). 
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lems.22 Traditionally, repayment rates have been extremely high in microfinance, in 
almost all cases above 95% (Morduch, 1999, 1571). However, in more recent times a 
slight deterioration in repayment rates has been observed (see Chapter 3.4.2).  
If MFIs demand funding from international investors (represented by MIVs), they are 
usually subject to a long process of due diligence in which investors check their solven-
cy and profitability. In turn, MFIs pay interest rates or dividends to the MIVs, depend-
ing on whether they are following debt or equity investment strategies. The micro-
finance investment market is highly concentrated with 45% of total market assets under 
the management of the five largest MIVs in 2011 (MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 9). 
Figure 3.3 MIVs: Amount Invested by Type of Investor 2011 
 
Source: MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 11. 
The financiers of MIVs can be classified into public and private investors (private insti-
tutions23 and private individuals (retail customers or HNWIs)) (Goodman, 2007, 24). In 
                                                 
22  Possible examples of information problems are adverse selection or moral hazard. Group lending 
techniques try to overcome problems of adverse selection by using local information networks to re-
ceive information on borrowers (see Ghatak, Guinnane, 1999, 201 and Morduch, 1999, 1580). Issues 
related to moral hazard are addressed within joint-liability techniques through peer monitoring. 
23  Such as pension funds, insurance companies or other large-scale companies. 
43%
29%
12%
3%
8%
Private Institutional
Public
Private Individuals
Not-for-Profit
Fund of Funds
26 3. Fundamentals of Microfinance 
2011, private institutional investors represented the largest share (42%) according to 
the amount invested, followed by public investors. (29%) Nevertheless, the fraction of 
private retail investors in microfinance (12%) is larger than with respect to other SRI 
instruments (as seen in Chapter 2.3). Not-for-profit investors are reported in the survey 
conducted by MicroRate in 2012 with a share of 3% and fund of funds with 8% (see 
Figure 3.3). 
Incentives for investing in microfinance include the following (among others):  
 higher and / or more stable financial returns 
 diversification within existing portfolios 
 double bottom line: financial and social return (De Sousa-Shields, 2007, 91). 
Several papers analyse the possible diversification effect of adding microfinance to an 
existing portfolio and find supporting evidence (Dreher et al., 2010, 52; Janda / 
Svárovská, 2009, 1; Galema et al., 2011, 514; Krauss / Walter, 2008, 24; Oehri / Schäfer, 
2011, 97 ff.). Oehri and Schäfer show that adding a microfinance investment fund (Dex-
ia Micro-Credit Fund) to an existing portfolio by substituting it for stock- and money 
market instruments can increase portfolio returns. Furthermore, including an MFIF 
could result in risk reduction for the overall portfolio (Oehri / Schäfer, 2011, 104 ff.). 
Diversification effects of microfinance directly relate to the characteristics of alternative 
asset classes. Other alternative asset classes (e.g. private equity or real estate) are also 
interesting in terms of diversification (Ibbotson (ed.), 2007, 5; Fugazza et al., 2009, 23).  
The different incentives reflect the diverse types of investors. For example, institutional 
investors typically use microfinance for diversification effects, as part of a bigger port-
folio. Another incentive for institutions is their concern to demonstrate social responsi-
bility in order to gain visibility among potential customers or to fulfil the requirements 
of existing stakeholders (Goodman, 2007, 24). On the other hand, private individuals 
might invest in microfinance either for financial returns or to some extent as a socially 
conscious activity. As presented in Chapter 9, MFIFs can deliver considerable financial 
returns, attracting commercial investors as well. This means that a microfinance inves-
tor is not per se a social or responsible investor. A responsible microfinance investor is 
motivated by the intention of contributing to the financial sustainability and capital 
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accumulation of the end clients rather than by personal financial gains (Symbiotics 
(ed.), 2012a, 31). 
Figure 3.4 Geographical Distribution of Microfinance Assets 2008-2010 
 
Source: MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 7;  MicroRate (ed.), 2010, 20. 
Microfinance assets are distributed globally across the following seven regions: Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Northern America and Others (see 
Figure 3.4). In the years 2008 to 2010, Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean accounted for the receipt of the majority of microfinance invest-
ments (38% for ECA in 2010 and 35% for LAC in 2010). The proportion of investments 
in South Asia declined in the years 2009 and 2010 while the proportion of investments 
in East Asia and the Pacific increased in 2010. Middle East and North Africa’s share has 
been growing marginally, while remaining the smallest recipient of all microfinance 
assets (1% in 2010). Africa’s share grew during 2009 and slowed again in 2010. North 
America and Others is not always specified as a microfinance region and has a rather 
small stake of the total market with around 6%. 
35%
43%
4%
10%
2%
5%
1%
35%
37%
7%
9%
6% 6%
0%
38%
35%
8% 7% 6% 5%
1%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
ECA LAC EAP SA NA & Other Africa MENA
2008
2009
2010
28 3. Fundamentals of Microfinance 
3.3 SOCIAL IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE 
With respect to the social performance of microfinance, several aspects can be distin-
guished (see Figure 3.5).24  The first two dimensions address the institution in its intent 
and mission whereas the three subsequent criteria put the focus on the clients. With 
respect to the microfinance institution, its intent, mission and goals and the quality of 
the internal systems and activities are evaluated (e.g. range of products, market re-
search on clients). Several institutions (e.g. social performance task force (SPTF), 
CERISE, M-CRIL and others) have tried to evaluate the social mission of MFIs and 
MIVs qualitatively. The definition of social performance used by the SPTF is the follow-
ing: “the effective translation of an institution’s mission into practice in line with accepted so-
cial values”.25 However, while such assessments of social performance capture its nature 
in detail, they are difficult and time consuming to assess. In collaboration with MIX, 
SPTF developed a standardised set of 11 performance indicators in order to achieve 
comparable results among MFIs (MIX Online, 7.05.2012). The indicators include mis-
sion and social goals, governance, range of products and services among others.  
As a next step, direct outputs are part of the social return. The direct output of micro-
finance activities is measured as outreach in terms of region and type of clients reached 
and lending methodology. The question of the outcome of microfinance then goes one 
step further in asking whether microfinance clients experience social and economic im-
provements. In addition to effects on a personal or institutional level, economic devel-
opment of whole regions is another outcome often associated with microfinance (Rob-
inson, 2001, 264).  In particular, the possibility of savings at local levels might deepen 
financial markets and increase domestic savings. This allows higher gross domestic 
investments, eventually fostering economic growth. 
                                                 
24  If applying this definition according to concrete dimensions, social return in microfinance can clearly 
be differentiated from social return on investment often discussed in the field of SRI. Social return 
components in SRI are more varied and different aspects of social return can have different relation-
ships with and impact on financial factors. Therefore, in some research social return in SRI is mod-
elled stochastically, as it is difficult to measure and might change over time (see Dupré et al., 2004). 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, microfinance is discussed separately from SRI investments when it comes to 
the interaction between financial and social return. 
25  http://sptf.info/how-do-i-start/faqs#1. 
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Figure 3.5 Social Performance Pathway (SPTF) 
 
Source: SPTF, 2009; Sinha, 2006. 
Addressing the causal relationship between microfinance and social or economic im-
provements (if any) leads to the question of impact. To date the social impact of micro-
finance has not been proven. Several institutions, banks, funds and researchers claim 
that microfinance might help to reduce poverty and improve the living standards of 
households and whole villages (Morduch, 1999, 1569; CGAP (ed.), 2005; Khandker, 
2005, 285 for Bangladesh; Islam, 2009). Nevertheless, a direct causal relationship is dif-
ficult to demonstrate in impact studies (Armendáriz / Morduch, 2010, 5; Duvendack et 
al., 2011, 27).26  
Funds in particular present quantitative measures in their social performance reports, 
mostly focusing on the output of microfinance. These include figures such as the per-
centage of female clients, the total number of clients served or average loan sizes, with 
a combination of the measures describing so-called outreach to the poor.27  
In general, two dimensions of outreach to the poor are differentiated: depth and 
breadth or width of outreach. Whilst depth of outreach indicates the extent to which 
service is provided to the poorest of the poor, breadth describes the number and varie-
ty of clients (Conning, 1999, 52; Schreiner, 2002, 595). Assessing outreach by means of 
the number of entrepreneurs served and the mean size of loans distributed is based on 
the premise that the more clients reached and the smaller the amounts of credit given, 
the higher the social contribution of a MFI because it requires greater effort and results 
in less profit (Cull et al., 2007, F131). While depth of outreach is clearly a measure of 
social responsibility, breadth of outreach arguably is not. Although it may be argued 
that serving a larger number of clients is more socially responsible, the counter argu-
ment is that a larger number of clients could be an indication of targeting the better-off 
poor in order to reach economies of scale by serving more clients (Li, 2010, 47). Still, 
                                                 
26  Impact studies try to measure the effect of microfinance directly in the markets by using various qual-
itative or quantitative approaches or (non-) randomised trials. 
27  For more details and an example refer to Chapter 6.2. 
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institutions with wide breadth might target as many poor clients as institutions with 
high levels in depth of outreach, simply because they serve a large number of clients, 
and a fraction of them are very poor (Schreiner, 2002, 596). 
The proportion of female and rural clients is often used as a simple measure of depth of 
outreach as it is assumed that they are likely to be poorer. Furthermore, the average 
size of the loans is used as a measure of the depth of outreach.28 Average loan size is 
difficult to use as a standardised measure because of its dependence on the economic 
situation of a particular region. A better, standardised  measure is the average loan bal-
ance per borrower in relation to the average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, 
but only few funds publish this indicator and its calculation is rather complex, particu-
larly for funds that place investments in many different MFIs and countries.  
Nevertheless, for empirical performance analyses, quantitative figures are necessary 
and to date, no other, more efficient approach exists. Therefore, most research studies 
focus on outreach-numbers when referring to social performance of microfinance. 
                                                 
28  Other proxies would be ethnicity, housing, access to public services (Schreiner, 2002, 594). 
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3.4 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MICROFINANCE 
3.4.1 COMMERCIALISATION OF THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
In 2007 the microfinance investment sector experienced a boom. Despite growing inter-
est, experts assumed a significant demand surplus as, according to statistics, only 3-5% 
of capital needs were expected to be served by respective funds, representing a funding 
gap of approximately USD 250 billion (Dieckmann, 2007, 1; Oehri / Fausch, 2008, 1).29 
Optimistic expectations and prospects for future growth of the microfinance market 
resulted in the so-called “commercialisation of the sector” (Sriram, 2010; Cull et al., 
2009) or “mission drift” of microfinance institutions (Mersland / Strom, 2010). Mission 
drift is said to occur when MFIs increase the average loan sizes provided and therefore 
reach out to a wealthier segment of clients (Armendáriz / Szafarz 2009, 2). In recent 
years, some players entered the market with the single goal of financial gain while ig-
noring social aspects. Certain so-called “new-wave” MFIs abandoned the guidelines of 
funders and sought maximum profits for managers or stakeholders (Bateman / Chang, 
2009, 22). The discussion intensified when some MFIs went public, such as SKS in 2010 
and Compartamos in 2007, realising huge profits for investors while charging annual 
interest rates amounting to 86% on the average loan portfolio (Sriram, 2010, 67; Rosen-
berg, 2007, 3). One way to assess whether mission drift is taking place is to analyse the 
development of the size of loans distributed, as an increase would indicate mission 
drift (lower outreach to the poor) (Mersland / Strom, 2010, 29). However, several pa-
pers find no evidence of mission drift among MFIs (e.g. Mersland / Strom, 2010, 35). 
The comparatively high interest rates charged by MFIs are regularly criticised (Sriram, 
2010; responsAbility (ed.), 2008b, 1). The annual compound interest rates vary accord-
ing to regions and types of the institutions and micro-credits usually have short matur-
ities, not even amounting to one year (Symbiotics (ed.), 2012a, 30). 
                                                 
29  However, the calculation of these market penetration rates can be criticised (for more information on 
penetration rates, see Krauss et al., 2012). 
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Figure 3.6 Microfinance Interest Rates30 
 
Source: own research, based on Becker, 2010, 63. 
Interest rates charged by MFIs are all based on their cost structures. Operating costs are 
high due to the large effort required per borrower for small amounts of credit (see Fig-
ure 3.6). Customers usually live in a widespread area around the region of a particular 
MFI and credit officers like to visit their clients regularly. Apart from operating costs, 
MFIs build provisions to offset risks such as the potential default of clients or currency. 
A further main cost factor is refinancing, either through funds or local capital markets. 
In 2010, MFIs paid average interest rates of around 8.6% to their funders, although the 
figure varies greatly between different types of funders. Evidence shows that in 2010 
the average interest rates charged by funds (9.90%) and financial institutions (9.71%) 
were higher than the rates charged by development financial institutions (8.17%) and 
more especially by governments (6.02%).31 Based on these facts, MFIs lending money 
from MFIFs clearly face difficulties in being profitable32, and in many cases a reduction 
in the interest rates charged to customers is not possible without risking default or re-
                                                 
30  FX risk stands for foreign exchange (FX) risk. 
31  Own analysis using 1,536 MFIs (data from MIX). The difference between the funders is significant 
based on a One-way Anova analysis. 
32  For more details on MFIF’s profitability refer to Chapter 8. 
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quiring subsidies (Morduch, 1999, 1571). In fact, most MFIs charge high interest rates to 
cover their costs rather than to realise profits. Many MFIs would not be able to contin-
ue their business without donations made by social institutions interested in micro-
finance (Hudon / Traca, 2011, 967). However, development finance should be with-
drawn as soon as a MFI is commercially viable and sustainable enough to be financed 
by MIVs (Brugger, 2004, 17). Levels of subsidisation higher than a certain threshold 
have been found to have a negative marginal effect on MFI’s efficiency (Hudon / Tra-
ca, 2011, 971). 
In recent years, MFIs have shown increased motivation to achieve financial sustainabil-
ity. On the one hand, donors and investors have greater interest in self-sufficient insti-
tutions and on the other hand, MFIs aim to survive independently of external subsi-
dies. Traditionally, commercially orientated asset managers outperform socially fo-
cused funds in terms of absolute portfolio size and portfolio growth (Kirchstein / 
Welvers, 2010, 7). As a result, even non-profit organisations begin to indicate financial 
performance as one of their main goals (Quayes, 2011, 3424).  
A decline in interest rates charged by both MFIs and MFIFs may, however, occur in the 
future. The recent trend towards increased competition has led to a “squeezing of the 
margins” (Di Bella, 2011, 15) as many suppliers have offered services in rather saturat-
ed markets as for example in Ecuador or Mexico (CSFI (ed.), 2011, 24). A decline in in-
terest rates was already observed in Bolivia in 2006 as a result of increased competition 
(Rhyne / Otero, 2006, 16). 
3.4.2 CRISIS HITTING THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
Following a phase of optimism in 2007, rising food prices in late 2007 and 2008 led to 
adjustments of growth assumptions. Worldwide food prices increased dramatically 
during this time33, which in turn resulted in lower repayment rates by end-customers 
(Reille et al., 2009, 2). Many microfinance customers were affected by rising food prices, 
not only as customers but also as entrepreneurs, eventually leading to an effect on the 
microfinance industry. Beginning in 2008, the global financial crisis also influenced the 
                                                 
33  In Bosnia & Herzegovina the average annual growth rate of the consumer price index was 3.3% for 
the years 2000 until 2010, in Bolivia 5.4%, in Nicaragua more than 8.8% and in some African countries 
as Congo and Angola even 27% and 37% (The World Bank (ed.), 2012, 274 ff.). 
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microfinance sector. Not only had food prices risen, but the global economy was also 
suffering, which resulted in a slowdown in consumption and a reduction in remittance 
flows into developing countries in the years 2008 and 2009 (Ratha et al., 2008, 7). More-
over, in some countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, Bangladesh and Bosnia & Herze-
govina (BiH), increased competition led to additional challenges (Rhyne / Otero, 2006, 
15). Local lenders have begun to contest the money market by offering competitive 
rates on local currency loans (MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 11). According to the Banana Skins 
report 2011, “competition” is one of the biggest risks perceived by MFIs. It is the fastest 
increasing risk factor from the MFIs’ perspective, climbing from ninth place in 2009 to 
third in 2011 (CSFI (ed.), 2011, 6). In the future, increasing competition could lead to a 
consolidation of the market through strategic alliances and mergers or acquisitions 
(Kirchstein / Welvers, 2010, 36). 
Directly related to increased competition, MFIs are finding it harder to access funding 
by both local and international investors. Moreover, the demand for loans declined in 
some countries, resulting in slower or negative growth of portfolios as the gross loan 
portfolio of MFIs reporting to the MIX shrank between 2008 and 2010 by more than 
40% (own analysis using MIX data).  
Furthermore, the level of indebtedness of clients is an often-discussed topic, as in some 
markets particular customers exhibit more than one loan, including examples of up to 
five loans at the same time in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Maurer / Pytkowska, 2010, 2). 
This causes deterioration in the quality of existing portfolios because higher portfolio at 
risk (PAR) indicators are registered mostly due to cross-indebtedness of clients (Reille 
et al., 2009, 3). The weakening of repayment stability is partly caused by the intensified 
competition leading to cross-indebtedness; by a decline in lending discipline by several 
MFI’s; and furthermore, by local events influencing several regions (Kappel et al., 2011, 
10 ff.). The changing lending behaviour of certain MFIs as well as the expansion of their 
product offerings seem to be reasonable motives (Chen et al., 2010, 10), as besides 
group lending, intensive monitoring of clients used to be an important reason for the 
success of microfinance and high repayment rates (Ghatak / Guinnane, 1999, 196). Due 
to repayment insecurities, credit risk is the biggest risk for MFIs according to the Bana-
na Skins survey 2011 (CSFI (ed.), 2011, 6). Related to these repayment difficulties, in 
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certain regions centralized credit bureaus and debt advisor institutions were created to 
monitor the activities of all financial institutions involved in loan distribution (e.g. Debt 
Advice Centre and Credit Registry in Bosnia & Herzegovina).  
On top of these negative developments, the recent country-specific events in several 
regions such as Bosnia & Herzegovina, India and Nicaragua and especially the related 
media coverage34 has led to a distortion of the public’s perception of the microfinance 
sector (MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 4; Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 17). As an example, some 80 sui-
cides in Andhra Pradesh (India) have been linked to microfinance borrowings and the 
coercive recovery practices of the institutions (BBC News Online, 12.09.2011).  
Recent developments have led to increased awareness in the industry about problems 
and potential for optimisation. In particular, the need for improved transparency when 
assessing the social and financial performance of investments in microfinance has been 
re-emphasised. Moreover, the microfinance sector needs tools to prove and justify its 
social mission (Urgeghe, 2012, 6). The topic is still of global interest on which more and 
more educational institutions, investment advisors and researchers are focussing. 
                                                 
34  See for example Jacquemart, 2011, 35. 
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4. ASSET ALLOCATION FOR SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENTS 
4.1 TYPES OF ASSET CLASSES 
Asset classes group securities with similar return-, risk- and liquidity-profiles (Greer, 
1997, 86). Traditionally, three basic asset classes are defined (see Table 4.1) with cash 
and fixed-income usually determined as the asset classes with the least risk (Spremann, 
2008, 5). However, this definition is challenged by recent developments regarding sov-
ereign bonds. In particular, the downgrading of several countries’ credit ratings has 
changed the perception of risk-free fixed-income investments as the risk attached to 
government bonds has increased. 
Table 4.1 Traditional Types of Asset Class 
Type Description 
Cash Currency and Coins on Hand 
Fixed-Income Bond Issues, Money Market Instruments 
Stocks Variations on Stock Exchange, Value of a Stock Depends on  Future Expectations and Economic Environment 
Source: own research based on Spremann, 2008, 5; Skidmore, 2010, 1. 
Besides the traditional asset classes, alternative asset classes are separated. Meanwhile, 
the definition of alternative assets is ambiguous and may include for example, all asset 
classes that are not “long-only” stocks and bonds, as well as investments following 
novel strategies and investments in special regions (Skidmore, 2010, 1; DWS (ed.), 2011, 
2). Alternative assets include hedge funds, private equity, natural resources and com-
modities, investments in emerging global markets and real estate (Skidmore, 2010, 1). 
DWS Investments distinguishes three categories of alternative investments according 
to the following objectives:  
 provision of absolute return, independent of the broader stock market 
 provision of real return as a protection against rising inflation 
 provision of non-traditional return. 
From an investors’ point of view, alternative assets are especially interesting as com-
ponents of portfolios due to their potential diversification effects. Starting a few years 
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ago, the demand for alternative assets has continued to increase, especially among in-
stitutional investors (Busack / Kaiser, 2006, 5).  
Microfinance belongs to the definition of alternative asset classes (Ernst, 2010, 6) as it 
provides non-traditional returns, largely independent of the broader stock market. 
However, to date microfinance may not meet all the criteria for being classified as an 
independent asset class, even though it shows weak correlation with major as well as 
emerging market equity and bond indexes and domestic GDP (Dreher et al., 2010, 52; 
Janda / Svárovská, 2009, 1; Galema et al., 2011, 514; Krauss / Walter, 2008, 24; Oehri / 
Schäfer, 2011, 97 ff.). Another requirement for meeting the definition “distinctive asset 
class” is the availability of a secondary market to assure liquidity. Microfinance in-
struments come close because of the homogeneity (Krauss / Walter, 2006, 18); howev-
er, illiquidity is an issue because of long lock-in periods defined by funds and the lack 
of a secondary market (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 14). 
4.2 MAGIC SQUARE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS 
Asset allocation involves deciding on the weighting of different components and leads 
to the value-related mixture of the portfolio. Asset allocation processes that focus on 
particular securities are defined as bottom-up while top-down stands for the choice of 
some specific asset classes, from which securities are selected in a second step (Spre-
mann, 2008, 17). After a portfolio is configured, constant management is required, in-
cluding monitoring and occasional modification of the asset composition to ensure 
constant efficiency of the portfolio. The availability of meaningful input parameters is 
important when choosing particular securities for investments. Relevant factors are 
only available on an historic basis, which complicates the valuation and evaluation of 
the securities. Past data are used to calculate future expected values and, especially 
when it comes to the evaluation of young asset classes, analysts face difficulties due to 
the short history. For alternative investment classes, e.g. microfinance, problems are 
even more severe, as funds are not publicly listed and prices are not officially quoted 
or transparent (i.e. no mark-to-market values reflecting current fair market prices 
available) (Sharpe, 1995, 986).  
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One of the reasons investors choose an investment in SRI is the opportunity to achieve 
social return. Aside from adequate liquidity, traditional portfolio allocation involves 
the optimal balance between risk and return (see Chapter 4.3, Elton, 2011, 100) (The 
magic triangle of return, risk and liquidity (Becker, 2010, 5)). When it comes to SRI, so-
cial return is an additional factor in the decision process, resulting in a magic square 
(see Figure 4.1) (Kirchstein / Welvers, 2010, 20). 
Figure 4.1 Incentives to Invest in SRI 
 
Source: own research, based on Spremann, 2008, 2 ff.; Becker, 2010. 
As a proxy for social return, the so-called ESG-criteria are often taken into account as 
outlined in Chapter 2.1.35 The construction of a specific SRI portfolio involves four 
steps starting with the whole investment universe based on a top-down approach (see 
Figure 4.2). Steps 2 and 3 can be exchanged in that the investment universe might be 
filtered by ESG-criteria first or, alternatively, investors might first evaluate the profita-
bility of funds using financial analysis and apply tests on sustainability factors later. 
After financial and social screening, portfolio construction follows. The final portfolio 
must then be monitored regularly to ensure optimal performance.  
Figure 4.2 Asset Allocation Process for SRI 
 
Source: own research, based on CSSP AG (www.cssp-ag.com). 
                                                 
35  For Microfinance, the “S”-component within ESG is particularly fundamental. Governance issues are 
gaining importance (e.g. Lapenu / Pierret, 2006). 
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4.3 FINANCIAL VERSUS SOCIAL PERFORMANCE SRI 
4.3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Comparison of the returns of SRI funds and traditional funds is an important and fre-
quently discussed topic. Many investors continue to assume that investing in SRI leads 
to a lower return than investing in traditional assets does. In order to elaborate the rela-
tionship between social and financial performance of SRI, a few theoretical considera-
tions are discussed here. 
As in standard economics, modern portfolio theory assumes that investors are rational 
and self-interested, known as “homo economicus”. This would mean that investors are 
not interested in SRI unless a positive connection between social and financial perfor-
mance is proven. However, evidence of growth in the SRI market shows that investors 
are willing to invest part of their money in SRI funds even if social return is difficult to 
measure and in some cases not directly linked to financial performance. Also theoreti-
cal models offer contradicting views on whether the inclusion of parameters, such as 
for example environmental or social aspects, correlates positively or negatively with 
financial return. 
According to the modern portfolio theory, including sustainability constraints when se-
lecting a portfolio results in limited efficiency. The theory, based on the work of Harry 
M. Markowitz in 1952, is predicated on the premise that investors managing portfolios 
should take account of the risks and returns when choosing investments. For a given 
amount of risk, an investor aims to find the portfolio leading to the highest available 
return. Alternatively, for a given level of return, the aim is to select a combination of 
assets that results in the lowest quantity of risk. The optimal investment portfolio con-
sists of a mixture of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset. This relationship be-
tween risk and return is described by the efficient frontier (see Figure 4.3), which con-
nects the asset of minimum variance to the asset with maximum return. The quadratic 
function describing the efficient frontier represents the investors’ aversion to risk (Bod-
ie et al., 2008, 205). The so-called capital allocation line (CAL) combines the different 
return possibilities with their associated risks (Sharpe et al., 1995, 244). The combina-
tion of the risky asset with the risk-free asset within a portfolio leads to higher returns. 
For the risk-free asset (intercept), the risk (standard deviation) is zero. For higher ex-
4. Asset Allocation for Socially Responsible Investments 43  
 
pected returns, risk increases as well. To find the optimal risky portfolio for a particular 
investor, the tangent of the CAL with respect to the efficient frontier is decisive (Elton 
et al., 2011, 99 ff.). 
Figure 4.3 Efficient Frontier and Capital Allocation Line 
 
Source: Elton et al., 2011, 100. 
If sustainability factors are taken into account, the market portfolio is restricted, result-
ing in a suboptimal diversification of the investor’s portfolio (Dupré et al., 2004). Add-
ing constraints leads to less efficient portfolios under the assumptions of the modern 
portfolio theory (Elton et al., 2011, 106 ff.; Staub-Bisang, 2011, 72; Wittwer, 2011, 37). 
Thus, SRI constraints result in a displacement of the efficient frontier to the southeast of 
the diagram due to the reduced diversification possibilities (Drut, 2010, 143; Brière / 
Szafarz, 2011, 18ff.) The amount of the dislocation depends on the intensity of the con-
straints and the efficiency of the final portfolio is subject to the investors’ risk tolerance 
(Brière / Szafarz, 2011, 20). The modern portfolio theory assumes that all firms or 
funds are homogenous in all but their risk premium and investors are rewarded only 
for bearing systematic risk. Therefore, accounting for SRI constraints is assumed to 
have a negative impact on financial performance (Barnett / Salomon, 2006, 31).  
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Several researchers find single-index models (only focusing on risk and return) insuffi-
cient, as other factors might cause stocks to move together. Therefore, approaches of 
Multi-Factor Models were elaborated controlling for diverse additional aspects (Elton et 
al., 2011, 160 ff.; Sharpe et al., 1995, 294). The aim of the models is to explain all the fac-
tors that jointly influence different securities in order to find the remaining unex-
plained fraction of the return of an individual security (Sharpe et al., 1995, 294). The 
factors included can be based on characteristics explaining the securities or on other 
elements, such as the macroeconomic environment (Sharpe, 1995, 295; Elton / Gruber, 
2011, 19). 
A model often used in analyses related to the performance of SRI investments is the 
Multi-Factor Model introduced by Carhart (1997) which expands the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) by three factors controlling for size, book-to-market and one 
year momentum in stock returns. The first two factors are adopted from Fama and 
French (1993) and the third factor is calculated by subtracting the equal-weighted aver-
age return of companies with the lowest 30 percentage eleven-month returns (lagged 
one month) from the equal-weighted average returns of companies with the highest 30 
percentage eleven-month returns (lagged one month) (Carhart, 1997, 61). The inclusion 
of these additional factors allows the explanation of most of the spread and patterns of 
portfolios (63). In particular size seems to be an important factor to control for when 
assessing performance, as according to Mollet & Ziegler (2012), the average market 
values of SRI companies are larger than the average market values of less sustainable 
firms (19). Nevertheless, multi-factor models are criticised because of the historic focus 
that does not necessarily hold for future development (Elton et al., 2003, 165). Most pa-
pers analysing investments in SRI combine single and multi-factor models for the com-
parison of return measures. 
According to the stakeholder theory on the other hand, the success of a company is sig-
nificantly affected by its sustainable attitude. Freeman and Reed (1983) consider that a 
company is not only responsible to stockholders, but also to further groups, namely the 
other stakeholders. Therefore, decisions made by companies, such as for example the 
implementation of certain policies, should be made including consideration of how the 
relationship with stakeholders would be affected (Freeman / Reed, 1983, 93). These 
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considerations can lead to more efficiency; as for example, fair treatment of employees 
could result in lower human resources costs and lead to higher profitability. Moreover, 
environmentally friendly actions might benefit the share price by preventing confronta-
tion with NGOs (Wittwer, 2011, 37; Freeman / Werhane, 1999, 8). This theory leads to 
the assumption that portfolios including SRI will result in higher returns and growth 
(Ruf et al., 2001, 150).  
4.3.2 CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE 
The selection of SRI investments is based on factors beyond the traditional long- and 
short-term financial goals. Even though the interaction between social and financial 
return is often discussed, few studies have investigated the empirical relationship, and 
the existing studies have come to contradictory results. Most papers so far analyse 
common stock mutual funds or equity investments rather than fixed-income securities 
(Derwall / Koedijk, 2009, 211). Recently, researchers started to focus on fixed-income 
investments and on the relationship between corporate social responsibility and the 
cost of bank debt (e.g. Goss / Roberts, 2011).  
Existing papers addressing the interdependence between social and financial factors in 
SRI use diverse approaches. As funds, indexes or stocks are compared, it is not only the 
analysed units that differ, the applied performance measurement techniques also di-
verge. 
Geczy et al. (2005) construct optimal SRI-portfolios using mutual funds and compare 
them to portfolios that include a broader investment universe. They analyse the differ-
ences between the portfolios based on diverse (theoretically modelled) expectations 
regarding pricing models and management skills of investors. They find that investors 
who rely on individual funds’ track records to predict future performance experience 
higher costs with the SRI constraint than do other investors (e.g. investors who believe 
strictly in the CAPM and not in the importance of management skills). Furthermore, 
they ascertain that the fraction of the portfolio allocated to SRI funds is important, stat-
ing that the cost of the SRI constraint is especially high for investors who allocate their 
entire portfolio to socially responsible mutual funds. The SRI constraint (or the cost of 
SRI) is measured using the certainty-equivalent loss of the investor, meaning the differ-
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ence between the expected return when funds can be chosen from the broad universe 
and the return if selecting among SRI funds (Geczy et al., 2005, 9 ff.). 
Bauer et al. (2005) analyse the differences in risk and return between ethical mutual 
funds and a matched sample of standard mutual funds by calculating equally weighted 
portfolios. Applying a CAPM as well as a Carhart Multi-Factor Model and controlling 
for investment style, they find no significant difference in returns (Bauer et al., 2005, 
1763). In a second step, they focus on indexes and show that in their analysis ethical 
equity indexes are not able to explain ethical mutual fund performance, and standard 
indexes even appear to better capture the performance of ethical funds (Bauer et al., 
2005, 1765)36. 
Statman (2006) compares the performance of the Domini 400 Social (DS 400) Index to 
the S&P 500 by analysing the 12-month moving average of the difference between 
monthly returns. The author finds Jensen’s alpha37 to be higher for the DS 400 index, 
although not at a significant level. He finds a very high correlation between the month-
ly performances of the two indexes (0.983), nevertheless, during many periods of sub-
stantial differences between the returns. The hypothesis that returns of socially respon-
sible companies are equal to those of conventional companies can therefore not be re-
jected based on his data (Statman, 2006, 108). 
Galema et al. (2008) use market-to-book values as well as alphas (excess returns) to re-
late US portfolio returns to different aspects of socially responsible performance. They 
find a negative impact of SRI on market-to-book values and alphas, supporting the 
theory of differences in demand between SRI and non-SRI stock. They create twelve 
SRI portfolios based on six SRI dimensions and calculate monthly excess returns using 
an adjusted version of the Fama & French three-factor model (1993). They find a signif-
icant impact on stock returns caused by lower market-to-book ratios for some catego-
ries of SRI. 
Lee et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between screening intensity and perfor-
mance of SRI funds. Their focus is on abnormal returns (alphas) measured using Jensen 
                                                 
36  Based on this result the authors conclude that using conventional indexes for the calculation of their 
ethical mutual fund variation leads to more meaningful results than using ethical indexes (1765). 
37  See more on Jensen’s alpha in Chapter 6.1.2 (Table 6.2). 
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and Carhart models. The authors consider both return and risk as performance indica-
tors. Regarding unadjusted return, no effect of screening intensity is found, when using 
the Carhart model for (risk adjusted) performance calculation. Instead, a decrease in 
return is observed. Regarding systematic risk (standard deviation of the performance), 
the authors find a curvilinear relationship to screening intensity (meaning that risk first 
decreases with screening intensity and then starts to increase). Nevertheless, Lee et al. 
recommend investors to choose SRI funds that do not screen too intensively. 
Weber et al. (2011) analyse 151 mutual funds that are self-classified as sustainable, envi-
ronmental, ethical or social and which provide monthly performance data between 
2001 and 2009. They find a significantly higher return for the SRI-fund portfolio com-
pared to the MSCI World Index. Moreover, they find a high correlation between the 
SRI-fund portfolio and the MSCI World Index during periods of economic turmoil. 
While all of the above mentioned papers focus on equity mutual funds, Derwall / 
Koedijk (2009) analyse fixed-income (F/I) funds. The authors use a sample of bond and 
balanced (debt/equity) mutual funds labelled as socially responsible by the US Social 
Investment Forum (SIF) and evaluate their performance relative to matched samples of 
conventional fixed-income funds. A four-factor model is applied to estimate fixed-
income fund performance. Evidence is found that socially responsible fixed-income 
funds show a steady performance between 1987 and 2003. They conclude that a portfo-
lio of SRI bond funds earns benchmark-adjusted returns similar to the conventional 
portfolio. Within the direct comparison of the SRI portfolio with the conventional port-
folio, the authors find a significant outperformance by the SRI funds of 1.3% per year. 
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Table 4.2 Overview Research on SRI 
Author(s) and Year Focus Result 
Geczy et al. (2005) Funds Depending on investor’s expectations 
Bauer et al. (2005) Funds / Index No significant difference in return 
Statman (2006) Index High correlation between indexes 
Galema et al. (2008) Stocks 
Impact on stock returns by lowering  
market to book ratio, not by generating 
positive alphas 
Lee et al. (2010) Funds Curvilinear relationship 
Weber et al. (2011) Funds Higher return for SRI portfolios 
Derwall / Koedijk (2009) F/I Funds Similar risk-adjusted performance 
Source: own research. 
4.3.3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
Research results on the impact of the consideration of social responsibility aspects on 
fund, index and stock level performance are not consistent (see Table 4.2). For analyses 
on the fund level, intensity of screening seems to be important. Nevertheless, when 
comparing actively managed funds it is important to keep in mind that it is difficult to 
disentangle the ability of the fund manager from the SRI impact on financial perfor-
mance (Mollet / Ziegler, 2012, 3). 
A study by Mercer (2009) provides an overview of the results of academic research on 
financial and social return. They analyse sixteen studies in 2009 and find ten that show 
evidence of a positive connection between ESG factors and financial performance. Two 
analyses find a negative-neutral link and four others identify a negative link.  
The Globalance Bank (2012) also published a study analysing 76 studies on double bot-
tom line returns. They find that in total 90% of the studies provide evidence of either 
outperformance or at least a market return from SRI investments. The authors then di-
vide the papers according to the analysed unit as they find positive results for analyses 
focusing on companies, but on the portfolio level only 19% of the studies show an out-
performance of SRI. The return of a portfolio very much depends on the portfolio con-
struction and management. Therefore, the authors conclude that it is important to as-
sess portfolio management in detail.  
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Galema et al. (2008) propose a possible explanation for the described puzzle in arguing 
that different aspects of SRI have specific effects on financial performance. The diverse 
directions of the effects could eliminate individual influences when analysing the im-
pact of SRI in an aggregate form. However, in their own study they find little evidence 
for this hypothesis (Galema et al., 2008, 2653). They also find that SRI comes at lower 
book-to-market ratios. Because most studies focus on alphas (excess return) when ana-
lysing the impact of SRI on financial performance, it is possible that they do not find a 
relationship because alpha is influenced controversially. When measuring alphas while 
controlling for risk using the Fama & French models that include an HML factor38, al-
phas cannot capture SRI effects due to lower book-to-market ratios induced by SRI also 
influencing alpha (Galema et al., 2008, 2653). This means that if SRI leads at the same 
time to lower book-to-market ratios (lowering alpha using the Fama & French model 
for the calculation of systematic risk) and to higher return (augmenting excess return / 
alpha), the total effect on alpha is (partly) erased. Therefore, parts of the potential 
trade-off between SRI and traditional investments are captured by the empirical meas-
ure of systematic risk (Galema et al., 2008, 2646). 
Dam (2008) shows the importance of analysing and discussing different financial per-
formance measures separately when testing the influence of social responsibility. He 
considers the effect of social factors on market-to-book ratios, return on assets (ROA) 
and stock market returns separately and finds clear associations between financial re-
turn and social responsibility. Dam finds positive effects on market-to-book ratios and 
ROA, but ambiguous relationships with stock market returns at the aggregate level and 
a negative effect at the industry level. 
Statman/Glushkov (2008) analyse the return of stocks of companies based on their score 
regarding social responsibility using a database by KLD Research and Analysis Inc. 
They find that socially responsible portfolios outperform conventional portfolios by 
using three different models (CAPM, three-factor and four-factor model). Interestingly, 
at the same time they find companies associated with tobacco, alcohol, gambling, fire-
arms, military or nuclear operations to outperform conventional and SRI companies. 
                                                 
38  HML: High minus low book-to-market factor assesses the sensitivity to the return difference of stocks 
with high and low book-to-market ratios. 
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As SRI portfolios often exclude these types of investments, they therefore experience a 
negative impact on their return. The authors argue that these two effects offset each 
other, leading to a zero effect. This finding would confirm and explain existing research 
discovering no difference in return between SRI and conventional portfolios. 
Barnett and Salomon (2006) analyse mutual funds practicing SRI focusing on differences 
between social screening strategies. They use a data set of 61 SRI funds operating be-
tween 1972 and 2000. They find a curvilinear relationship between financial and social 
returns as financial returns decline at first with an increasing number of social screens 
and then recover. The authors therefore conclude that their findings support both the 
stakeholder theory and the modern portfolio theory (Barnett / Salomon, 2006, 31). 
To summarise, a conclusion about the performance of SRI in relation to traditional in-
vestments has not been reached. It is important to clearly define the unit of investment 
that is analysed, as the performance of portfolios depends on other factors, such as the 
quality of portfolio management. Furthermore, different aspects of SRI might have di-
verse effects on return measures and different return measures might in turn not be 
affected in the same way. Therefore, a concluding remark on the performance of SRI 
investments is difficult. However, in sum, research so far shows that SRI does not lead 
to systematic disadvantages when comparing risk-adjusted returns. 
4.4 THE SPECIAL CASE OF MICROFINANCE 
4.4.1 SPECIAL FEATURES OF INVESTMENTS IN MICROFINANCE 
Investments in microfinance differ in many ways from traditional socially responsible 
investments. Comparable with other asset classes, the field of SRI can be differentiated 
into traditional and alternative investment opportunities. Microfinance is part of the 
less conventional, alternative investments within core SRI, which leads to challenges in 
asset management. One way in which alternative asset classes are differentiated from 
traditional asset classes is that they follow unconventional return objectives (see Chap-
ter 4.1). By contrast, a fund that is considered SRI is not necessarily different from a 
traditional fund when broad negative screening strategies are applied, such as invest-
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ing in companies that are not involved in the production of weapons.39 MFIFs are in 
any case different from traditional funds as they explicitly invest large parts of their 
assets in microfinance. Investing all, or at least large shares of the assets, in MFIs com-
plicates the comparison of microfinance with other asset classes regarding risk and re-
turn objectives. As with other thematic funds, MFIFs consist of investments in small 
companies, whereas the MSCI World Index, for example, is composed of 70% large 
companies leading to a different risk profile (Globalance (ed.), 2012, 49). Moreover, 
there is no secondary market for investments in MFIs. In turn, investments placed by 
SRI funds are mostly attributed to companies traded on a regular stock exchange. Once 
a fund suspects that a particular company might underperform, the sale of the shares is 
possible. However, when it comes to MFIs, the sale of shares or the cancellation of a 
loan is only possible if another investor (usually having comparable information on the 
market) is willing to buy the stake or take over the loan. Furthermore, investments in 
microfinance are usually made on a long-term basis, which complicates an early exit.  
Because microfinance is an alternative asset style, its specific characteristics apart from 
social performance may have a diversification effect on an existing portfolio (Staub-
Bisang, 2011, 77). In contrast, traditional SRI funds show no diversification effect com-
pared with conventional mutual funds (Bello, 2005, 51). Microfinance investments are 
best reflected by direct investments in SRI, such as in infrastructure, renewable energy 
or agriculture for example. Direct investment in SRI rather than investments in SRI-
orientated companies results in less correlation with the development of global stock 
markets due to the alternative investment characteristics.  
The distinction between the direct relationship among financial and social return ver-
sus the impact on the portfolio is crucial. Some studies focus on potential diversifica-
tion effects caused by the integration of microfinance vehicles into an existing portfolio, 
while others examine the difference in performance among microfinance investments, 
independent of the portfolio. Researchers focus on differences between microfinance 
investments rather than comparing them with traditional investments, as social return 
is easier to compare across microfinance products. 
                                                 
39  Cortez et al. even find that SRI funds are more sensitive to conventional indexes than to SRI indexes 
and conventional benchmarks show higher explanatory power (Cortez et al., 2009, 579). 
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Two examples of asset classes apart from SRI might reflect the special structure of 
MFIFs: investments in private equity (PE) and in real estate (RE). Funds invested in PE 
or RE are limited to a special market and are thus barely comparable with other asset 
classes. From an asset allocator’s perspective, RE and PE have several similarities (Ib-
botson (ed.), 2007, 6). PE investments focus on companies that are not publicly listed 
(Busack / Kaiser, 2006, 17). Similar to the microfinance market, private equity investors 
often actively support the management of companies in which they invest (technical 
assistance in microfinance). Furthermore, similar to PE and RE, microfinance invest-
ments are rather illiquid alternative investments (Verwilghen, 2006, 453).  
Asset allocation decisions for traditional investments are based on the expected return 
and the standard deviation40 of the whole asset class. For more established asset classes 
investment in a passive representation that mimics the risk and return characteristics 
of the whole asset class is possible (Ibbotson (ed.), 2007, 8). However, similar to PE, this 
is not possible for microfinance. Therefore absolute returns are analysed instead of re-
turns relative to the asset class benchmark. 
Comparable with private MFIFs, non-publicly listed PE or RE funds are only valued on 
a quarterly or monthly basis (Becker, 2010, 77). For these asset classes, listed funds 
show a much higher volatility of returns due to prices that include risks defined by the 
market. Listed PE-indexes might more appropriately capture the volatility of the pri-
vate equity asset class (Ibbotson (ed.), 2007, 4). This means that the volatility of returns 
in the illiquid market of private funds41 is not a good measure of risk (Becker, 2010, 77). 
As risk and return are the two crucial factors when choosing assets and managing 
portfolios, investments in microfinance are currently difficult to include in regular as-
set management processes (Becker, 2010, 77). This again emphasises the importance of 
the calculation of a meaningful index to represent the branch. 
Interestingly, social factors do not play a significant role in the fund manager’s invest-
ment process in microfinance. In contrast, for SRI, the social component is crucial in the 
investment decision as it is the factor that distinguishes SRI from traditional invest-
ments. One impediment to accounting for social factors is the fact that microfinance 
                                                 
40  Standard deviation is a widely accepted measure of risk (Elton et al., 2003, 20). 
41  See also Chapter 5.2.1 for different structures of funds. 
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fund managers believe that microfinance is social “per se”. Other factors are the lack of 
standardisation of measurement tools and the laxity of regulation standards (Urgeghe, 
2012, 18). In microfinance, social return is often perceived as the concrete action of ena-
bling poor people in emerging countries to gain access to financial services (see Chap-
ter 3.3). The social return component is therefore rather standardised and straightfor-
ward. Because of this concrete focus, microfinance is classified as SRI-thematic invest-
ment and therefore belongs to the category of impact investing. This criterion for defin-
ing SRI investments is much stronger than ones that exclude certain topics or focus on 
others. Analyses related to SRI do not usually measure the impact of social return on 
financial return by comparing different SRI indexes, portfolios or funds (with the ex-
ception of Barnet and Salomon (2006)); instead they compare SRI funds to traditional 
investments. The main reason for this is the lack of comparability of the social return of 
different SRI investments. Most studies that find positive relationships between finan-
cial and social return in SRI, focus on positive or negative screening strategies applied 
by funds rather than on impact investments. However, one example of a thematic in-
vestment, the Pictet-Water-Fund-P, outperformed the MSCI World index between 2000 
and 2010 by 36.3% (Staub-Bisang, 2011, 34). 
4.4.2 FINANCIAL VERSUS SOCIAL PERFORMANCE IN MICROFINANCE 
Arguments from the stakeholder theory are difficult to apply to microfinance invest-
ments as their social return component does not necessarily involve a specific sustaina-
bility component, which would be supposed to lead to higher financial return (Staub-
Bisang, 2011, 78). Therefore a special analysis of the interaction between social and fi-
nancial return for microfinance, apart from SRI, is presented here.  
Until now, only few studies provide evidence of the relationship between financial and 
social return. Furthermore, the investor perspective (funds) has so far not been an of-
ten-discussed topic in this context. 
Conning (1999) differentiates between low-end microfinance lending organisations 
(MFOs) serving clients with loans that are on average less than 20% of GNP per capita, 
and high-end MFOs with loans on average exceeding 85% of GNP per capita. The 
MFOs in between the two categories are defined as the broad-end group. The analysis 
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is based on data on 72 organisations. Staff expenses per average loan are reported to be 
more than three times higher than average for low-end MFOs. This means that more 
socially oriented MFIs (measured based on average loan balances) show lower efficien-
cy (measured using staff expenses). He finds that low and broad-end MFOs charge in-
terest rates that are on average around twice as high as those charged by high-end 
MFOs. The reason for the higher interest rates is assumed to be the intention to cover 
the higher costs. Finally, low and broad-end MFOs show lower levels of leverage. 
Paxton (2003) creates a poverty outreach measure that includes depth of outreach and 
scale. Analysing 18 MFIs he finds that banks and credit unions serve a large number of 
clients below the poverty level. Furthermore, she measures a zero or even negative re-
lationship between the reliance on subsidies and depth of outreach, indicating that fi-
nancially self-sufficient MFIs reach out to the largest number of poor people.  
Cull et al. (2007) analyse a database of 124 institutions in 49 developing countries, focus-
ing on trade-offs between outreach to the poor and profitability. The authors find no 
significant relationship between profitability and average loan size in base regressions 
while using financial self-sufficiency as the main measure of profitability and opera-
tional self-sufficiency (OSS) and ROA for robustness checks. They find that larger loans 
imply lower average costs for both individual-based and solidarity-group lenders. Vil-
lage banks are found to face the highest costs and subsidy levels while individual-
based lenders earn the highest profits with lower levels of outreach.  
Quayes (2011) analyses a database comprising information from financial statements as 
of 2006 provided by MIX. The aim of the study is to show empirical evidence that em-
phasis on financial performance of MFIs does not necessarily have a negative impact 
on outreach (Quayes, 2011, 3425). The author uses average loan balance divided by 
GNI per capita (ALB_GNI) as the measure of social performance. Financial perfor-
mance is represented by a dummy variable for financial self-sustainability (FSS42). The 
author divides a sample of 702 MFIs based on the MFIs’ disclosure levels in two groups. 
He finds a positive impact of FSS on the depth of outreach (using ALB_GNI) for the 
high-disclosure MFIs. Furthermore, the opposite interaction is measured and it is 
                                                 
42  FSS is here defined as OSS>100% and takes the value 1 if OSS is greater than or equal to 100%, and 0 
otherwise. 
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found that a lower average loan balance per borrower increases the probability of 
reaching financial self-sustainability for high-disclosure MFIs within a logit model us-
ing FSS as the dependent variable. 
Another study by Hermes et al. (2011) analyses the interaction between efficiency and 
social return, based on data from more than 1,300 MFIs. The authors use stochastic 
frontier analysis to calculate an efficient cost frontier. They measure cost efficiency of 
MFIs in terms of the reduction in costs that could have been achieved if a MFI was 
more efficient in comparison with the efficient frontier. Using this data, the authors 
examine whether there is a trade-off between outreach and efficiency for MFIs. They 
find evidence for a negative relationship between efficiency and depth of outreach 
measured as percentage of female borrowers and average loan balances. 
Using a social performance indicators tool for the measurement of social performance, 
Bédécarrats et al. (2011) analyse the relationship between financial and social return. The 
tool collects data on 70 indicators to measure social performance of MFIs and is based 
on the criteria defined by the Social Performance Task Force.43 The authors find that 
social and financial performance (productivity, portfolio quality and operational ex-
pense ratio) are compatible and can be combined in order to achieve a double bottom 
line return (Bédécarrats et al., 2011, 23). They argue that finding the right mix of social 
performance practices in order to ensure financial sustainability is crucial. For example 
individual targeting (actively selecting clients based on criteria such as poverty level or 
exclusion) leads to higher transaction costs at first. However, the authors reason that 
the right strategy and time can lead to the recovery of efficiency through other ele-
ments of social and responsible performance as the right mix is important (Bédécarrats 
et al., 2011, 23). 
To conclude, findings on the interaction between financial and social return do not 
yield consistent evidence (see Table 4.3). Researchers find that more socially orientated 
procedures incur higher costs (Conning, 1999; Paxton, 2003; Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et 
al., 2011). However, except for Quayes (2011), most studies find no significant impact 
on return measures (ROA / OSS). According to Conning (1999), more socially orientat-
ed MFIs charge higher interest rates.  
                                                 
43  Tool is available on http://www.cerise-microfinance.org (CERISE (ed.), 2009). 
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The second part of this paper therefore aims to close the gap by focusing on portfolio 
yield in addition to efficiency and return measures. 
Table 4.3 Overview Research on Microfinance 
Author(s) and Year Social Return Financial Factors Results 
Conning (1999) ALB_GNI Staff expenses 
Lower ALB_GNI  
higher expenses, higher 
interest rates charged 
Paxton (2003) Outreach measure 
Reliance on  
subsidies 
Financially self-sufficient 
MFIs reach out to the 
largest number of poor 
Cull et al. (2007) ALB OSS, ROA 
Larger loans imply lower 
costs, no significant rela-
tionship with OSS, ROA 
Quayes (2011) ALB_GNI FSS Positive relation between FSS and ALB_GNI 
Hermes (2011) ALB, female Efficiency (total costs) 
Negative relation  
between depth of out-
reach and efficiency 
Bédécarrats et al 
(2011) SPTF factors 
Productivity, portfo-
lio quality, opera-
tional expenses 
Right mix of social per-
formance practices is  
important 
Source: own research. 
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5. MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT FUNDS 
5.1 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT 
FUNDS 
Microfinance as a part of the socially responsible investment sector has experienced 
growth in the number of investment possibilities in recent years. By the end of 2009, 
122 microfinance investment intermediaries (MIIs)44, of which around 73 were active 
microfinance investment vehicles, could be identified, compared with 23 MIIs in 2000 
(CGAP (ed.), 2010b, 7; CGAP (ed.), 2010c, 2). In 2011, seven new MIVs were founded, 
while nine closed their operations (Symbiotics (ed.), 2012b, 8). According to an annual 
survey conducted by MicroRate, a specialist microfinance industry service provider, a 
slowdown in MIV asset growth was observed in 2009 and in 2010 resulting in USD 7 
billion in 2011 (see Figure 5.1) (CGAP (ed.), 2010c, 1; MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 5). The rea-
son for this slowdown is partly due to increased competition in several major countries 
as discussed earlier (see Chapter 3.4). Nevertheless, according to a study conducted by 
CGAP, the top ten MIVs again showed a 7.2-percentage growth in 2011 (CGAP (ed.), 
2012, 1), total microfinance assets grew by 15% in the same year and they are expected 
to grow by another 19% in 2012 (Symbiotics (ed.), 2012b, 7). 
The structure and form of MIVs is constantly changing. For example, the proportion of 
equity investments is growing rapidly and the demand from MFIs for local currency is 
expanding (CGAP (ed.), 2010b, 15; Symbiotics (ed.), 2010, 2; Brugger, 2004, 4).  
Most funds use Luxembourg or Lichtenstein45 as their preferred microfinance fund ju-
risdiction. In Switzerland, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) 
has to date only approved the responsAbility Global Microfinance Fund to be sold 
publicly (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 28). Most funds not being approved by the regulator 
are not allowed to publicly advertise and are therefore limited to restricted groups of 
accredited investors (Lhabitant, 2006, 404). 
                                                 
44  MIIs combine MIVs, holding companies and other MIIs such as cooperative companies, NGOs or 
foundations (CGAP (ed.), 2010a, 37). 
45  Reasons for the choice of Luxembourg / Lichtenstein are the policy to back microfinance and impact 
investments, fast registration process, comparably low fees etc. For more details refer to Symbiotics 
(ed.), 2011, 28. 
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Figure 5.1 Growth in Microfinance Investment Vehicles 
 
Source: CGAP, 2010b, 7; MicroRate, 2012, 4. 
In recent years, MIVs have found it difficult to place their funds as there have been few 
investment opportunities and a lack of regulated MFIs, and this has led to a growing 
liquidity position in their portfolios (MicroRate (ed.), 2010, 3; LUXFLAG (ed.), 2010b, 
16). This excess liquidity on the balance sheets of many MIVs puts pressure on the fi-
nancial returns of the funds. The global financial crisis, which led to a decline in de-
mand for funding by MFIs in late 2009 and early 2010, could be one reason for this de-
velopment. Another explanation for the increasing proportion of the MIV’s liquid as-
sets is that they took a more conservative and defensive position. Recent surveys show 
that investment vehicles have improved the selection procedures for the placement of 
their funding (MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 4).  
MFIs are commonly classified into four different “Tier-Groups” (see Figure 5.2). The 
institutions are grouped according to their financial and operational track record and 
their maturity. So-called Tier 1 MFIs are the best known and most mature MFIs with a 
strong financial and operational track record46. Taking account of all MFIs, approxi-
mately 1% can be classified as being Tier 1 quality, and most of the profit-orientated 
funds aim to invest in these highest quality MFIs. This means that the number of MFIs 
that MIVs find feasible for investing is limited to a few hundred, and these are pursued 
by all MIVs. A recent study shows that in 2009 the top 7 MIVs were financing 574 MFIs, 
of which 85.35% could be classified as Tier 1 (Wiesner / Quien, 2010, 11). Experts cur-
                                                 
46  A precise definition of the “Tiers” is not applied, CGAP uses a classification system that is only based 
on assets: Tier 1: Assets in excess of USD 50 million; Tier 2: Assets of between USD 3 million and USD 
50 million; and Tier 3: Assets less than USD 3 million (Reille et al., 2009, 13). 
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rently express serious concerns about the future of the MIV market due to the limited 
investment universe (Urgeghe, 2012, 5). 
Figure 5.2 Segmentation of Microfinance Institutions47 
 
Source: based on Mehan, 2004, 7. 
Because of the relatively large supply of investment funds available from MFIFs and 
the comparatively low number of profitable (Tier 1) MFIs, a certain bargaining power 
exists for selective MFIs. This may explain the current trend towards granting longer-
term equity and local currency loans by MFIFs. When funded by equity investments or 
loans in local currency, MFIs are able to reduce their risks, especially by shifting the 
currency risk to the investor (Reille / Forster, 2011, 7). Some funds even seek local cur-
rency investments for speculative reasons and for emerging market exposure (Reille / 
Forster, 2011, 7.) 
According to responses collected by MicroRate in their yearly survey on MIVs in 2010, 
factors perceived to hinder growth were government regulation, negative publicity and 
lack of demand from investable MFIs. Meanwhile, a number of official agencies, do-
                                                 
47  Percentages of all MFIs. 
Tier 1 ~ 1%
Tier 2 ~ 9%
Tier 3 and 4 ~ 90%
Mature and best known 
MFIs; strong financial & 
operational track record.
Successful but smaller, younger, 
or less well-known MFIs. 
At or near profitability.
Tier 3: Approaching profitability. Understandable shortcomings due to young 
organisation, lack of capital, weak MIS, or other needs. Nearly all 
NGOs.
Tier 4: Mix of unprofitable MFIs: start-ups, weak institutions or microfinance 
not in focus
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mestic and international banks and international development finance institutions are 
competing to fund lucrative MFI targets (MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 5). This trend forces 
MIVs to concentrate their assets into fewer MFIs, resulting in a decreased number of 
microfinance investments while their assets continue to grow. The most obvious solu-
tion to this development would be the support of smaller Tier 2 or 3 MFIs, leading to 
more investment possibilities for MFIFs and other financial intermediaries. Starting in 
2010, stronger interest in Tier 2 and Tier 3 MFIs is observed (LUXFLAG (ed.), 2010b, 
17). This could be a profitable strategy for both, MFIs and MFIFs, because Tier 2 and 3 
MFIs need funding and support to become the next generation Tier 1 MFIs. Many 
funds and companies are furthermore expanding their supporting activities for MFIs 
by offering technical assistance and capacity building. 
Because MFIFs have varied structures (MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 14), some important crite-
ria for fund classification are discussed in the next section. The aim of this analysis is to 
highlight differences that could influence investment decisions and benchmarking. 
5.2 CRITERIA TO CLASSIFY MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT FUNDS 
5.2.1 STRUCTURE 
Traditionally, two reasons for the use of investment companies (such as funds) rather 
than a direct investment in financial assets can be named: Economies of scale48 and 
professional management (Sharpe et al., 1995, 776). Besides unit investment trusts, 
managed investment companies, such as closed-end and open-end investment compa-
nies, exist (Sharpe et al., 1995, 778). While a unit investment trust owns a fixed set of 
securities for the whole lifetime, managed companies can adjust their portfolios.  The 
focus here is on managed companies to capture the structure of most microfinance 
funds.  
For the purpose of calculating indexes used to benchmark asset classes, the securities 
included need to be comparable in terms of their performance calculation guidelines. 
Managed investment companies describe a board of directors in charge of a portfolio. 
They can have various structures as they might be organised as a legal entity or as a 
                                                 
48  Economies of scale can be realised if the investment company includes diverse securities at lower 
costs (reduced commission). 
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vehicle simply applying a set of legally defined relations between the involved entities, 
such as the custodian and the fund manager (e.g. “Fonds Commun de Placement 
(FCP)” in Luxembourg).49 Examples of legal entities present in Luxembourg include 
Societé d’investissement à capital variable (SICAV), Societé d’investissement à capital 
fixte (SICAF) and Societé d’investissement à capital risque (SICAR). 
In microfinance, most vehicles are organised as legal entities (among the 24 funds la-
belled by Luxflag, 21 funds have a legal status of either SICAV or SICAR (LUXFLAG 
online, 13.11.2012), whereas the responsAbility Global Microfinance Fund for example 
is organised as a FCP. From an investor’s perspective the legal status of a fund is not 
important when it comes to performance as long as the measures are comparable (see 
Chapter 6).50 
Three issues should be considered when comparing a large number of funds (Cesari / 
Panetta, 2002, 101): 
 classification of funds 
 expenses and fees 
 survivorship bias.51 
This section examines the classification of funds, analysing structures and evaluating 
different techniques for building groups. Expenses and fees are outlined within the 
performance analysis in Chapter 6.3.2.  
Microfinance funds52 can generally be described as actively managed vehicles because 
the fund managers dynamically select and manage their portfolio while passively 
managed funds, by contrast, follow an index. However, MFIFs vary greatly in terms of 
their structures, characteristics and portfolios.  
                                                 
49  See http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jlxobs.html. 
50  Nevertheless, tax treatment for different types of investment vehicles differ and might have an impact 
on the investor’s final outcome (Ogier (ed.), 2012). 
51  Survivorship bias, the third issue mentioned by Cesari / Panetta, is not analysed here in detail as in 
the short history of the microfinance asset class, only few fund ceased operations and the ones that 
disappeared are difficult to locate because some of them have not been known before (see Chapter 
9.1). 
52  International investment opportunities in microfinance (MIVs) can be roughly grouped into invest-
ment funds and structured products (Hechler-Fayd’herbe / Lüscher, 2008, 1).52 The focus here is on 
the funds that were in existence at the time of this investigation. 
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MFIFs are often grouped according to their degree of commercialisation, meaning ac-
cording to their objectives regarding financial and social return. Funds that classify 
themselves as either commercial or quasi-commercial target higher financial return com-
pared with non-profit microfinance development funds, which focus on social factors 
(Goodman, 2007, 26-28). The aim of the fund needs to be taken into account when as-
sessing the performance of a MFIF, as development funds cannot be expected to have 
the same financial return as traditional funds. Quasi-commercial funds have clear fi-
nancial objectives and are mostly funded by private donors and development agencies. 
The third category, the development funds, are commonly organised as cooperatives or 
non-profit entities and do not necessarily seek financial profit, but aim to preserve the 
real-valuation adjusted amount of their original capital. Moreover, these funds often 
provide MFIs with technical assistance. Table 5.1 presents an overview of popular ex-
amples of MFIFs within each degree of commercialisation, grouped according to their 
own statements.53  
Table 5.1 Degree of Commercialisation of MFIFs 
Degree of Commercialisation Examples 
Commercial Funds Dexia Microcredit Fund54, Dual Return Fund, 
ASN Novib Fund, responsAbility Global Micro-
finance Fund, Triodos Fair Share Fund, EFSE 
Quasi-commercial Funds Accion Investments in Microfinance, ProFund, 
Africap, IC Asia Women Microfinance Fund, 
LMDF 
Development Funds CreSud, Alterfin, Incofin 
Source: own research, based on Goodman, 2007. 
Traditional funds attracting private and institutional investors provide them with more 
information on financial returns, cost structure and risks than microfinance funds do, 
                                                 
53  Statements on the degree of commercialisation were found on websites or in the factsheets published 
by the particular funds. 
54  The Dexia Microcredit Fund is now called BlueOrchard Microfinance Fund. 
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mostly because of regulatory directions. As commercial investors become more active 
in the microfinance sector, funds need to improve the quality of their reporting. 
The differentiation between public and private funds (or private placement funds) is im-
portant. Public and private funds differ particularly with regard to their fund raising 
strategies. Private funds tend to focus on a smaller group of repeat investors whereas 
public funds are open to a large base of potential investors. Private funds are not sold 
to the general public but are distributed privately to institutional or private investors, 
especially HNWIs. Typically, private funds require high minimum investments (De 
Sousa-Shields, 2007, 88). Private funds do not have to be registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the disclosure of financial information or an invest-
ment prospectus takes place on a voluntary basis. 
In microfinance, only few funds are public and easy accessible to a large range of inves-
tors. Few investment companies currently offer publicly traded funds (see Table 5.2 for 
examples). In contrast with other funds, publicly traded funds operate under strict 
regulatory requirements and the costs to launch and operate a publicly available fund 
represent a challenge (De Sousa-Shields, 2007, 87).  
Table 5.2 Examples of Microfinance Asset Managers (2011) 
Investment Company Domicile Assets in Microfinance 
ACCION USA USD 316 million 
BlueOrchard Finance SA Switzerland USD 777 million 
Development Finance Eq-
uity (DFE) Partners Switzerland USD 34 million 
Developing World Mar-
kets (DWM) USA USD 481 million 
Vision Microfinance Austria n/a 
LLB Fund Services AG Liechtenstein n/a 
responsAbility Social In-
vestments AG Switzerland USD 635 million 
Triodos Bank Netherlands USD 328 million  
Wallberg Invest Luxembourg n/a 
Source: MicroRate (ed.), 2011, 10; www.mixmarket.org; Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 12. 
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These regulatory requirements are possible reasons why MFIFs are not usually public-
ly listed. Requests such as daily valuations and the higher transaction costs constitute 
hurdles for microfinance funds wishing to enter the publicly traded market, as fund 
volumes are still small and costs need to be kept low.  
In general, MFIFs are invested directly (debt or equity) in MFIs. In 2011 the proportion 
of debt clearly dominated amounting to around 82%, with equity at 18% and guaran-
tees in the minority at less than 0.5% (see Figure 5.3) (MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 9). 
Debt funds are the most common investment option for microfinance investors. Debt 
instruments used by investment funds include mostly promissory notes, short paper 
documents or term loan agreements without pledge or collateral provided by the MFI. 
These instruments are not listed but are under custody of the funds’ banking agents 
and are largely under the jurisdiction of Luxembourg or Lichtenstein (see Chapter 5.1). 
Due to limited liquidity, funds book their investments using the amortised cost method 
and accruing interest and possible impairment for the calculation of their net asset val-
ue (NAV) (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 14). Compared with other investment vehicles in mi-
crofinance, debt funds are more transparent, liquid and usually structured as open-end 
(Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 14, 21). 
Figure 5.3 Composition of Microfinance Assets (2008-2011) 
 
Source: MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 9. 
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Guarantees meet the objective of enabling financial access of the MFIs through local 
commercial banks by the provision of insurance contracts, guarantee agreements or 
collateral through deposits. However, the number of MFIFs using guarantees as an in-
strument has declined in recent years despite offering the advantage of avoiding cur-
rency risks (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 15).  
The proportion of equity investments in microfinance has been growing fast in recent 
years (O’Donohoe et al., 2009, 3), amounting to 18% of all microfinance assets in 2011. 
Equity investments are either held by a holding company or by a private equity fund. 
Private equity investment funds are currently not transparent, especially with regard to 
rates of return, as many of them are either still in the investment process and not able 
to calculate returns before closing or they are not willing to disclose performance data 
publicly (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 21). Examples of private equity funds are the BlueOr-
chard Private Equity Fund, Balkan Financial Sector Equity Fund and the Aavishkaar 
Goodwell India Microfinance Development Fund. 
The distinction between different types of funds in terms of private / public and equity 
/ debt is important with respect to total expense ratios (TER). TERs are higher for equi-
ty and private funds than for debt and public funds (GGAP (ed.), 2010b, 30) (see Chap-
ter 6.3.2). 
The above-mentioned possibilities for grouping funds lead to the classification that is 
most often used in the sector, introduced by CGAP (CGAP (ed.), 2010a, 4): 
 Fixed-Income Funds 
 Equity Funds 
 Mixed / Hybrid Funds 
 Public Placement Funds 
 Private Placement Funds 
 Cooperative Companies / Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
 Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs). 
However, this approach to classification tends to reflect the view of investors and does 
not account for the individual characteristics of the funds. 
The differentiation between public and private funds, debt and equity, commercial and 
quasi-commercial or the classification of CGAP according to investment styles is not 
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detailed enough for the present analysis. Furthermore, a clear assignment of the funds 
to these categories is difficult. To capture the individualities of funds influencing 
benchmarks, specific characteristics and the underlying portfolio are addressed in the 
next two subchapters. 
5.2.2 CHARACTERISTICS 
Mutual funds are typically grouped according to their investment objectives and the 
“style” of their managers.55 Classifications of funds are important for investors to better 
estimate the future behaviour of their investments and to provide hints for benchmark-
ing. However, classification based on investment objectives or management styles is 
not the best way to explain potential differences in future returns or the calculation of 
benchmarks. A better way is to compare risk and return characteristics of funds over as 
many years as possible and to build an empirical model to test for characteristics of the 
funds (Brown / Goetzmann, 1997, 374 ff.). However, the history of the microfinance 
sector is too short and some funds do not publish data on returns more than once a 
year. Therefore, some qualitative classification criteria which provide the basis for the 
detailed empirical analysis of MFIF’s characteristics in Chapter 8 are introduced. 
As discussed earlier, not all funds target the same investors; therefore differentiation 
according to permitted investors could be of importance from a benchmarking point of 
view. For special types of investors, such as private individuals for example, an index 
including funds that only admit institutional investors is unlikely to be useful. 
MFIFs differ greatly in their size and age (Derwall / Koedijk, 2009, 215). When compar-
ing their financial performance, these two measures might be important as some newer 
funds may suffer from disadvantages due to their limited experience. Also, as profita-
ble microfinance investments are rather rare and competition for them is keen, early 
movers may have an advantage as they have the opportunity to capture large parts of 
the market. As discussed earlier, the largest ten MFIFs cover considerable parts of the 
whole market (MicroRate (ed.), 2012, 9). The many small MFIFs that exist are therefore 
not comparable with large MFIFs in terms of their market power and diversification 
possibilities. Nevertheless, methods exist to consider differences in size within index 
                                                 
55  Other typical criteria are size and systematic risk (Goldreyer / Diltz, 1999, 25). 
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calculation, as for example the calculation of equally weighted indexes versus asset-
weighted approaches. Furthermore, age differences exist in all branches and other in-
dexes do not account for possible disadvantages by younger funds either. 
Within microfinance, currency is another essential topic because funds place their in-
vestments in many different countries. Funds are invested in either hard or local cur-
rency, and hedging local currency against possible future developments is important. 
To date, there are few hedging approaches that attempt to facilitate the funds’ invest-
ments in local currency (e.g. MFX: Microfinance Currency Risk Solutions56). Most funds 
use these hedging techniques for large parts of their local currency investments; there-
fore currency is not used as a classification criterion in the present approach. 
The countries where investments are made and the diversification between countries 
are criteria that are taken into account for the classification of funds in general (Cesari / 
Panetta, 2002, 102). MFIFs have various possibilities for managing regional risks. One 
approach is the diversification of assets across different MFIs and countries. Therefore, 
the top country and MFI exposure as well as the top five are often taken into account 
(Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 24). With the diversification between countries and MFIs, funds 
are able to manage not only country risks but also the specific default risks of selected 
MFIs, currency risks and liquidity risks. Within this study, similar to other research 
approaches, risk is therefore measured as the concentration of the fund’s microfinance 
assets into countries and MFIs respectively (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 24). 
Furthermore, social return is an important classification criterion, which is elaborated in 
detail under performance analysis (see Chapter 6.2). 
The next section focuses on the underlying portfolio of MFIFs and the two main prop-
erties of MFIs: legal status and regional distribution. Current research is summarised as 
background for the analyses in Chapter 8.2 and 8.3. 
5.2.3 UNDERLYING PORTFOLIO 
Besides differences in their structures and characteristics, MFIFs vary according to their 
underlying portfolio determined by the individual qualities and preferences of fund 
managers.  
                                                 
56  http://www.mfxsolutions.com/. 
68 5. Microfinance Investment Funds 
The legal status of MFIs invested in varies. Banks, credit unions / cooperatives, non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
commonly distinguished.57 The various legal structures of MFIs can have an impact on 
financial and social performance and risk of the fund.  
One factor affecting financial return is the cost function, which can vary between MFIs 
based on their structure, for example due to diverse levels of subsidies which these in-
stitutions receive from outside (Hermes et al., 2011, 11).  
Hassan and Sanchez (2009) analyse MFIs in Latin America, Middle East and North Africa 
and South Asia to find sources of inefficiencies. Technical efficiency is defined as the 
ability of a MFI to maximise output from a given set of inputs. 58 The authors find high-
er levels of technical efficiency in formal MFIs such as banks and credit unions (Hassan 
/ Sanchez, 2009, 1). 
In a mean-variance spanning test59 performed by Galema et al. (2011), banks and rural 
banks are found to be the best performers according to ROA and return on equity 
(ROE) compared with NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions / cooperatives (Galema et al., 
2011, 513).  
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) analyses MFI data between 2001 and 2006 and shows that 
the financial performance of private MFIs (microfinance banks or other non-banking 
financial institutions) is better only when using portfolio quality as performance meas-
ure. Moreover, when analysing social performance, interestingly the author finds that 
for-profit MFIs show higher social performance than not-for-profit MFIs (Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua, 2010, 439 ff.).  
On the other hand, Cull et al. (2009) find that banks give larger loans (160% average 
loan size in relation to income vs. 48% for NGOs60) and serve fewer customers than 
NGOs do. Taking loan size as a proxy for the poverty of customers, banks therefore 
serve fewer poor customers than NGOs do, leading to lower costs, assuming that a 
                                                 
57  e.g. MIX data base. 
58  The authors define the source of inefficiency as purely technical rather than in relation to scale, as-
suming that less efficient MFIs are wasting resources or not producing enough output. 
59  The mean-variance spanning test is a methodology that is used by the authors to analyse if the risk-
return profile changes for investors after adding microfinance to a portfolio (Galema et al., 2011, 509). 
60  160% for banks and 48% for NGOs represent the median in a sample of 315 institutions. 
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large part of the costs for issuing loans is fixed (Cull et al., 2009, 179 ff.). Moreover, 
NGOs serve more female clients than banks do (Cull et al., 2009, 182). 
These results indicate that the legal status of the MFIs is important with regard to their 
performance. Although the variables used and the results of existing research studies 
are ambiguous, fund managers base investment decisions on the legal status of MFIs. 
Funds do not usually provide detailed information on their underlying portfolios, 
mostly because they wish to avoid having other funds competing against their profita-
ble investments. 
Besides the legal status, the regional distribution of microfinance investments is im-
portant for the analysis of MFIFs (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007, 140). Some funds focus 
on one region or country while other funds specialise in diversification across regions.  
In microfinance, regional aspects and diversification matter, as differences in salaries 
and cost of living strongly influence the costs of MFIs and thereby the financial returns.  
Evidence shows that, when focusing on operating expenses in relation to the portfolio, 
South Asian MFIs are most efficient whereas MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America are least efficient (González, 2011, 1; Hassan / Sanchez, 2009, 20). In contrast, 
in a study by Stephens / Tazi (2006) analysing return on assets by region, Latin Ameri-
can and Eastern European and Central Asian MFIs are found to have performed quite 
well, while Southern African and South Asian MFIs scored worse (Stephens / Tazi, 
2006, 25).  
According to Galema et al. (2011), MFIs located in Africa show the lowest values of ROA 
and ROE. Possible reasons are higher costs caused by more expensive infrastructure, 
interest rate ceilings and high inflation (Galema et al., 2011, 512). Caudill et al. (2009) 
find that in 2003 and 2004, MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia showed on aver-
age higher gross portfolio yield and OSS than MFIs from other regions (Caudill et al., 
2009, 655). An analysis of the fraction of the portfolio being at risk (meaning overdue 
more than 30 days, PAR30) finds that South Asia and Africa carry the highest levels of 
credit risk among all regions (Stephens / Tazi, 2006, 28).  
When it comes to social performance, South Asia beats all other regions in the number 
of borrowers and by serving some of the poorest clients in the world when measured 
70 5. Microfinance Investment Funds 
through size of average loan balances compared with GNI per capita (Stephens / Tazi, 
2006, 23; Rhyne / Otero, 2006, 9).  
Regional factors are, of course, influenced by the specific characteristics of countries. 
Three major factors have been found to be important for the development of the micro-
finance industry in a country (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009, 8): 
 the regulatory framework (regulation of microfinance operations, formation and 
operations of regulated and non-regulated MFIs, regulatory and examination 
capacity) 
 the investment climate (political stability, capital market stability, judicial sys-
tem, accounting standards, governance standards and MFI transparency) 
 the institutional development of the microfinance industry (MFI services, credit 
bureaus and level of competition). 
To conclude, differences in performance and risk persist among MFIs according to re-
gions although the characterisation and the extent of the differences have not yet been 
examined in a consistent manner. 
5.3 SUMMARY OF MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT FUND 
CLASSIFICATION 
MFIFs can be classified according to three parameters: structure, characteristics and 
portfolio. This classification approach indicates that despite the small number of funds 
in existence, there are large differences. Taking these different characteristics into ac-
count might be important when comparing and benchmarking MFIFs. Based on the 
survey, the existence of these differences is investigated, and the participating funds 
are characterised in Chapter 8. MFI-level data are taken into account to assess potential 
regional and structural distinctions between MFIFs based on their portfolio. Further-
more, the most important criteria to distinguish MFIFs according to structure, charac-
teristics and portfolio are presented based on the data collected in the survey. 
5.4 EXISTING RESEARCH ON MFIFS 
Literature on MFIFs is rare as most research focuses on MFIs. This section gives a short 
overview of some publications that are relevant to the present investigation. 
CGAP, MicroRate and Symbiotics publish annual reports on the microfinance invest-
ment market including details on the number of vehicles, regional distribution and 
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debt / equity investments as well as investors. Since 2008 these reports have provided 
a comprehensive picture of the market, though it is unfortunate that they are only pub-
lished annually. For most quantitative analyses, yearly figures are not sufficient. In 
2010, CGAP published the Microfinance Investment Vehicles Disclosure Guidelines for 
MIVs reporting to investors (CGAP (ed.), 2010a). The guidelines include information 
on the profiles of MIVs, selected indicators of financial performance and ESG policies. 
Matthäus-Maier and von Pischke (2007) focus on MFIFs in their publication “Micro-
finance Investment Funds”. Two parts are differentiated, one describing the market for 
investments in microfinance and the other risks and governance in microfinance in-
vestments. The book provides a comprehensive picture of the market though it lacks 
detailed empirical analyses. 
Lorenzo (2011) focuses on the performance of large public MIVs. She avoids the diffi-
cult data situation by limiting the research to funds that publish data on Bloomberg. 
This approach, comparing the performance of MFIFs with other investments, while 
interesting and important, could nevertheless lead to a biased picture of the market as 
only the large and most established funds are included. She finds low but positive and 
stable returns (low standard deviation compared to benchmarks61) of the 10 MIVs that 
she analyses. Furthermore, using beta values, she finds a low correlation between MIVs 
and the broader market, indicating the diversification possibilities of microfinance. 
Becker (2010) concentrates on investments in microfinance through MIVs and claims 
that applying a scenario methodology for the integration of the “new” microfinance 
asset class to an existing asset allocation framework is more useful than quantitative 
approaches. Arguments made for the inefficiency of quantitative analyses of the micro-
finance market for asset allocation purposes include the short history, specific valua-
tion concepts, and the absence of a liquid secondary market.  
To date, most studies that focus on MFIFs either include only the few large funds, or 
provide information only on an annual basis, or they are purely qualitative. This over-
view demonstrates again the need for further analysis of MFIFs. The present study at-
tempts to reveal as much information on investments in microfinance as possible.
                                                 
61  MSCI World, DJSI World and JP Morgan EMBI. 
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6. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT OF MICROFINANCE 
INVESTMENT FUNDS 
6.1 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
6.1.1 NET ASSET VALUE 
In microfinance, performance indicators are not standardised. Their calculation is 
therefore not easy and may differ across the fund universe, especially when comparing 
debt and equity funds. Because the fund shares are not publicly traded, no prices are 
available and therefore analyses need to be based on accounting values. Mutual funds 
are traditionally valued using net asset values (NAVs) by subtracting liabilities from 
assets (see Table 6.1 for an example) (Sharpe et al., 1995, 777).  
Table 6.1 Calculation NAV: responsAbility Global Microfinance Fund 31.3.2011 
Assets (USD) 
Investments in securities at market value 407,096,244.65 
Cash at banks 102,715,860.34 
Receivable for securities sold 4,674,947.82 
Income receivable 8,668,039.36 
Prepaid expenses 644,343.25 
Total Assets 523,799,435.42 
Liabilities 
Due to banks 934,664.54 
Provisions for accrued expenses 1,177,753.73 
Other Liabilities 2,740,741.54 
Total Liabilities 4,853,159.81 
Net Assets 518,946,275.61 
Source: responsAbility (2011a). 
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For debt funds, the NAV is influenced by MFIs’ interest payments as well as the com-
position and quality of the portfolio (taking account of new investments, sale of securi-
ties and defaults). In contrast, the performance of equity funds changes depending on 
the valuation of the underlying assets, which is challenging and different from the val-
uation of traditional banks (O’Donohoe et al., 2009, 1). Therefore, a separate analysis of 
equity funds is reasonable and is presented in subchapter 6.1.3. 
The net asset value per share is calculated using the following formula: 
ܰ݁ݐ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݌݁ݎ	݄ܵܽݎ݁
ൌ ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܵ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ൅ ܥܽݏ݄	ܽ݊݀	݋ݐ݄݁ݎ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ െ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܱݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃	݄ܵܽݎ݁ݏ  
6.1.2 OPEN-END FUNDS 
The focus in this Chapter is on open-end funds where the prices paid by investors do 
not reflect supply and demand for the funds’ shares (as for example stock prices do). 
The reason for this difference is that traditional companies offer a limited number of 
shares defined at the initial public offering (IPO) and might release more shares later, 
but often hesitate because of a possible devaluing effect. Open-end funds, on the other 
hand, are able to issue more shares and adapt to the current demand situation, so fund-
share prices cannot be artificially inflated. Funds do not usually trade on open markets; 
instead, fund managers buy and sell the fund shares themselves, or they engage a sales 
force. Funds engaging a sales force are known as load funds as they charge the inves-
tors a percentage commission on the net asset value (Sharpe et al., 1995, 784). NAVs 
therefore reflect the real calculated value of the fund divided by the number of out-
standing shares. In the case of microfinance, most MFIFs restate their net asset value 
quarterly or monthly as MFIs usually pay their interest then. Therefore, most funds 
provide their net asset values on either a monthly or a quarterly basis while some only 
calculate their performance once a year.  
In times of insecurity or fear of crisis funds will build provisions to prepare for poten-
tial defaults by customers (namely MFIs), which will lower the NAV immediately but 
have a cushioning effect once a crisis or downturn appears (see Table 6.1). For example, 
after a recent crisis affecting Bosnia & Herzegovina and Nicaragua, responsAbility 
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built new provisions of USD 3.3 million in 2010, resulting in a total of USD 13.0 million 
(2.5% of the NAV) (responsAbility (ed.), 2011a, 8).62 
Open-end funds usually report returns using the NAV per share. NAV per share is in-
fluenced only by the valuation of the investments whereas the total NAV of an open-
end fund is also influenced by the number of shares outstanding. Open-end funds can 
release new shares if more capital is needed. This increases the assets and therefore the 
NAV by an equal amount so that existing investors are not affected. The price of the 
NAV is adjusted each time new shares are sold, which means that the development of 
the NAV per share exactly reflects the performance of the fund. 
Another important factor when analysing MFIFs is that absolute return figures are typ-
ically used (e.g. ex post alpha), whereas risk-adjusted measures are calculated for more 
developed asset classes. Some widely used performance measures control for risk 
when measuring performance as follows (see Table 6.2). These measures can be ap-
plied for the evaluation of stock returns as well as other securities, such as funds 
(Sharpe, 1966, 119).  
All these single-index models would be appropriate for comparing the risk-adjusted 
returns of microfinance investments once an adequate benchmark is available. The Jen-
sen Alpha would probably be the most significant measure as it captures the extent to 
which a portfolio manager exceeds the performance of a combination of the market 
portfolio and the riskless asset (Elton / Gruber, 2011, 17).  
  
                                                 
62  The responsAbility global microfinance fund started provisioning for potential defaults only in 2009 
(based on the difficult economic and political situation in Nicaragua and Bosnia & Herzegovina), ac-
cording to the annual reports from 2003 up to 2009 no specific provisioning was done before.  
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Table 6.2 Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures 
Name Formula Description 
Ex post Alpha ߙ௉ ൌ arp - arbp The average performance of a mutual fund in comparison to a benchmark 
portfolio can be calculated using the ex 
post alpha, ߙ௉ 
arp: Average return of the portfolio 
arbp: Average return of the benchmark 
portfolio 
Sharpe Ratio 
݄ܵܽݎ݌݁	ܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ ܴ௉ െ ܴிơ௉  
When applying the Sharpe Ratio the 
result is the amount of excess return 
per unit of volatility (total risk). 
RP: Average return on portfolio 
RF: Return of risk-free asset 
ơP: Standard deviation of portfolio P 
Treynor Ratio 
ܶݎ݁ݕ݊݋ݎ	ܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ ܴ௉ െ ܴிߚ௉  
The Treynor Ratio is used to analyse 
excess returns. Excess returns are 
measured against the beta-factor,  
representing the systematic risk. 
RP: Average return on portfolio 
RF: Return of risk-free asset 
βP: Systematic risk 
Jensen Alpha ߙ௉ ൌ 
ሾܴ௉ െ ܴிሿ െ ߚ௉ሾܴெ െ ܴிሿ 
The Jensen Alpha is measured as the 
difference between the realised risk 
premium and the expected risk  
premium. 
A positive alpha stands for superior 
performance, a negative alpha for 
weak performance. 
RP: Return on portfolio 
RF: Return of risk-free asset 
RM: Market return 
βP: Systematic risk 
Source: Sharpe, 1966, 119 ff.; Anderson / Ahmed, 2005, 13 ff.; Cochrane, 2005, 20 ff.; Sharpe et al., 1995, 
798. 
Nevertheless, an appropriate return measurement culture has to be established for 
each new asset class within a process. Similar to the performance assessment of other 
mutual funds, the application of multi-index models will lead to even more meaning-
ful results than the performance measures presented above (Elton / Gruber, 2011, 31). 
For newly established investment possibilities, however, the factors that are important 
for the calculation of risk-adjusted performance measures are unknown and hard to 
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estimate. For example, the determination of the systematic risk of the market (beta val-
ue)63 or the appropriate market return is difficult. Beta values are particularly hard to 
determine, as usually historic peer group betas are calculated. The history of the micro-
finance market is too short, and, due to the small number of comparable funds, the 
number of observations is insufficient to represent the market adequately. This means 
that as with the treatment of other alternative asset classes, fund managers take total 
risk into account rather than analysing risk relative to a benchmark. Traditional asset 
managers do not consider total risk, as they perceive that passive risk is managed by 
the market itself (Jaeger, 2006, 400). Therefore, they value the risk relative to the 
benchmark. The approach of alternative asset managers is more conservative regard-
ing risk. Each fund has a high amount of specific investment risk (idiosyncratic risk). 
This means that the average standard deviation of a single MFIF should be higher than 
the standard deviation of the whole microfinance asset class.64 
6.1.3 EQUITY FUNDS 
Equity MFIFs need to value their investments in MFIs and in other funds. Therefore, 
information provided by MFIs is crucial to evaluate investments as well as to choose 
potential further investments. Valuation is the most important source of information 
on MFIs, because other KPIs, such as ROE and ROA, could mislead by simply reflect-
ing a small NAV base of a particular MFI. However, the valuation of MFIs is very diffi-
cult and to date, no standardised process exists (O’Brien, 2006, 279ff.). 
In order to value the return and risk expectations of MFIs, profound knowledge of the 
market is necessary. Moreover, different valuation methodologies can be applied. Most 
MFIs are not listed on a public stock exchange and the lack of availability of readily 
identifiable share prices usually leads to lower values (O’Brien, 2006, 278). The possible 
valuation approaches are the following (O’Brien, 2006, 278; O’Donohoe et al., 2009, 14):  
 net asset values 
 discounted cash flow (DCF) 
 market prices 
                                                 
63  The beta value represents the systematic risk inherent in the sensitivity of prices to changes in the 
market. 
64  A similar situation to private equity funds (Ibbotson, 2007, 8). 
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 multiples of earnings or dividends paid 
 multiples of net assets or book value. 
All of these approaches have inefficiencies when it comes to microfinance. NAVs pro-
vide a historical analysis of an investment and do not reflect current market conditions, 
or potential prospective development. Discounted cash flow, which is a very popular 
valuation method, implies the identification of free cash flows as well as the determi-
nation of a suitable cost of equity, involving the definition of adequate growth rates, 
risk factors and beta values, which is difficult in this sector (see 6.1.2 for the similar 
situation at the fund level).  
Market prices are, of course, a useful measurement for performance, although only few 
MFIs are publicly listed.65 The use of financial multiples of earnings, dividends or net 
assets is complex in the field of microfinance due to the small number of transactions 
observed (Reddy, 2007, 11). In addition, after the specification of a value, an illiquidity 
discount is necessary to account for the lack of a liquid secondary market (O’Donohoe 
et al., 2009, 16).  
A special valuation approach is justified because MFIs differ from traditional banks 
and companies. In particular, their objective to deliver both a social and a financial re-
turn should be acknowledged. Moreover, they are expected to offer better asset quali-
ty, higher net interest margins and higher operating expenses than banks in emerging 
markets (O’Donohoe et al., 2009, 33). 
Therefore, in the field of microfinance it makes sense to use several valuation ap-
proaches in parallel to ensure a reliable result. For example, book values can be used to 
validate calculated terminal values (used in the DCF approach) (O’Brien, 2006, 283). 
6.1.4 CLOSED-END FUNDS 
When it comes to the assessment of fund performance, another important distinction is 
open-end vs. closed-end (SICAF) structure. In contrast with open-end funds, closed-
end funds have a limited number of shares available for trade on a secondary market 
(Lückoff, 2011, 67). The price of a closed-end fund share usually fluctuates around its 
NAV, according to supply and demand. Closed-end funds often trade at a discount to 
                                                 
65  e.g. SKS Microfinance, Compartamos. 
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their NAV (Lückoff, 2011, 68; Sharpe et al., 1995, 814)66 and therefore, their NAVs do 
not necessarily represent their performance as prices can vary from NAV development. 
In order to calculate the performance of the fund based on its NAV, it is necessary to 
make a distinction between capital contributions by shareholders and realised and un-
realised gains on the portfolio. 
Due to the lack of a secondary market in microfinance, closed-end funds are rather il-
liquid vehicles and the investment style is buy-and-hold (UBS (ed.), 2008, 5). However, 
when comparing publicly traded closed-end funds to open-end funds the possibility of 
the closed-end funds being traded on a secondary market needs to be considered. Sec-
ondary market trading results in a return regardless of the development of the NAV as 
performance is then calculated based on share prices instead.  
For the index calculation in this paper I only include closed-end funds that provide 
performance information representing the development of their portfolio (NAV). 
Several microfinance funds that are closed to new investors are not to be confused with 
closed-end funds. Open-end funds face a liquidity risk as investors can channel more 
money into the fund; the resulting liquidity service is costly for the fund (Lückoff, 2011, 
52). When there is excess liquidity that cannot be placed, funds try to overcome this 
risk by temporarily or permanently closing to new investors.67 
6.2 SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
In order to assess social performance, a MFIF usually takes the social performance of 
the underlying portfolio into account. The funds evaluate the outreach (see Chapter 
3.3) of the MFIs, in which they are invested, and calculate their own outreach based on 
the proportion of their assets within each MFI.  
Even though the results are quantitative values, they are typically displayed only with-
in a table in the social performance report (see Figure 6.1). Usually the information on 
outreach is published as the total number of borrowers and savers, average outstand-
ing credits and savings, estimated number of family members served and percentage of 
                                                 
66  This discount of closed-end mutual funds has been subject to many research studies, see for example 
Dimson / Minio-Kozerski, 1999. 
67  For example responsAbility momentarily closed the Global Microfinance Fund to new investors in 
2010 (responsAbility (ed.), 2010). 
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rural / female clients. To date, there is no index or similar figure representing the com-
bined social performance of the funds. Moreover, as seen in the example of re-
sponsAbility (see Figure 6.1), some funds report total figures for all MFIs. This means 
that for the example of responsAbility, the table includes all MFIs that the fund is in-
vested in, not accounting for the percentage of responsAbility’s investment. If another 
fund serves the same MFI, both MFIFs include the same outreach data in their social 
performance reports. As some funds only refer to the percentage share of their invest-
ments in a particular MFI, different funds’ outreach measures are difficult to compare. 
Figure 6.1 Social Performance Report by ResponsAbility 
 
Source: responsAbility (2011a). 
Three other criteria can be taken into account to better evaluate the social mission of a 
MFIF. While some funds only state financial information, others provide their investors 
with detailed information on ESG factors. In addition, two sets of principles have been 
adopted and are implemented by several funds: 
 Client Protection Principles (smart campaign)68 
 UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI).69 
Considering the willingness to sign such principles, helps to rate the social awareness 
of MFIFs explicitly, while outreach measures explain the social attitude of the underly-
ing MFIs. The outreach measure is useful, as MFIFs choose their investments by analys-
                                                 
68  See Table 12.1 in the Appendix. 
69  See Table 12.2 in the Appendix. In 2012, the PIIF (Principles for Investors in Inclusive Finance) 
emerged and as of April 2012, over 1,000 investment institutions became signatories 
(www.unpri.org). Nevertheless, at the time the survey was distributed, the UNPRI were applied by 
the MFIFs.  
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ing social factors, but applying the criteria defined above, helps to underline their 
strategy further.  
It is important for MFIFs to make their social involvement clear, particularly since the 
recent microfinance crisis, which unsettled investors (Urgeghe, 2011, 3). On the subject 
of the presentation of their social approach, microfinance funds can learn from the ex-
perience of the broader socially responsible investment sector (Urgeghe, 2011, 3).  
To date, still most social performance tools focus on MFIs rather than MFIFs, and there 
is a trend towards the elaboration of in-house methodologies by funds to assess social 
performance (Choi, 2010, 7). One example of a fund-specific social performance report-
ing system is the so-called “rADER (responsAbility Development Effectiveness Rat-
ing)” by responsAbility, which covers the following five dimensions of the MFIs which 
they have invested in (responsAbility (ed.), 2011b, 11): 
 mission and objectives of MFIs 
 products and services 
 operational systems and processes 
 access to financial services 
 contribution to local economic development. 
While these measurements are interesting for the special case of responsAbility, a com-
parison to other MFIFs is not possible.  
To summarise, to date no standardised approach exists to collect, calculate and disclose 
social performance measures. Moreover, no rating agency combines both financial and 
social return in their calculation methodology (Urgeghe, 2011, 6). 
The MIV disclosure guidelines by CGAP try to overcome this lack of comparability by 
improving reporting practices of MIVs with respect to social performance factors 
(GGAP (ed.), 2010a, 24). Indicators for the three categories Environmental, Social and 
Governance are presented and described in detail in order to ensure comparability 
among MIVs. For the factors “number of clients served”, “percentage of female bor-
rowers” and “average loan balance”, strict guidelines are included in that those num-
bers need to be calculated based on the directly financed portfolio of the respective 
fund. The other requirements probably represent too much detail, as they sum to more 
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than 20 indicators and the social performance reports of MIVs to date do not include 
them in a consistent manner.  
De Corte et al. (2011) try to aggregate different approaches to measure social perfor-
mance using a MACBETH (Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evalua-
tion Technique) approach. The aim of the model is to assess how far MIVs reach their 
objectives regarding social and financial return. The authors elaborate procedures to 
overcome the methodological difficulties of measuring and aggregating multiple social 
performance criteria. The formulation of a unit to measure social performance of MIVs 
is the target of the analysis. The MACBETH approach consists of a set of processes to 
assess multiple criteria. While their approach is very interesting and important, to date 
only a working paper is published and the technique was so far only tested using one 
fund manager based on debt investments (de Corte et al., 2011, 31). 
6.3 CALCULATION OF MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT FUND 
INDEXES 
6.3.1 METHODOLOGIES FOR INDEX CALCULATION 
When assessing the risk and performance of a given investment, potential as well as 
existing investors rely on established indexes. An index describes a measure that com-
bines the development of a universe of objects over a time frame. Such indexes are 
usually calculated by adequate techniques of aggregation or averaging (Fahrmeir, 2003, 
548). Indexes for benchmarking need to be appropriate to build a constructive tool for 
valuing investments. In the case of investments for which there is no related bench-
mark, fund managers and investors must rely on the asset class that is perceived to be 
closest (De Sousa-Shields, 2007). Appropriate indexes are mostly chosen according to 
regional factors, currency and, if available, specific characteristics such as for example 
the industry.70 
To be considered as a meaningful benchmark, an index should fulfil certain require-
ments. According to Bailey (1992), the following characteristics are important for 
benchmarking a given fund manager’s actions among others: 
                                                 
70  For example MSCI China for funds investing in China or Nasdaq Biotechnology for funds invested in 
biotech. 
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 no ambiguity (names and weights of securities in the index should be clearly 
specified) 
 measurability (calculation of the benchmark at least monthly) 
 appropriateness (consistency with the manager’s investment style) 
 reflecting current investment options (the securities used within the benchmark 
should be well-known by the managers). 
Ideally a microfinance index should represent the whole microfinance universe accu-
rately. However, in microfinance, some funds are too young or too small and too un-
familiar to be attractive to investors. Excluding these funds leads to a limited but (from 
an investor’s point of view) probably more reasonable fund universe. 
Existing SRI benchmarks are assumed not to be reasonable for microfinance, as they 
use a broader investment approach. SRI is comparable with regard to the social com-
ponent of return, the young age of the industry and the relatively little that is known 
by investors about different types of possible investments. However, SRI is not useful 
at a detailed level, as performance and valuation techniques cannot be compared with 
microfinance. 
Other than SRI, emerging market benchmarks such as the JP Morgan Emerging Mar-
kets Bond Index (EMBI) are often believed to be useful. However, MFIFs do not invest 
directly in emerging markets in the way that funds included in the JP Morgan EMBI do 
by buying government bonds. Moreover, the JP Morgan EMBI focuses on large emerg-
ing countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) rather than small development coun-
tries whereas MFIFs are usually broadly diversified in all types of developing coun-
tries (Heilmann, 2010, 26). The JP Morgan ELMI+ index71 could offer a better oppor-
tunity as it reflects currency volatility in emerging countries. However, it still fails to 
provide perfect benchmarking because MFIFs are more influenced by the evolution of 
the portfolio they have invested in than by currency up- and downturns. 
                                                 
71  The Emerging Local Markets Index Plus (ELMI), produced by JP Morgan, tracks total returns (in 
USD) for local-currency-denominated money market instruments in 23 emerging markets (King, 
2008). 
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A fund index for microfinance investments differs from stock or bond price indexes 
because the funds are not traded and consequently no prices are available.72 As elabo-
rated in Chapter 6.1, performance is therefore measured using net asset values. 
The basic formula representing an index is the following: 
ܴ	ூ௡ௗ௘௫ ൌ 	෍ݓ௜ ∗ ܴ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
where: 
wi = Weight attributed to fund i 
Ri = Return of fund i 
There are different ways to calculate the weight (wi) attributed to each fund within an 
index. The most commonly used methods are “equally weighted” and “asset-
weighted” (Lhabitant, 2008, 489; Reilly / Wright, 1997, 134). 
If all the funds included are equally weighted, the average of the index is recognised as 
the “average fund behaviour”, independent of the assets under the management of 
each fund manager. In contrast to equal weighting, taking volume into account results 
in a minor impact of the smaller funds on the index. The weight of each fund within 
the index is based on its assets in relation to the total volume of all funds considered.  
The asset-weighted methodology is preferred in many industries as it reflects the per-
formance of the average dollar invested in the industry (Lhabitant, 2006, 489). Howev-
er, the largest vehicles or companies included in the index may have extreme impacts 
on the index if the sizes of the vehicles included are not comparable. One example 
where capital weighting could be criticised is the Swiss Market Index (SMI), which is 
greatly influenced by the performance of the biggest players Nestlé, Novartis and 
Roche (SIX Swiss Exchange (ed.), 2011, 3). In microfinance this criticism may also be 
appropriate as a small number of funds reflect large parts of the whole industry.  
For the asset-weighted methodology, comparable to price indexes, different approach-
es for weighting can be applied. The two best-known methodologies are the Laspeyres 
                                                 
72  See S&P Dow Jones Indices (2013) for Corporate Bond Indexes, S&P Dow Jones Indices (2009) for 
Home Price Indexes or Dow Jones Indexes / Credit Suisse (2012) for Core Hedge Fund Indexes. 
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and the Paasche price indexes. Both indexes use prices and quantities of goods to dis-
play price development. The Laspeyres index uses a weighting technique based on the 
quantity measure in the base period whereas the Paasche price index focuses on the 
current quantities (Fahrmeir, 2003, 549).73 
In general, transparent methodology for index calculation, weighting and the list of the 
funds included is very important. For example, it is essential to clarify whether the in-
dex only includes funds that are currently investable and open to new investors.  
Excluding funds that are closed to investors from the analysis would result in a limited 
picture of the investment universe. Thus, the question of whether to include or exclude 
closed funds is not easy to answer, but when calculating an index it is important to 
clarify and communicate the decision on this question (Lhabitant, 2006, 489). In micro-
finance, it is reasonable to include both closed and open funds in the index, as the 
sample is not large enough for exclusions.  
6.3.2 EXPENSES AND FEES 
Expenses and fees are important when analysing funds, especially when different 
funds are compared. The total expense ratio combines all of the expenses charged to an 
investor. In microfinance, TER varies a lot between diverse fund styles. Structured debt 
funds report the lowest TER, while equity funds are the most costly ones (Symbiotics 
(ed.), 2012a, 79). The reason for higher costs associated with equity funds is the com-
plex investment process, which often requires an active position, such as a seat on the 
board of the MFI. In general, microfinance funds have TERs that are competitive with 
other funds, which is interesting in view of their high transaction costs and low aver-
age transaction sizes (Symbiotics (ed.), 2011, 24). 
NAVs are calculated after the deduction of direct expenses and fees (see for example 
responsAbility (ed.), 2011a, 13). When analysing fund performance from the investors’ 
point of view, looking at performance after fees charged by the fund is accurate. How-
ever, for other analyses, such as the evaluation of fund managers’ strategies, it is better 
to compare returns before fees and expenses, otherwise, a fund manager could outper-
                                                 
73  The Laspeyres index therefore reflects the absolute change in prices in relation to constant quantities 
(Fahrmeir, 2003, 550); nevertheless for the present analysis on fund performance without price infor-
mation, the application of the Laspeyres methodology will not reveal price changes. 
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form others simply because lower fees and expenses are charged. This paper takes the 
investor’s perspective and therefore expenses and fees are deducted before perfor-
mance is analysed.  
Instead of charging fees, some funds trade with an agio. This makes buying prices 
higher than selling prices and the difference between the two represents the charges. 
When comparing these funds with other investment vehicles, the focus should be ei-
ther on selling prices or on buying prices throughout the whole period in order to re-
veal the true performance of the fund. 
In addition to these usually reported expenses, the investor can be charged so called 
transaction costs or load charges, especially if an external sales force is engaged (Sharpe 
et al., 1995, 801). These commission rates are not usually disclosed and therefore not 
considered in the index calculation.  
6.4 EXISTING INDEX SYMBIOTICS MICROFINANCE INDEX 
At the beginning of 2005, Symbiotics, a specialised microfinance investment manager 
and data provider, started the calculation of the so-called “Symbiotics Microfinance 
Index” (SMX) with the aim of providing a benchmark for assessing returns and their 
inherent volatility (Symbiotics (ed.), 2005, 2). Symbiotics calculates two indexes: one for 
investments in debt and one for equity.74 The debt index focuses on the performance of 
MIVs. Besides the standard requirements for a fund to be classified as a microfinance 
investment, a vehicle is only included in the index if monthly valuations are available, 
the currency is Euros or US Dollars and the fund is certified with a valid ISIN-
indication.75 However, the number of public MIVs disclosing information on risks and 
returns is small and Symbiotics’ data is limited to the funds that they manage. Apart 
from this limitation, the index has other shortcomings: 
 small number of observations and no justification for in- / excluding funds 
 equal weighting of all funds 
 no regional split available 
 missing classification of different structures and investment policies 
 no consideration of social impact. 
                                                 
74  For debt investments, three indexes are calculated: USD, CHF, and EUR. 
75  International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). 
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For equity funds, Symbiotics uses the performance of the five largest publicly traded 
MFIs76 to calculate the SMX equity index, which leaves the investor with a very limited 
picture of the market. Five institutions is a small number, as most funds invest in more 
than five targets. In addition, the performance of institutions does not necessarily re-
flect the performance of funds: more factors such as dividends and distributions and 
the quality of the fund management need to be taken into account. Furthermore, a bi-
ased picture of the market results when only publicly traded MFIs are considered, as 
the vast majority of MFIs is not listed.  
The above-mentioned shortcomings of the two existing benchmarks provide the moti-
vation for the present research on MFIFs. The ideal result would be an optimised index, 
including large parts of the whole microfinance market, considering special characteris-
tics, social factors and regional distribution of the assets. However, data restrictions to 
date pose a challenge to this objective, especially regarding social factors. The major 
limitation of the Symbiotics index is the restricted picture of the market and the lack of 
independence as the funds considered for the index calculation are all managed by 
Symbiotics. Moreover, the SMX probably overestimates the average return in the mi-
crofinance industry, as the funds managed by Symbiotics tend to be rather well estab-
lished commercial vehicles. Furthermore, funds managed by the same company might 
perform similarly and not reflect the industry. The index proposed in this analysis 
overcomes this shortcoming of the SMX by being open to all existing funds. 
                                                 
76  Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Equity Bank, Banco Compartamos, Brac Bank Limited, SKS Microfinance. 
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7. DATA SELECTION 
7.1 DATA SITUATION 
Obtaining detailed information on the performance and operations is challenging for 
most MFIFs due to their private structure. On the other hand, as MFIFs are not allowed 
to advertise in most markets, it should be of their interest to be included in databases 
so that they have a chance of being spotted by consultants and investors.77 Approaches 
exist to facilitate public access to information on MIVs, such as the MIV disclosure 
guidelines elaborated by CGAP (see Chapter 5.4). Still, the information available de-
pends strongly on the willingness of funds to provide data, as the disclosure is volun-
tary. For some funds, even the fund manager’s contact data is treated as proprietary 
information. This situation is reminiscent of the hedge fund market around 2006, when 
performance and risk data were difficult to obtain there, too (Lhabitant, 2006, 404). 
Regulation of the vehicles is minimal and a fund manager’s interest in disclosing fi-
nancial information is limited as growth targets can largely be met by serving high net 
worth individuals and institutional customers. Most regulators do not allow MFIFs to 
advertise their services to the general public. The disclosure of past performance data, 
especially if positive, could be interpreted as advertising and is thus avoided by fund 
managers. Another handicap to transparency is the fund managers’ fear of revealing 
their strategies to competitors. Again, this situation is highly comparable with the be-
ginning of the hedge fund industry (Lhabitant, 2006, 404). 
7.2 OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES ON DATA GATHERING 
In 2006, the newly established non-profit organisation Luxflag started to specialise in 
labelling funds that invest mainly in microfinance. To date, 24 funds carry the Luxflag-
label (LUXFLAG online, 18.05.2012). This label aims to help investors when choosing 
securities, by enhancing the visibility of particular MIVs.78 The label reassures an in-
vestor that the MIV actually does invest large parts of its assets in microfinance and 
each vehicle’s practice is examined annually in order to ensure that it meets interna-
                                                 
77  A similar situation was observed in the beginning of the hedge fund industry (Lhabitant, 2006, 479). 
78  LUXFLAG is an independent and non-profit making institution based in Luxembourg, similar to 
Novethic, an independent body labelling SRI funds (see http://www.novethic.com). 
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tionally recognised standards (LUXFLAG online, 18.05.2012). To date, the Luxflag-
label is the only certification possibility for MIVs. 
Symbiotics offers several data packages on www.syminvest.com. Information is availa-
ble on MFIs and MFIFs, as well as indexing for both institutions and funds. However, 
Symbiotic’s data packages on individual funds are limited to annual snapshots. While 
they do provide benchmarking between MFIFs, these are only based on five to seven 
funds, depending on the currency. 
In 2012, a beta version of the specialised MIV-platform Luminis was released, which 
provides factsheets of fund information (www.luminis.com). This overview only ex-
tracts basic fund-specific information for 80 funds using data from 2010. In May 2012 
Luminis announced that 22 funds agreed to undergo the so-called Luminis PRSM pro-
cess (analysis of performance, risk, social factors, and management). On May 10th 2012 
Luminis advertised the start of the official online data service on their website. Data 
packages are offered on between 10 and 23 funds, and a fee is charged online. Once 
again, however, quantitative data are only provided on an annual basis, and no de-
tailed history is available. 
MIX is well known for providing relatively meaningful data on MFIs and is also com-
piling information on MFIFs. As MIX focuses on MFIs, data on funds are not timely 
nor do they include large parts of the fund universe. However, MIX provides a large 
database for the analysis of the underlying portfolio of MFIFs. 
One-year figures are not sufficient for comparing different funds or evaluating them in 
the context of other asset classes, particularly with regard to performance. In order to 
gain more data points, a comprehensive study that includes all MFIFs or at least all 
funds willing to disclose information is conducted. In the present analysis, quantitative 
measures are complemented with portfolio information (MFIs) such as legal status and 
regional distribution and the interaction between financial and social return. 
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7.3 DATA FROM SURVEY 
7.3.1 STRUCTURE OF SURVEY 
Due to the lack of availability of disclosed data, a questionnaire was elaborated and 
distributed to 104 fund managers in October 2011. The aim of the survey is to gather 
informative data on fund structures, portfolios and performance.79 With the exception 
of few questions, the survey does not collect subjective data such as fund managers’ 
opinions or estimates.  
Table 7.1 Content of the Questionnaire80 
Part Content 
General Information 
Investment Type 
Target Return / Benchmark 
Expenses 
Investment Objective 
Portfolio 
Total Assets 
Debt / Equity/Guarantees / Liquidity 
Direct / Indirect Investments in Microfinance 
Diversification 
Regions 
Portfolio Quality 
Currencies 
Social Performance 
Number of Clients Served, Average Loan Size 
Female / Rural Clients 
Client Protection Principles 
UNPRI 
Provision of ESG Information to Clients 
Financial Performance Net Asset Values and Return Since Inception 
Source: own research. 
The survey consists of four main parts and is distributed in the form of an Excel spread 
sheet including visual basic applications, in order to facilitate data input by partici-
pants. The first two parts are based on the results of the approach to classification de-
veloped for this project, which attempts to capture all the characteristics of the funds. 
The third and fourth parts focus on the collection of data regarding social and financial 
return (see Table 7.1). The Excel spread sheet was distributed accompanied by an E-
                                                 
79  The Center for Microfinance aims to continue the analysis by publishing the calculated index on the 
website and therefore, the survey was distributed in early 2013 again. 
80  Print screens of the survey that was distributed are available in the Appendix (Figure 12.2). 
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mail explaining the aim of the study and assuring confidential treatment of the re-
sponses.81 
7.3.2 FEEDBACK FROM SURVEY 
The survey was distributed to all MFIFs found online (MIX and others) and in surveys 
conducted by CGAP and MicroRate. Some fund managers are responsible for several 
funds, including for example representatives of BlueOrchard, ResponsAbility and 
Deutsche Bank. From the information found online it was not always possible to de-
termine whether a vehicle is organised as a fund, a structured product or a company, 
and so the structure of the 104 targets is diverse. I distributed the survey by the end of 
October 2011 with a deadline of November 30, 2011. The first reminder was sent in De-
cember 2011 and a second one was distributed to funds that are considered to be par-
ticularly important in January 2012. Following this second reminder, an attempt was 
made to reach the fund managers by telephone. The reactions of fund managers were 
diverse: some refused to participate in the survey due to internal disclosure re-
strictions; some funds were willing to elaborate a fund-specific non-disclosure agree-
ment (NDA), which helped to overcome certain restrictions. However, even after the 
provision of NDAs, some funds did not fill in all the information requested. Perfor-
mance information, in particular, is not provided by all of the participants. Of the total 
of 104 funds contacted, 28 returned a survey, which represents a response rate of ap-
proximately 27%. 
The final response rate exceeds expectations82 and may be a reflection of strong interest 
in the research among fund managers due to the overall low transparency in the mar-
ket. Making continued efforts to contact fund managers personally and talking to quite 
a large number of them in person might also have increased the response rate, as did 
making contacts at workshops and conferences. The 28 participating funds will receive 
an exclusive overview of the results of the survey after publication. 
For the calculation of the index, only funds that provide monthly performance data 
were included, and unfortunately not all participating funds were able or willing to 
                                                 
81  By means of a detailed Internet search I compiled an address list of fund managers, enabling most of 
the e-mails to be addressed to the recipient by name. 
82  I expected a very low return rate because financial information, especially for private funds, is confi-
dential from a fund manager’s perspective. 
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disclose such detailed data. Interestingly, monthly performance information is only 
provided by open-end funds that focus on debt investment. As a result, it is not possi-
ble to calculate an index for equity investments. 
From the surveys received, 20 funds provide performance data of which 13 on a 
monthly basis. For the calculation of an index, accounting currencies need to be differ-
entiated. All the funds that provide performance information use either US Dollars or 
Euros. In order to complete the picture, performance data for six funds are retrieved 
from Bloomberg83 resulting in a total of six US Dollar based funds and 13 Euro based 
funds (see Table 7.2). All information received from fund managers is kept strictly con-
fidential and published only in an aggregated form.  
Table 7.2 Data Overview 
Description Number of Funds 
Surveys distributed 104 
Respondents 28 
Providing Performance Information 20 
Performance on a monthly Basis 13 
Data in US Dollar 5 
Data in Euro 8 
Data from Bloomberg (US Dollars) 1 
Data from Bloomberg (Euros ) 5 
Total Funds for Index Calculation US Dollars 6 
Total Funds for Index Calculation Euros 13 
Source: own research. 
7.3.3 POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ERRORS 
7.3.3.1 MISSING DATA 
When using a questionnaire, several issues concerning data quality must be taken into 
account. Missing data occurs because: 
 fund managers do not participate (unit non-response) 
                                                 
83  Data from Bloomberg are only financial returns, therefore the seven funds providing data in Bloom-
berg are only included in the index calculation and not in the qualitative analysis.  
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 fund managers ignore some questions (item non-response). 
For both types of non-response the missing data could be completely at random 
(MCAR), at random (MAR) or non-at random (MNAR). For a MNAR, the missing data 
would result in a bias within the data set (Göthlich, 2007, 120 ff.). However, in the pre-
sent paper, data are used only in a descriptive manner and for index calculation. In the 
descriptive analysis, missing data are explicitly discussed whereas in the calculation of 
the index, only funds that provide performance data on a monthly basis are integrated. 
It is possible for biases to emerge in the index if fund managers with poor performance 
quality omit the section on performance collection intentionally. This latent bias in the 
calculated index is addressed separately in the next section. 
7.3.3.2 SOURCES OF BIAS 
When collecting performance data by means of a questionnaire filled in by fund man-
agers themselves, there are several sources of bias that can occur and must be ad-
dressed. Equal problems arise for databases that are collected in the same way, because 
no generally accepted data sources, such as audited annual reports, exist (Lhabitant, 
2006, 479 ff.). 
As private investment pools, MFIFs are not required to disclose performance data to 
the public, and therefore, the number of funds that explicitly provide researchers with 
information will not be a truly random sample of the general population (self-selection 
bias) (Lhabitant, 2006, 481). Furthermore, a fund manager can decide what kind of in-
formation to reveal. Therefore, performance data may be positively biased as fund 
managers with poor performance might not agree to disclose information voluntarily. 
On the other hand, well-established and profitable funds might not wish to participate, 
as they do not need to acquire new customers. When it comes to the calculation of in-
dexes, they would prefer not to be included, as their inclusion would raise the perfor-
mance index and make their own fund look less profitable in comparison (Lhabitant, 
2006, 481). 
Self-selection bias could therefore have either a positive or a negative influence on per-
formance measures collected by means of a survey. In the special case of microfinance, 
it is easier to gain access to information on larger and more commercial funds. There-
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fore, it is possible that the performance data received in the survey outperform the in-
dustry average. 
If funds hold illiquid securities or assets that are difficult to price, the valuation is chal-
lenging, as no information on regular effectively traded prices is available leading to an 
“infrequent pricing and illiquidity bias” (Lhabitant, 2006, p 485). Furthermore, most MFIFs 
value their portfolios themselves. The involvement of third-party administrators would 
provide investors with a more realistic and neutral picture (Lhabitant, 2006, 481). Final-
ly, the short history of some funds could pose a problem, particularly as the financial 
crisis of the last few years might hinder a meaningful depiction of the industry. 
7.4 DATA FROM MICROFINANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
The second empirical analysis on the relationship between financial and social return is 
conducted using data on MFIs rather than MFIFs. Despite the fact that MFIFs improve 
their social performance measurement tools and start to disclose them in the social per-
formance report (Chapter 6.2), more data are available on MFIs.  
Data on MFIs used are included in a special data package, which provides a unique 
and very comprehensive picture of the microfinance market.84 Data are converted into 
US Dollars at contemporaneous exchange rates and closely monitored by MIX. Partici-
pating MFIs are required to disclose detailed information on their performance such as 
financial statements and annual reports. However, data retrieved from MIX are always 
subject to the possibility of bias as MFIs report their data themselves and on a volun-
tary basis. MFIs participating in the MIX must assume some potential benefit from the 
disclosure of their data, such as gaining the interest of investors and being included in 
research analyses. It is therefore likely that some of the more commercially orientated 
banks are under-represented in the database. MIX does not check the reliability of each 
participating MFI although it undertakes some adjustments to make comparison easier 
such as correcting for inflation, loan loss provisioning / write-offs and subsidies (MIX 
(ed.), 2007, 71). Data collected by MIX on MFIs are credited with being the best availa-
ble representation of the MFIs in the whole microfinance industry (Krauss / Walter, 
2008, 11; Di Bella, 2011, 16; Hartarska / Nadolnyak, 2007, 1212). However, as the data 
                                                 
84  The data package was purchased by the Center for Microfinance from MIX in early 2012. 
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quality of the MIX database has often been criticised, MIX started to use so-called dia-
monds, a rating system on a scale of one to five to indicate the reporting quality and 
completeness of MFIs. A MFI receiving five diamonds publishes audited financial 
statements on a yearly basis accompanied by a rating or due diligence report.85 To en-
sure that the regression results are not biased by MFIs with bad reporting standards or 
missing information, only MFIs with 5 diamonds were included.86 The resulting data 
file includes 1,508 observations between the years 2004 and 2010 for the purposes of the 
regression analysis (see Table 7.3). However, to show a more complete picture, I repeat 
the main regression also using all MFIs rated from one to five diamonds and show the 
results in the Appendix.87 
To capture the effect for investors, additionally special data on funding of MFIs is ana-
lysed. This data is newly collected by MIX since 2007 and has so far not been subject to 
many research projects. 
Table 7.3 Composition of Data File 
Year Number of MFIs 
2004 138 
2005 180 
2006 235 
2007 259 
2008 271 
2009 250 
2010 175 
Total 1,508 
Source: own research. 
                                                 
85  Four diamonds means that audited financial statements are available with lack of rating/due dili-
gence. An institution receiving three diamonds needs to have an active profile (one diamond), some 
data on clients and products for the year (two diamonds) and some financial data for the year (see 
http://www.mixmarket.org/faq/diamond-rankings). 
86  The decision to exclude all MFIs with less than 5-diamonds is taken because strange values reported 
by several low-diamond MFIs were discovered (e.g. percentage of female customers>100%). Addi-
tionally, MFIs reporting negative levels of leverage (18 observations) and one observation with a lev-
erage of over 2,000 were excluded. 
87  The whole data file, including MFIs of all diamond ratings, is used for some descriptive analysis, 
especially regarding regions and countries in Chapter 8. 
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8. CLASSIFICATION OF MFIFS: RESULTS 
8.1 CLASSIFICATION USING INFORMATION FROM SURVEY 
8.1.1 GENERAL SURVEY RESULTS 
The motivation for this paper is the lack of generally accepted benchmarks in micro-
finance. Interestingly, responses received from funds concerning their use of bench-
marks are varied. Of the respondents, 29% say that they do not focus on a particular 
benchmark, while 11% use the money market and another 11% use the SMX as their 
benchmark. The remaining 50% focus either on LIBOR, or on 5-year term deposit notes 
or they do not reply to the question. These answers provide evidence that, to date, 
MFIFs have not been using a standard benchmark. Funds also vary in their approach to 
return targets as they focus on different proxies. Two funds state that their target is to 
achieve a return of 100 to 200 basis points above LIBOR. Three respondents focus on a 
return above the money market rate and two more base their targets on the rate of in-
flation, with one aiming to match it and the other to exceed it by 1%. The remaining 
respondents give their aims as a certain percentage of annualised return, with a wide 
range from 2-3.5% to 6-11% and even 13.5%. This huge range of responses reflects the 
different strategies of the funds regarding their financial performance. Funds aiming to 
achieve a high return are the private equity vehicles and the closed-end funds, which 
refer to the target return realised during their lifetime.  
Questionnaire recipients are asked about the management fees charged and 75% re-
sponded, with answers ranging from 0% to 2.5% and one vehicle stating that the man-
agement fee is not defined.  
With the exception of one fund that offers daily subscriptions, all the surveyed funds 
are rather illiquid vehicles for investors compared with publicly traded investment pos-
sibilities, stating subscription and redemption periodicities of at least one month. The 
redemption in particular requires investors to be patient. Some funds indicate redemp-
tion lock-in periods of a quarter year (four funds), half a year (three funds) or a year 
(two funds). In addition, many funds require minimum investments ranging from USD 
20,000 to USD 250,000 at maximum. The total assets of all the funds considered amount 
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to USD 5,241 million, reflecting approximately 74.9% of the microfinance market eval-
uated by MicroRate in 2011 (see Figure 5.1). 
8.1.2 FUND STRUCTURE 
Building on the MFIF classifications described in Chapter 5.2, this Chapter defines the 
most important characteristics of the funds that participate in the survey. As none of 
the equity funds or the development funds disclose their performance data on a 
monthly basis, this group cannot be included in the index. Their survey data are still 
used to identify the part of the microfinance fund universe captured within the survey.  
Regarding commercialisation, the majority of the funds claim to be either a commercial 
(13 responses) or a quasi-commercial (eight responses) investment vehicle. One re-
spondent claims to be a social investor and six do not provide information. Interesting-
ly, very few social investors or development funds replied to the survey. Furthermore, 
only commercial and quasi-commercial funds are willing to disclose financial perfor-
mance. For this reason, it is not possible to base the indexing part in Chapter 9 on both 
commercial and development funds. 
Five of the funds participating in the survey are classified as public funds by CGAP 
(2010b, 37). 
The majority of funds replying to the survey are mainly invested in debt, with five 
funds reporting 100% debt investment. Four of the respondents are invested only or 
mainly in equity. Thirteen funds report a small proportion of equity of between 1 and 
22%. Funds investing 75% and more in debt are treated as debt-funds and compared 
within one index. Some funds indicate a high proportion of liquidity within their port-
folio, with a maximum of 61%. Eight funds report their percentage liquidity on top of 
their equity / debt investments rather than in relation to them, and their portfolios 
therefore sum to more than 100% (see Figure 8.1). Only two funds indicate a part of 
their portfolios in guarantees, although the amounts are small at 0.1% and 4% respec-
tively. 
The total expense ratio reported by 16 of the respondents ranges from 1.3% to 4%. Two 
funds report higher TERs of 8%, and 15.7%. The differences are, for the most part, ex-
plained by different structures, as would be expected. As only debt funds are consid-
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ered for further financial analysis, distinguishing between different rates of TER is not 
necessary. 
Figure 8.1 Fund Portfolios Reported in the Research Survey for 2010 
 
Source: own research. 
8.1.3 FUND CHARACTERISTICS 
Regarding the investors targeted, 18 funds claim to be open to public and private inves-
tors and involved in retail as well as targeting HNWIs. Four funds only target institu-
tional investors and the remaining funds do not reply to this specific question. While it 
would have been interesting to analyse the financial performance of institutionally ori-
entated funds separately, limited data availability makes this distinction impossible. 
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The funds vary greatly in size, measured as total assets converted into US Dollars using 
the contemporaneous exchange rate (see Figure 8.2).88 The sample is dominated by two 
large funds whose total assets amount to more than twice that of the smaller funds. 
Seventeen of the 28 funds have total assets of less than USD 100 million. Of the funds 
that provide financial information on a monthly basis (including the funds retrieved 
from Bloomberg), the four largest funds account for 59% of all assets. The asset-
weighted index calculated from these data needs to be reviewed critically due to the 
strong influence of these four funds. 
Figure 8.2 Total Assets of Survey Respondents in USD Millions for 2010 
 
Source: own research. 
The average age of the responding funds is seven years with a wide variance that rang-
es from two to 37 years. 
As expected, the more commercial funds invested in debt hedge a large percentage of 
local currency. Only two debt funds report a significant percentage of unhedged assets, 
                                                 
88  Exchange rates were taken from www.oanda.com. 
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with 56% and 10%. Among the equity funds, four vehicles report larger unhedged 
portfolios in local currency, amounting to between 28% and 100%. However, as these 
funds do not provide financial performance data they are not included in further anal-
yses.  
Regarding risk and diversification, the number of funds investing large proportions of 
their assets in one country is very small, while eight out of the 28 funds claim to have 
more than 70% of their assets in the top five countries. Moreover, five of the funds have 
allocated more than 70% of their funds to the top five MFIs. As expected, private 
placement and equity funds are less diversified across countries and MFIs (CGAP (ed.), 
2010b, 28; Symbiotics (ed.), 2012a, 79). 
With respect to social return, data are collected on the application of two types of prin-
ciples, on ESG information provided to investors and on four outreach measures. The 
investigation into the application of client protection principles and UNPRI shows that 
13% of the funds do not subscribe to client protection principles and 24% are not signa-
tories to UNPRI, while five and seven funds respectively did not reply to the question. 
Twenty-two funds state that they inform investors about ESG, while two say they do 
not and four fail to answer the question. 
The outreach measures are, as expected, rather difficult to collect at the fund level be-
cause different funds provide information that cannot be compared with or added to 
others. Respondents add comments to their responses such as: “total number, served 
by all portfolio companies” or “figures related to direct MFI investment, MIV invest-
ments not included”. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the funds disclose 
information on all the MFIs / MIVs they are invested in as a total or if they only ac-
count for the percentage they are actually financing at the time. This result shows that, 
to date, funds do not all disclose social performance factors according to the MIV dis-
closure guidelines introduced by CGAP in 2010 (see 6.2).  
Nevertheless, a short descriptive analysis can be made and data is compared with MFI 
data from the 2010 MIX file. In total, 23 of the 28 respondents provide complete social 
performance information. On average, 1.7 million clients are served by the funds, with 
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a range from 7,000 to 15 million.89 Regarding average size of the loans distributed, most 
funds only provide information on a total basis rather than in relation to GNI per capi-
ta. The average loan size amounts to USD 1,408 ranging from USD 130 to USD 3,600. 
The mean loan balance per borrower distributed by MFIs is very similar at USD 1,439 
according to the MIX data file on MFIs, which includes 1,092 institutions for the year 
2010.90 On average, the funds serve 64.7% female and 49.1% rural clients. Interestingly, 
all funds claim to serve at least 50% female clients, with a minimum of 50.3% and one 
fund operating almost exclusively with female clients at 98.3%. The set of 996 MFI ob-
servations in 2010 shows an average of 64.8% female customers, almost the same as the 
funds that participate in the survey. The distribution of rural clients is between 22% 
and 71.6%. There is no data on rural clients in the MIX data file, so it is not possible to 
compare the surveyed funds with the MFIs. 
8.2 LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNDERLYING PORTFOLIO 
The effect of the legal status on performance and risk of MFIs is analysed using a cur-
sory approach, as investors do not usually have information on the legal structures of 
the MFIs on which the fund is focusing. Furthermore, funds do not provide detailed 
information on the structure of their target MFIs in the survey. Regarding the target 
MFIs, 19 (68%) of the participants claim to focus on MFIs that are profitable or ap-
proaching profitability when choosing investments. Only two responses specify their 
investments in Tier 2 or Tier 3 or mention more socially orientated MFIs as their tar-
gets. Three participants did not reply to the question and four did not clearly specify 
their target MFIs. 
Fund managers use information on the legal status of MFIs to make decisions on poten-
tial investments. The MIX database is used for the analysis of legal status, including un-
weighted averages from the years 2004 to 2010, with the focus on two measures of fi-
nancial returns (ROA and ROE), one efficiency measure (operating expenses divided 
                                                 
89  The results on number of clients reached need to be interpreted with caution as numbers are possibly 
positively biased because some funds might provide the total number served by all MFIs invested in 
(rather than calculating their share). Therefore, number of clients is not compared to MIX data on 
MFIs. 
90  For this descriptive analysis I use the complete data file including all MFIs without respect to their 
number of diamonds. 
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by assets OPEXP), portfolio yield (nominal, YIELD) and a risk measure displaying the 
portion of the portfolio that is more than 30 days overdue (PAR30).  
Portfolio yield is highest for NBFIs and NGOs and this result remains stable when each 
year is analysed separately (significant at the 1% level). This result is rather counter-
intuitive as it indicates that NBFI and NGOs charge their customers higher average 
interest rates than do banks and credit unions / cooperatives. It could indicate that 
these institutions try to cover possibly higher expenses with increased interest rates. 
Supporting the results of Hassan / Sanchez in 2009, I find that rural banks, banks and 
credit unions / cooperatives (COOP) have lower operating expenses (significant at the 
1% level) and thus higher efficiency than do NBFIs and NGOs (see fourth column of 
Table 8.1).  
In agreement with Galema et al. (2011), rural banks (3.01%), banks (1.26%) and NBFI 
(1.31%) show the highest values of ROA. Nevertheless, these differences are not signifi-
cant (except for the difference between rural banks and NGOs). The results for banks 
are influenced by negative performance in the years 2008 and 2009. Rural banks man-
age to show positive performance (measured as ROA) in all the years observed. Inter-
estingly, the performance of NGOs also turned negative in 2008 and 2009; thus it ap-
pears that NGOs and banks are most affected by the crises. 
Regarding risk, evidence shows the highest levels of PAR30 for rural banks (11.73%), 
significant at the 1% level in comparison with all other types of institutions. This result 
for rural banks contradicts the one of Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010), as the data do not 
indicate that private MFIs (microfinance banks or other non-banking financial institu-
tions) have the best portfolio quality. 
To conclude, the results indicate that funds focusing on efficiency should invest in 
banks and NBFIs rather than NGOs and credit unions / cooperatives. However, ROA 
measures do not vary between types of institutions to a significant extent. Furthermore, 
possible diversification effects might be reduced due to the correlation between micro-
finance banks and the global financial market. When focusing on social factors, such as 
percentage of women served and average loan balance in relation to GNI per capita, 
NGOs (74.96% females and 32.25% ALB_GNI on average) perform best, while banks 
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perform worst (52.58% females and 161.75% ALB_GNI on average), both at a statistical-
ly significant level. 
Table 8.1 Average Financial KPIs by Legal Status (2004-2010)91 
Legal  
Status Obs.
92 
YIELD 
(nom.) 
% 
OPEXP 
% 
ROA 
% 
ROE 
% 
PAR30 
% 
FEMALE 
% 
ALB_
GNI % 
Bank 428 30.68 14.57 1.26 16.91 5.78 52.58 161.75 
COOP 743 25.03 11.88 1.13 50.16 7.56 50.70 91.49 
NBFI 1,825 36.62 19.85 1.31 7.85 5.78 62.10 64.46 
NGO 2,014 36.12 22.99 -0.06 6.32 6.81 74.96 32.25 
Rural 330 30.10 11.91 3.01 17.00 11.73 51.60 50.26 
Source: own research.93 
8.3 REGIONAL ALLOCATION 
8.3.1 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS’ ASSETS 
Even though the underlying portfolio of a fund is not often published in detail, most 
established funds provide information in their factsheets or monthly reports on the re-
gional distribution of their assets. In the survey, 26 of the 28 funds provide information 
on the regional spread. The largest regions for investment are Latin America and the 
Caribbean (35% of assets) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (27% of the assets) (see 
Figure 8.3). 
MicroRate’s 2011 survey also found 35% of microfinance assets invested in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean. The share of assets invested in South Asia is rather higher in this 
sample at 16% compared with 7% in the MicroRate survey. Otherwise the regional dis-
tribution is quite comparable with MicroRate’s larger survey (see Chapter 3.2). 
 
                                                 
91  Anova analyses regarding the statistical significance of the differences in means (multiple compari-
sons using a one-way Anova analysis) are presented in the Appendix based on 5,431 observations 
(Table 12.3). 
92  For the two social measures (female and ALB_GNI), the number of observations is smaller: 282 banks, 
643 credit unions / cooperatives, 1,606 NBFIs, 1,846 NGOs, 212 rural banks. 
93  The very high level of ROE for credit union / cooperatives is driven by four institutions reporting 
extremely high ROEs, amounting each to values of more than 1,000%. 
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Figure 8.3 Regional Distribution of Assets by Respondents 2010 
 
Source: own research. 
8.3.2 REGIONAL DIFFERENCES 
I analyse the regional distribution of the MFIs from an investor’s point of view, includ-
ing information on financial return (YIELD, OPEXP, ROA), risk (PAR30) and social 
performance (average loan balance in relation to GNI, ALB_GNI). Six regions are dif-
ferentiated in the data file provided by MIX, and in 2010, the percentage of MFIs in Lat-
in America and the Caribbean is clearly dominant with 33%, followed by Eastern Eu-
rope and Central Asia with 19% (see Table 8.2). The graphical illustration presented 
here is accompanied by a one-way Anova analysis displayed in the Appendix (Table 
12.4), which includes all observations (8,482) over the seven years. 
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Table 8.2 Regional Distribution in MIX Data File for 201094 
Region Number of MFIs Percentage 
Latin America and the Caribbean 352 33% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 202 19% 
South Asia 193 18% 
Africa 151 14% 
East Asia and the Pacific 114 11% 
Middle East and North Africa 62 6% 
Total 1,074 100 
Source: own research based on data from MIX, 2010. 
The MFIs’ earnings, measured as yield on their portfolio between 2004 and 2010, vary 
across regions (see Figure 8.4). South Asia clearly underperforms the other regions in 
all observation periods with an average yield of 23.74% (significant at the 1 percent lev-
el). Over all periods, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are the top perform-
ing regions on average with respect to their average yield on portfolio. Except for South 
Asia and Africa, all regions experienced a decline in portfolio yield in recent years, pos-
sibly indicating the effects of increasing competition. Because portfolio yield does not 
account for loan losses (Cull et al., 2007, F118), the microfinance crisis and the resulting 
repayment difficulties are not reflected in this measure. 
                                                 
94  All MFIs are included here (no matter how many diamonds) in order to ensure enough observations 
by region/country.  
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Figure 8.4 Yield on Portfolio by Region (%) 2004-2010 
 
Source: own research based on data from MIX, 2010. 
When assessing operating expenses, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are 
the lowest performing regions, significant at the 1 percent level (highest expenses in 
relation to assets) (see Figure 8.5). Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a large 
increase in expenses in 2008, levelling to 21.4% in 2010. As expected, similar to the re-
sults published by González (2011, 1), South Asia shows the highest efficiency in terms 
of operating expenses while all other regions managed to reduce operating expenses 
over the period. 
20.0%
22.0%
24.0%
26.0%
28.0%
30.0%
32.0%
34.0%
36.0%
38.0%
40.0%
42.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Africa EAP ECA LAC MENA SA
110 8. Classification of MFIFs: Results 
Figure 8.5 Operating Expenses / Assets by Region (%) 2004-2010 
 
Source: own research based on data from MIX, 2010. 
These high expenses lead to very small values for ROA in Africa compared with the 
MFIs in other regions for the years 2003 – 2010 (significant except for the comparison 
with SA), whereas Latin America and the Caribbean manages average performance 
and is above zero between 2005 and 2007 (see Figure 8.6). South Asia underperforms 
the other regions except Africa on the measure of ROA confirming the results by Ste-
phens / Tazi (2006) and Galema et al. (2011). MFIs in Africa and South Asia show nega-
tive levels of ROA for all the years 2005 – 2009 but gain higher ROAs in 2010, and 
South Asia even reaches positive levels. Eastern Europe and Central Asia shows the 
highest level of ROA with a short downturn in the years 2008 and 2009 (again confirm-
ing Stephens / Tazi, 2006).  
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
22.0%
24.0%
26.0%
28.0%
30.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Africa EAP ECA LAC MENA SA
8. Classification of MFIFs: Results 111 
 
Figure 8.6 Return on Assets by Region (%) 2004-2010 
 
Source: own research based on data from MIX, 2010. 
The analysis of regional aspects from a fund manager’s perspective depends on the 
factors influencing its return. Yield on portfolio has a strong effect on the financial per-
formance for debt investors (see further analysis in Chapter 10). Therefore, Africa and 
Latin America and the Caribbean may experience more attention from financially ori-
entated funds. However, another important factor influencing investors’ decisions is 
the potential default risk of MFIs, caused by losses on loans. The values of PAR30 are 
higher in Africa compared with other regions, significant at the 1 percentage level (see 
Figure 8.7). This might be the reason why respondents reported only 8% of total assets 
in Africa (see Figure 8.3). Latin America and the Caribbean is an interesting region, 
with a high yield on portfolio and average risk and operating expenses, confirmed by 
the fact that it is the most popular region with respondents investing 35% of their assets 
there. Eastern Europe and Central Asia is second with 27% and convinces investors 
with low operating expenses and comparatively low values of PAR30. 
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Figure 8.7 Portfolio at Risk (PAR30, %) by Region 2004-2010 
 
Source: own research based on data from MIX, 2010. 
The development of PAR30 varied across different regions during the recent financial 
crisis. South Asia experienced a large increase in average PAR30 in 2008, 2009 and 
2010, whereas the high value in 2010 is especially driven by India, Pakistan and Bang-
ladesh. Unfortunately, more detailed data on regional differences within countries is 
not available. This level of analysis would be important as regions such as Andhra 
Pradesh in India or Punjab in Pakistan were hit harder by the crisis than the rest of the 
countries.  
PAR30 did not change significantly in Latin America and the Caribbean during the pe-
riod analysed. While Nicaragua experienced a crisis with a rise in PAR30 to 22.09% in 
2010 (and with 180 observations over the seven years the country accounts for a large 
share of the region after Mexico and Ecuador), the other countries in the region com-
pensate for this development. At this time Ecuador’s PAR30 was 3.33% and Mexico’s 
was 6.03%. Eastern Europe and Central Asia experienced an increase in PAR30 over the 
last 3 years of the period studied, reaching 6.67% in 2010. This is largely caused by 
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Bosnia & Herzegovina where PAR30 was 11.03% in 2010 while countries like Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan managed to keep their levels of PAR30 around 3%.  
The crisis is not so evident from other measures. For example, ROA increased in 2010 
in all regions except East Asia and the Pacific with a slight decrease. The negative effect 
on Latin America and the Caribbean is, once again, caused by developments in Nicara-
gua, where the ROA value is -5.84% in 2010. ROA in India remains positive on average 
in every year except for 2004 while Mexico had negative ROA in 2004 and 2005 but 
otherwise the value was positive. 
When analysing PAR30 data it can be useful to examine the write-off-ratios as the 
PAR30 value of a MFI depends on its write-off policy (Rosenberg, 2009, 6). A MFI that 
immediately writes off loans that are not paid off shows a low PAR30 rate. This is illus-
trated by the development of write-offs in Bosnia & Herzegovina and India, where the 
impact of the financial crisis was particularly severe (see Figure 8.8). The two countries 
experienced comparable jumps in their PAR30 ratios starting in 2008, which continued 
to increase in 2009 and 2010. However, in India the write-off ratio remained at a very 
low level, which could be an indication that Indian MFIs have not (yet) written down 
the risky loans, while Bosnia & Herzegovina saw a significant increase in write-offs 
starting in 2008.95 This could explain the negative ROA ratios in 2009 and 2010 in Bos-
nia & Herzegovina, while India continued to show positive average ROAs. Clearly, 
when the risk of a MFI is analysed using PAR30, cautious interpretation is important. 
According to the CGAP disclosure guidelines for the financial statements of a MFI, 
overdue payments older than 180 days should be written off by the MFI twice a year 
(Rosenberg et al., 2003, 25). This means that some MFIs might not have reacted termi-
nally to the crisis so far, as they only account for lower repayment behaviour by aug-
menting PAR ratios and not by writing off existing loans. Augmentation of the PAR 
does not affect the return of a MFIF directly, because it does not necessarily influence 
                                                 
95  Interestingly, BiH shows even lower levels of PAR90 than India, so that the higher write-offs in BiH 
cannot be explained by the longer terms of non-repaid loans. However, one explanation could be that 
the Indian MFIs are better at collecting outstanding loans. The loan loss rate in India remained at a 
very low level of 0.87% in 2010, whereas in BiH the loan loss rate increased from 0.52% in 2004 to 
9.03% in 2010. 
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the financial statements of the MFIs96 as long as no provisioning is done. A look at the 
current risk coverage rate, which measures how far the impairment loss allowance97 is 
adjusted in relation to PAR30, would help to assess whether institutions build appro-
priate provisions. Nevertheless, this measure is not available on MIX. 
Figure 8.8 Write-off Ratio (%) versus PAR30 (%) 2004-2010 
 
Source: own research based on data from MIX, 2010. 
Fund managers therefore need to be careful when assessing the consequences of poten-
tial crises, as some KPIs (e.g. ROA) may not be meaningful when it is possible for MFIs 
to postpone write-offs and provisioning (at least within a limited time frame). 
Outreach to the poor is another factor that is important to fund managers when placing 
their assets, and to investors when valuing investments. Differences between average 
loan balance and average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita emerge when 
                                                 
96  According to the Consensus Guidelines, PAR ratios should be disclosed within a portfolio quality 
and management report (Rosenberg, 2003, 32). 
97  The impairment loss allowance is an asset account (typically negative) being calculated by adding 
current year provisions and subtracting current year write-offs from the prior year impairment loss 
allowance. 
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comparing regions in 2010 (see Figure 8.9). Average loan balance is shown in US Dol-
lars using the secondary (right) axis and average loan balance in relation to GNI per 
capita (ALB_GNI) in % based on the primary (left) axis. For example, in Africa the av-
erage loan balance per borrower seems to be very low at first sight (USD 664). Howev-
er, when Africa’s lower GNI per capita is taken into account, the average loan balance 
is relatively high for Africa when compared with the other regions. The average size of 
loans in Latin America and the Caribbean is higher than average (USD 1,792), but the 
GNI per capita is higher than average leading to low levels of average loan size per 
GNI. This may be because poverty measured in absolute terms (people living on less 
than USD 1 per day) is not as severe in Latin America and the Caribbean as in other 
countries (The World Bank (ed.), 2012, 72). These results reinforce the importance of 
relating average loans to GNI per capita rather than using absolute values. Therefore, 
analysing average loan balance in relation to GNI per capita, South Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean are found to be the best regions for more socially interested 
investors (small loan sizes). Regarding the percentage of female borrowers, South Asia 
clearly outperforms the other regions in terms of social performance, serving 88.4% 
women on average in 2010.98  
When comparing regions and countries, it is necessary to understand the different reg-
ulation and policy systems, which can have a major influence on the development of 
MFIs. These include the inflation rate, the exchange rate and the taxation systems. This 
means that funds need to investigate the specific characteristics of the region on top of 
the qualities of MFIs when choosing investments. 
As described earlier, the funds participating in this survey are well diversified across 
countries so that country-specific crises may not affect them to any great extent. 
 
                                                 
98  This result is calculated using the same database. 
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Figure 8.9 Average Loan Balance in Relation to GNI per Capita (2010) 
 
Source: own research based on Iossifidis, 2010. 
8.4 SUMMARY OF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS 
Based on theoretical considerations regarding the distinction between different fund 
structures and styles, this Chapter used empirical data from the survey and the MIX 
database to discover the factors most important for classification. 
For future analyses based on more data points, a distinction according to these classifi-
cation criteria would be useful (see Table 8.3). The degree of commercialisation of a 
fund plays an important role in regard to its target return and its benchmark. Commer-
cial funds and DFIs are likely to have different targets and their returns should there-
fore not be compared.  
Regional aspects are important when comparing funds and when financial perfor-
mance data becomes available for more funds, indexes could be calculated separately 
for each region.99 Nevertheless, analysing regions in aggregate may lead to biased or 
overstated results as the effect of diversification within a region can lead to the eradica-
tion of individual effects in particular parts of a region. For example the effect of the 
                                                 
99  However, it has to be considered that most of the large MFIFs are evenly diversified across regions. 
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financial crisis on areas such as Andhra Pradesh, Punjab or countries such as Nicara-
gua or Mexico are not revealed in an analysis of the countries or regions as a total. The 
smallest available unit of regional allocation should therefore be analysed. 
Risk and diversification aspects should be considered as they have an impact on return 
assessment. Funds could be treated differently according to their risk profile. A possi-
ble example is using a risk premium to adjust the performance of funds that are not 
diversified across countries or MFIs. Other than that, returns could be calculated and 
compared on a risk-adjusted basis when more information and longer history are 
available. 
Table 8.3 Further Differentiation between Funds for Indexing 
Criterion Differentiation 
Commercialisation  Commercial funds versus DFIs 
Regional focus  Different indexes for regions 
Risk exposure  Adjust for different risk levels / calculate and compare 
returns on a risk-adjusted basis 
Source: own research. 
Due to the limited availability of data and the relatively low rate of response by fund 
managers, the above mentioned classification criteria can only be used in a limited 
manner.100 Instead, an approach similar to the one used by Symbiotics is applied, sepa-
rating the funds into debt and equity investments and, in accordance with their ac-
counting currency, into US Dollars and Euros. Because funds invested in equity do not 
provide financial return information on a regular basis, two groups for the index calcu-
lation are separated: 
 debt funds (Euros) 
 debt funds (US Dollars).
                                                 
100  Nevertheless, the results of this Chapter is directly used in the empirical analysis in Chapter 10, as the 
factors elaborated as influencing microfinance performance here are used as control variables in the 
regression model. 
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9. INDEX CALCULATION 
9.1 CALCULATION METHODOLOGY 
To calculate the indexes, I use absolute day-to-day total returns (%) provided by funds 
or Bloomberg on a monthly basis, starting with a base value of 100 in December 2003 
and cumulating monthly returns. The starting date is the earliest date for which per-
formance information is available. The level of the index at each point in time reflects 
the performance of the funds included relative to the particular base period (Bos, 2000, 
11). I include funds from the date on which they start to operate. This means that the 
indexes do not necessarily include the total number of funds over the whole period. 
However, none of the funds included in the calculations ceased operations during the 
time period observed. 101 Among microfinance funds in general, a few did terminate 
operations in the respective time frame. Nevertheless, it is very hard to determine the 
number and names of the funds that ceased operations as most of them did not provide 
information publicly beforehand. Therefore, a potential survivorship bias seems not to 
be a big issue as the probability is high that none of the funds that disappeared so far 
would have provided financial performance data for indexing or other purposes.  
I use the following two methodologies of index calculation (according to Lhabitant, 
2008, 489; Reilly / Wright, 1997, 134): 
 weighted by total assets in 2010 (Microfinance (MF) Cap) 
 equally weighted (MF). 
I apply the weighting technique using total assets in a methodology in line with the 
price index calculation by Laspeyres.102 This means that the total assets of one particu-
lar period are used for the weighting of the funds over the whole time frame. In con-
trast to the Laspeyres technique, the total assets as of December 2010 are used instead 
of the base period. I decided to apply this technique because most funds reported total 
assets at a single point in time rather than the monthly development. Therefore, I 
weight their monthly performance using total assets as of December 2010. In addition, 
two late-responding funds reported total assets for 2011. 
                                                 
101  A number of funds did not provide performance data for November and December 2011 because 
they handed in the survey earlier; however, this does not lead to a significant change in the index. 
102  See Chapter 6.3.1 for the Laspeyres price index. 
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Two indexes weighted by total assets 2010 (one in US Dollars and one in Euros) and 
two equally weighted indexes (one in US Dollars and one in Euros) are calculated. I 
compare the two indexes for each currency with the corresponding SMX (US Dollars / 
Euros). The US Dollar index comprises the same number of funds as the SMX USD, 
namely six, but two funds are not the same. The composition of the Euro index is more 
varied than the SMX EUR as it includes 13 instead of seven funds. 
I calculate two separate indexes for the two currencies in order to avoid the influence of 
currency fluctuations on the index performance. The combination of the two currencies 
in one index would lead to difficulties in interpretation. Particularly in microfinance, 
where the underlying portfolio is often reported in the local currencies of diverse coun-
tries, the translation to either US Dollars or Euros could lead to performance devia-
tions. Therefore, particularly from a practitioner’s point of view, the calculation of two 
separate indexes makes sense.103 
9.2 INDEXES FOR INVESTMENTS IN DEBT 
The two Euro indexes (MF EUR and MF EUR Cap) are calculated and compared with 
the SMX EUR (see Figure 9.1). Performance data are available from December 2003 to 
December 2011. All the respondents that provide monthly financial return data are ei-
ther open- or closed-end funds, whereas the comparability of financial data is ensured. 
Average monthly performance of the included funds is shown in percentage by the 
bars in Figure 9.1, which relate to the secondary (right) axis. The average return of the 
funds included is positive for all months observed between December 2003 and De-
cember 2011. This is the reason why the calculated indexes, which represent cumula-
tive performance, rise continuously over the period. The mean monthly return deterio-
rated slightly between 2009 and 2011 (monthly return 0.26% on average) compared to 
the prior years (0.30% on average). In 2008, the average monthly performance of the 
MFIFs reached a peak at 0.45%, just as the financial crisis began.  
                                                 
103  I made this decision based on statements by fund managers. 
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Figure 9.1 Index for Investments in Debt (EUR) 
 
Source: own research and www.syminvest.com (15.01.2012). 
To calculate the indexes, I aggregate the average monthly returns and standardise to 
December 2003. The black line indicates the index calculated on an asset-weighted ba-
sis (MF EUR Cap) and the dashed black line is the index calculated on an equally 
weighted basis (MF EUR). The orange line is the SMX EUR, which is computed by 
Symbiotics using an equal-based weighting method and including seven funds.  
In comparison with the SMX EUR, both the asset-weighted and the equally weighted 
Euro index show weaker performance summing to a negative 0.96% (96 base points) 
and a negative 2.63% (263 base points) over the total period.104 A difference in perfor-
mance between the indexes calculated and the SMX EUR occurs notably in 2004 (June 
and December), in February 2007 and in January 2009. Otherwise the indexes proceed 
essentially in parallel. The apparent underperformance of the indexes calculated in this 
paper is caused by the inclusion of more and obviously weaker performing funds. The 
results for the Euro funds therefore confirm the hypothesis that Symbiotics rather over-
                                                 
104  In this particular analysis of indexes based on 100, all three notations: percentage, percentage points 
and base points can be used interchangeably, with 1 percentage = 100 base points. 
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estimates the return of the microfinance industry by including only their own managed 
funds. 
Interestingly, the performance of the equally weighted and the asset-weighted indexes 
differs only slightly. Between 2004 and the first half of 2008, the asset-weighted index 
underperforms the equally weighted index by 0.58% (58 base points) on average. Start-
ing in mid-2008, the asset-weighted index outperforms the equally weighted index, 
resulting in plus 167 base points by the end of 2011. Thus the large funds, which have a 
strong influence on the asset-weighted index, perform better than the smaller funds 
between late 2008 and 2011. This difference might be caused by large currency fluctua-
tions in the Euro (CGAP (ed.), 2012, 3), which have a disproportionately large effect on 
small funds: Larger funds may have better opportunities to deal with currency risks 
(for example due to their access to currency hedging facilities). Also, the microfinance 
crisis as well as the financial crisis could have impacted smaller funds more intensively 
(for example because of less diversification across regions and markets or because of 
less capacity for provisioning).  
In general, the differences between all three indexes are relatively small, which leads to 
the proposition that the performance of the debt funds using the Euro as their account-
ing currency is essentially similar. This could be explained by the earlier mentioned 
expectation that commercial funds all invest in the same Tier 1 MFIs (see 5.1).  
The results of the analysis of microfinance debt investments in US Dollars are similar to 
those for Euro investments (see Figure 9.2). For US Dollar funds, the average perfor-
mance is positive in every month, except in April and May 2011, while average month-
ly returns are clearly lower from 2009 to 2011 (0.22%) than they have been in the years 
before (0.41%).  
From 2004 until July 2007, the three indexes differ only marginally. After July 2007, the 
calculated US Dollar indexes clearly underperform the SMX USD, leading to minus 
4.76% (476 base points) on the equally weighted index and minus 6.51% (651 base 
points) for the asset-weighted index by December 2011. The reason for this significant 
underperformance is the exclusion of two high-performing funds that are included in 
SMX USD but failed to respond to our survey. The two funds that are substituted for 
them do not significantly underperform the other four funds in the sample.  
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In contrast to the Euro funds, the asset-weighted US Dollar index (MF USD Cap) starts 
to underperform in mid-2009 compared to the equally weighted index. The outperfor-
mance of the equally weighted index (MF USD) amounts to 1.75% (175 base points) by 
the end of 2011. Thus, when focusing on US Dollar vehicles, larger funds perform 
worse than the smaller funds.  
The constantly increasing pattern of the microfinance indexes calculated could indicate 
the presence of return smoothing techniques applied by fund managers. For example 
by strategically postponing parts of large returns from one year to another, they could 
have avoided the disclosure of lower return figures in later years. Nevertheless, in the 
years analysed, both MFIs and MFIFs experienced strong growth and no major crises 
emerged. Particularly before the years 2009 and 2010, MFI downturns were very rare 
and accordingly there is little in the literature that addresses microfinance crises on an 
institutional level (Rozas, 2011, 7). Still, for conclusive proof that fund managers did 
not apply methods of return smoothing there is insufficient information on the indi-
vidual portfolios available in this industry. Even though it is public knowledge that 
some institutions experienced problems, it is not possible to check whether particular 
funds had those titles included in their portfolios. Nevertheless, as the microfinance 
industry is still young, the realisation of growth is easier from very low starting levels, 
and this could explain the trend of the index indicating, for example, economic or tech-
nical development (Fahrmeir et al., 2003, 548).   
The fact that the benchmark results for both US Dollar and Euro funds is lower than 
the existing SMX indicates that the fund managers who responded have not overstated 
their performance in the survey. 
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Figure 9.2 Index for Investments in Debt (USD) 
 
Source: own research and www.syminvest.com (15.01.2012). 
9.3 COMPARISON OF MF INDEX WITH SRI AND TRADITIONAL 
INDEXES (US DOLLAR) 
9.3.1 COMPARISON OF THE DEBT INDEX 
The comparison of the calculated MF USD indexes with SRI and traditional indexes 
aims at disclosing the special characteristics of investments in microfinance described 
previously and possible diversification effects (see Figure 9.3).  
In this analysis, all the indexes included are equity based because bond indexes were 
elaborated much later, and to date, debt indexes are still in the minority (Reilly / 
Wright, 1997, 129), and when it comes to SRI, no debt index is widely established. The 
creation of bond market indexes is more difficult because the universe of bonds is larg-
er and changing constantly (Reilly / Wright, 1997, 131). Furthermore, a number of 
bond issues are not actively traded and sometimes still included in bond indexes. 
Therefore, the index might include price estimates for certain bonds which could lead 
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to inaccurate results (Elton et al., 2003, 23). Nevertheless, for completeness, a compari-
son with standard bond indexes follows on page 130.  
Figure 9.3 Comparison of MF Debt Index to SRI and Traditional Indexes (USD) 
 Source: own research and Bloomberg, 29.2.2012. 
Data on the traditional indexes MSCI World, MSCI Emerging Markets (MSCI EM) and 
the three SRI indexes DJSI USD, Calvert index (CALVIN) and FTSE4GOOD were re-
trieved from Bloomberg. I chose the three SRI indexes, which were introduced briefly 
in Chapter 2.2.1, based on data availability. The MSCI World index captures large and 
mid-cap representations across 24 developed countries, including 1,613 companies and 
accounting for around 84% of the free-float-adjusted market capitalisation of each 
country. The index is weighted using free-float-adjusted market capitalisations (UBS 
(ed.), 2012). The MSCI EM is a free-float-adjusted market capitalisation index that fo-
cuses on the equity market performance of emerging countries.105 
The microfinance monthly returns (USD) display low variation (standard deviation of 
0.21% for equal weighting and 0.24% for asset-weighting, calculated on monthly re-
turns) and follow a slowly growing path between 2004 and 2011. In contrast, both the 
                                                 
105  The following 21 countries are included: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey (as of May 30, 2011, see 
http://www.msci.com/products/indices/tools/index.html#EM, May 23, 2012). This selection of 
countries is therefore not a complete overlap with MFIF investment countries. 
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SRI indexes (DJSI, CALVIN, FTSE4GOOD) and the traditional indexes (MSCI World 
and MSCI EM) show up- and downturns during the eight-year period. Moreover, the 
variation in the returns is greater, as shown by a larger standard deviation of monthly 
returns amounting to 5.25% for DJSI, 4.87% for MSCI World and 7.29% for MSCI EM. 
The expectation based on PE investments, assuming that MFIFs would not show levels 
of volatility as high as publicly listed funds, is therefore confirmed. The high volatility 
of the MSCI EM indicates that the lower standard deviation of the MF index is not due 
to the focus on emerging markets. 
From the beginning of 2008, all the SRI and traditional indexes experienced a drastic 
downturn in performance that lasted until the beginning of 2009 (see Table 9.1). All the 
SRI indexes and the MSCI World index experienced negative growth during this time 
resulting in index values below 100. Until the beginning of 2009, the performance of all 
the indexes except the MSCI World and EM and the two MF indexes was negative. The 
CALVIN was hit hardest, resulting in an index low point (41.20 points) in February 
2009. By the end of 2008, both microfinance indexes performed better compared with 
the other indexes except for the MSCI EM (see Table 9.1). In 2009, the SRI and tradi-
tional indexes started to recover after a low point at the beginning of the year. The 
MSCI EM clearly outperforms all the other indexes over the whole observation period 
in total at a remarkable 60.20% above the second best performer, the MSCI World In-
dex. The total return achieved with traditional and SRI investments is higher by the 
end of 2011, as microfinance is outperformed by all other indexes except for the 
FTSE4GOOD and the CALVIN. I find similar results when focusing on investments in 
Euros and comparing the MF index EUR to the DJSI EUR, the ING socially responsible 
index and the MSCI World EUR (see Figure 12.1 in the Appendix). 
Nevertheless, for direct performance comparisons it is important to keep in mind that 
the index calculated here is based on fund data and when conducting analyses at the 
fund-level, differentiating between the performance of the fund manager and the secu-
rities themselves is difficult (Mollet / Ziegler, 2012, 3). Furthermore, risk profiles are 
not necessarily comparable among the indexes due to the focus of MFIFs on small 
companies, whereas other indexes comprise large entities (Globalance (ed.), 2012, 49). 
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Table 9.1 Performance in US Dollar 
Index Total Cumulative Return Volatility 
 31.12.2007 31.12.2008 31.12.2009 31.12.2010 31.12.2011 2004-2011 
MF USD 18.66% 24.78% 27.49% 30.19% 32.72% 0.21% 
MF USD Cap 18.96% 24.99% 26.79% 28.94% 30.97% 0.24% 
MSCI World 61.16% 6.59% 40.57% 56.29% 52.02% 4.87% 
MSCI EM 113.79% 50.24% 110.30% 128.88% 112.21% 7.29% 
DJSI USD 57.34% -9.82% 33.47% 44.74% 37.18% 5.25% 
CALVIN 29.75% -33.39% 8.77% 27.06% 26.51% 4.69% 
FTSE4GOOD 37.49% -12.14% 15.20% 24.56% 19.16% 5.09% 
Source: own calculation, return compared to base period December 2003. 
Table 9.2 Correlation MF Debt Index with SRI / Traditional Indexes (2003-2011) 
 MF USD MSCI World MSCI EM DJSI USD CALVIN FTSE4GOOD 
MF USD 1.0000      
MSCI World -0.0578 1.0000***     
MSCI EM -0.0469 0.8947*** 1.0000***    
DJSI USD -0.0512 0.9907*** 0.9005*** 1.0000***   
CALVIN -0.0502 0.9409*** 0.7840*** 0.9155*** 1.0000***  
FTSE4GOOD -0.0498 0.9928*** 0.8759*** 0.9913*** 0.9433*** 1.0000*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Analysis of the correlation coefficients between the different monthly returns in the 
period 2003 to 2011 shows that all returns are strongly positively correlated except for 
the MF returns (see Table 9.2), which are negatively correlated to all the other index 
returns, although not at a significant level. While this result is remarkable and the 
method is also applied by other researchers (e.g. Statman, 2006, 108; Reilly / Wright, 
1997, 139 ff.), it is necessary to point out some limitations. Economic variables such as 
monthly performance, which exhibit strong trends, are not stationary in many cases 
(Green, 2012, 942). This implies that mean, variance and covariance change over time, 
and regular correlation estimations are possibly biased. Moreover, time-series data dis-
turbances often display autocorrelation or serial correlation over time (Green, 2012, 
903). The so-called ARIMA model controls for non-stationary effects by calculating 
first-differences of the variables (Green, 2012, 943). This adjustment of the variables 
leads to stationary outcomes. The ARIMA model is applied here as well, and the same 
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albeit insignificant negative effects are found between the MF index and the other in-
dexes (results available on request). 
Possible reasons for the relatively stable growth of the MFIFs are the earlier mentioned 
illiquidity, the long-term investment focus, and the few valuation dates. Moreover, 
most MFIFs that invest in MFIs using debt obligations tend to value the obligations at 
par. This results in the low volatility of the return. Previous research by Oehri / 
Schäfer (2011, 110) confirms the low volatility and stable returns of MFIFs. The only 
events that significantly influence the NAV and thus the return of a MFIF are the 
write-offs of existing loans due to the risk of default or the building of provisions (see 
Chapter 6.1) (Symbiotics (ed.), 2012a, 89). During the recent crisis, the MFIFs’ NAVs 
did not suffer from defaults or higher provisions to any significant extent. In total, the 
development of the funds remained positive, except for two months when the US Dol-
lar funds moved into the negative zone. These results support the view that the micro-
finance industry tends not to be affected by financial crises (Krauss and Walter, 2008; 
González, 2007).  
However, Wagner (2012) finds that MFI credit growth slowed substantially and portfo-
lio quality deteriorated in the microfinance industry in 2008 and 2009, particularly in 
countries with strong capital inflows (Wagner, 2012, 10). This development would 
suggest that the microfinance market is not operating independently from the tradi-
tional banking sector in certain regions. She argues that microfinance has become part 
of the global credit cycle and thus reacts to crises in a similar way to the rest of the 
market (Wagner, 2012, 18).  
Comparing both types of evidence, it seems therefore fair to assume that the perfor-
mance of MFIFs is more immune to crises and less connected to global developments 
than individual MFIs are, due to diversification across countries and markets. This re-
inforces the fact that investing in microfinance through funds rather than directly 
through MFIs is less risky for investors. The funds that provide performance infor-
mation tend of course to be the larger and more diversified ones, which strengthens 
this effect. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the funds that provide performance in-
formation might also be the ones that are performing best, or the ones least affected by 
the crisis. As stated earlier, another explanation would be that MFIs have not yet writ-
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ten off the loans that are overdue despite the high PAR30 values prevailing in some 
regions and funds therefore did not adjust provisions accordingly.  
The results confirm that the financial performance of microfinance investments differs 
greatly from traditional and SRI indexes and, thus, might be interesting for the purpose 
of diversifying existing portfolios. Particularly in phases of turmoil, the MF index has 
not reacted in the same way as other indexes. All the indexes that are included are eq-
uity based and therefore probably subject to factors other than debt investments in mi-
crofinance. I assume that the differences between microfinance debt investments and 
the other indexes are not caused by the special nature or the regional allocation of the 
microfinance market, but by the unique characteristics of microfinance returns. The 
financial performance of microfinance funds (debt) is influenced to a large extent by 
interest payments and is therefore not comparable with equity investments. The 
benchmarks used by the funds (money market plus, LIBOR) are appropriate because 
the development of the index shows similar attributes and low volatility. As suggested 
by Hechler-Fayd’herbe in 2010, investments in microfinance perform in a way that is 
similar to money market instruments. This is not surprising as the interest rates paid by 
the clients are short term and can thus be adjusted regularly to reference rates, such as 
LIBOR or EURIBOR (Hechler-Fayd’herbe, 2010, 2).  
Because of this special characteristic of microfinance investments, an assessment of the 
relationship between the MF index and bond indexes is necessary. In this analysis, the 
JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index (JP GG) 106 and the JP Morgan Emerging 
Market Bond Index (JP EMBI) are taken into account, while I find the JP GG to offer the 
best match from a performance point of view (see Figure 9.4). Cumulative performance 
seems to follow a similar path, and monthly performance is mostly positive and rela-
tively independent of the financial crisis. The correlation coefficient between the 
monthly performances of the two indexes is positive but insignificant. Tracking fixed 
rate issuances from countries around the world, the JP GG also fully depends on inter-
est rate payments, which is likely to be the reason for the performance link to micro-
finance. However, unlike to microfinance investment funds, the JP GG focuses on 
bonds issued by governments. The respective types of issuers are therefore quite dif-
                                                 
106  This index tracks fixed rate issuances from countries around the world, hedged in US Dollar.  
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ferent. Government bonds are comparable with corporate bonds regarding repayment 
patterns, nevertheless, corporate bonds face a higher risk of default (Elton et al., 2003, 
15). The JP EMBI, tracking actively traded external debt instruments in emerging mar-
kets107, clearly outperforms the MF index. Furthermore, the correlation of the monthly 
performances is negative between the two indexes.  
Figure 9.4 Bond Indexes in Comparison with MF Debt Indexes (USD) 
 Source: own research and Bloomberg, 29.2.2012. 
To conclude, an index closely related to monthly microfinance performance cannot be 
identified, even when bond and emerging market indexes are included. Although the 
path of the JP GG seems to be in line with the MF index, the monthly performances are 
not significantly related. 
9.3.2 COMPARISON OF EQUITY INDEXES 
The analysis of equity investments shows a different picture. Equity investments can 
only be represented by the SMX equity, as I do not have enough data points to calcu-
late a specific equity index. As mentioned earlier, the SMX equity is based on the per-
formance of the five largest MFIs, which are all publicly listed.  
The SMX equity shows higher standard deviation (8.51%) than the debt investments in 
microfinance. Moreover, contrasting with the debt indexes, the SMX equity exhibits a 
                                                 
107  See http://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/research/EMBI. 
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downturn in 2008 / 2009 (resulting in a low mark of 138.71, simultaneously with the 
SRI and traditional indexes in February 2009) followed by a phase of growth in the first 
half of 2010. The cumulative performance of the five MFIs used by Symbiotics for the 
SMX equity is higher than the performance of the SRI indexes or the traditional indexes 
(see Figure 9.5). The MSCI EM performs better than all the other indexes except the 
SMX equity. The outperformance of the SMX equity amounts to a maximum of 59.16% 
(5,916.07 base points) compared with the MSCI World and 35.92% (3,591.72 base 
points) compared with the MSCI EM over the whole period. The SMX equity reached a 
peak in September 2010 and then fell consistently until the end of 2011, when it clearly 
underperformed the other indexes. This downturn is most probably linked to the re-
cent crises in Andhra Pradesh and Nicaragua strongly influencing two of the five insti-
tutions representing the SMX equity. 
Investments in microfinance through equity are expected to show higher returns than 
debt investments (Symbiotics (ed.), 2012a, 29) and higher than commercial indexes 
(O’Donohoe et al., 2009, 27). However, an index calculation using equity funds rather 
than MFIs would be more appropriate and possibly lead to weaker results.  
In October 2011, Brière and Szafarz calculated an equity index that includes all publicly 
listed MFIs worldwide.108 By first calculating capitalisation weighted indexes for sever-
al countries (Kenya, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mexico and South Africa) and then aggre-
gating the countries into one worldwide capitalisation weighted equity index, they 
generate a global microfinance index (GMI). They compare their index with a con-
structed global financial index (GFI) mimicking the procedure of the GMI and includ-
ing the same countries. The authors find evidence that the GMI and the GFI have large-
ly converged, starting around 2003. For South African MFIs they find exceptionally 
high growth between 1990 and 2010 (6 ff.). However, the SMX equity largely outper-
forms their equity based GMI index, which includes more MFIs. The cause of the out-
performance by the five MFIs used by Symbiotics is not linked to regional effects as 
they are distributed across different regions (Bangladesh, Mexico, Indonesia, Kenya 
and India). There must therefore be other reasons for the high performance of the five 
                                                 
108  They consider three MFIs in South Africa, one in Kenya, two in Indonesia, one in Bangladesh and two 
in Mexico (total of 9 MFIs). 
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MFIs considered by Symbiotics. The SMX equity outperforms an index measuring the 
performance of all listed MFIs and might outperform non-listed MFIs even more, and 
therefore seems most probably not to represent the microfinance industry appropriate-
ly. 
Figure 9.5 Comparison of SMX Equity to SRI and Traditional Indexes (USD) 
 
Source: own research and Bloomberg, 29.2.2012. 
The correlation coefficients between the SMX equity and the SRI and traditional index-
es are shown in Table 9.3. The SMX equity reveals a strong and significant correlation 
with the other four indexes. While the correlation coefficient is lower than the coeffi-
cients between the SRI and commercial indexes, it is significantly positive. As with the 
debt investments, broader analysis is helpful. Running the ARIMA model for the equi-
ty investments, I again find significantly positive results for all index returns compared 
with the SMX equity (results available on request). 
Table 9.3 Correlation SMX Equity with SRI / Traditional Indexes (2003-2011) 
 SMX Equity MSCI World MSCI EM DJSI USD CALVIN FTSE4GOOD 
SMX Equity 1.0000***      
MSCI World 0.5900*** 1.0000***     
MSCI EM 0.6224*** 0.9084*** 1.0000***    
DJSI USD 0.5761*** 0.9911*** 0.9171*** 1.0000***    
CALVIN 0.5438*** 0.9533*** 0.8152*** 0.9286*** 1.0000***  
FTSE4GOOD 0.5798*** 0.9936*** 0.8943*** 0.9920*** 0.9536*** 1.000***  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The weak and even negative correlation between the MF indexes and traditional and 
SRI indexes leads to the result that for the debt part of the investments diversification 
possibilities exist. Once debt investments in SRI are more elaborated and debt SRI in-
dexes exist, this analysis could be revisited.  
The interaction between social and financial performance besides microfinance diversi-
fication possibilities is analysed in the following Chapter using data on MFIs rather 
than funds. MFI level data are used to overcome the problem of the lack of MFIF data 
on social performance. Only 12 survey participants provided information on both so-
cial and financial return. Furthermore, social return is difficult to measure and compare 
across funds. As discussed above, funds must apply appropriate methodologies for the 
calculation of an average value for all the MFIs they are invested in. Comparison of 
social performance is particularly difficult for funds invested indirectly in MFIs 
through other vehicles (as discussed earlier in Chapter 6.2). 
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10. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS: SOCIAL VERSUS FINANCIAL 
RETURN 
10.1 SOCIAL VERSUS FINANCIAL RETURN:  HYPOTHESES 
Three Hypotheses are elaborated based on the existing literature concerning the inter-
action between outreach to the poor and financial return in microfinance (see Chapter 
4.4.2 for details). Prevailing research is not consistent regarding the direction of the in-
teraction of social factors with financial return. Social return is in microfinance usually 
measured based on outreach to the poor, operationalised with percentage of female 
clients and average loan balance. Certain researchers find deeper outreach to the poor 
related to lower efficiency (e.g. Conning, 1999; Cull et al., 2007; Hermes, 2011) while 
others see a positive relationship between outreach and financial self-sufficiency (e.g. 
Paxton, 2003; Quayes, 2011). Furthermore, Cull et al., 2007, find no significant relation-
ship between outreach and return measures. These contradictory results motivated a 
more detailed analysis. Besides the traditionally estimated factors measuring return 
and costs, portfolio yield is analysed here as well. The intention is to go one step deeper 
by trying to identify how the factors driving return measures (cost and yield) are relat-
ed to outreach measures. The Hypotheses developed here are based on the assumption 
that outreach to the poor controversially influences different aspects of financial return 
(Figure 10.1). Existing research indicates that outreach to the poor positively impacts 
portfolio yield and increases costs at the same time, which would lead to a zero or very 
weak influence on return measures. 
All three Hypotheses address the relationship between financial return and outreach to 
the poor. 
The first Hypothesis reflects the findings of Conning (1999) indicating that MFIs 
providing smaller loans charge higher interest rates. Portfolio yield measures clients’ 
gross interest payables by dividing interest and fee income by average loan portfolio 
and is therefore used as a proxy for interest rate. Smaller loans in turn indicate higher 
levels of outreach. Confirmation of this Hypothesis would indicate higher returns with 
more outreach to the poor (everything else being equal). 
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Figure 10.1 Overview Hypotheses 
 
Source: own research. 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the outreach, the higher the portfolio yield. 
The second Hypothesis is predicated on the results of several authors including Con-
ning (1999), Paxton (2003), Cull et al. (2007) and Hermes et al. (2011) who show evi-
dence that social return (outreach) comes at higher costs: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the outreach, the higher the costs. 
Therefore, the second Hypothesis indicates lower returns at more outreach (everything 
else being equal). 
The third Hypothesis then follows directly from the first two. Financial return meas-
ured as ROA, ROE or OSS is controversially affected by portfolio yield and costs. All 
return measures increase with portfolio yield and lower with costs. This Hypothesis is 
based on the findings of Dam (2008), who states that various financial measures are 
diversely connected to social factors (Dam, 2008, 27). If outreach has a positive impact 
on both portfolio yield and costs, the resulting effect on return could be erased.109  
Hypothesis 3: Outreach is not related to financial return. 
The interaction between the three Hypotheses is of course limited because earnings 
other than portfolio yield could influence return. Also, a wide spectrum of costs, possi-
bly not all connected with outreach, could affect financial return.  
                                                 
109  Assuming that the two effects are of similar size. 
Increase in Portfolio 
Yield (YIELD/R) 
Increase in Costs 
(OPEXP)
No effect on Return 
(ROA/ROE/OSS)
Increase in Outreach 
(FEMALE, ALB_GNI)
H 2
H 1 H 3
H 3
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Hypothesis 3 is also supported by the fact that until now, researchers have not found a 
significant relationship between financial return (measured as profitability) and social 
return measured by means of a variety of indicators (Cull et al., 2007; Quayes, 2011). 
10.2 OPERATIONALISATION OF VARIABLES 
10.2.1 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES: DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
There are various measures that can be used for the analysis of the financial perfor-
mance of MFIs. Since MFIs are not listed, accounting indicators such as ROA, ROE and 
efficiency measures are used as indicators of performance (Galema et al., 2011, 511; 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010, 438).  
The top ten KPIs of MFIs defined by Symbiotics are a useful source of measures rele-
vant to MFIs and nine of the ten measures are used in this analysis (see Table 10.1).110 
This analysis uses total assets as a proxy for the size of an MFI rather than the loan 
portfolio.111 Number of clients is a measure for the breadth of outreach (social perfor-
mance). I use this measure only in the regression diagnostics to analyse whether the 
effect of breadth is comparable with the influence of depth of outreach.  
To test the first Hypothesis, I take portfolio yield on both a nominal (YIELD) and a real 
(YIELDR) base. Portfolio yield is used as a proxy for average interest rates at MFI levels 
(González, 2011, 1). Higher portfolio yield values indicate higher revenues earned by 
the institutions and thus better financial performance. Loan losses are not subtracted 
from the revenue, which means that YIELD is a gross measure capturing the interest 
rate charged by the lender, rather than the interest rate realised on the portfolio (Cull et 
al., 2007, F118). 
As a proxy for costs (Hypothesis 2), I use operating expenses divided by assets 
(OPEXP), as they have been found to be the most important driver of differences in 
total costs between institutions (Cull et al., 2009, 183). In the dataset used, operating 
                                                 
110  Other authors use the same or similar KPIs (e.g. Krauss / Walter, 2008, 8; Ledgerwood, 1999, 205 ff.); 
see also KPIs used in existing research mentioned in 4.4.2. 
111  The analysis does only differ marginally when instead including loan portfolio. In the main dataset 
used, gross loan portfolio and total assets are strongly correlated with a correlation coefficient 
amounting to 0.98, significant on the 1% level (own calculation using 2,547 observations). 
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expenses and total expenses strongly correlate (coefficient of 0.92, significant at the 1% 
level). Results therefore only differ marginally if including total expenses in the analy-
sis instead of operating expenses. Operating expenses are the best indicator for the effi-
ciency of the MFI’s lending operations (Ledgerwood, 1999, 214) and are therefore an 
appropriate measure. 
Table 10.1 MFI Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) by Symbiotics 
Key Performance Indicators Used as 
Total Assets Control Variable 
Loan Portfolio Not Used 
Number of Clients Regression Diagnostics 
Average Loan Social Performance 
Portfolio Yield Financial Performance, Hypothesis 1 
Portfolio at Risk > 30 days (PAR30) Control Variable  
Operating Expense Financial Performance, Hypothesis 2 
Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) Financial Performance, Hypothesis 3 
Debt / Equity Ratio Control Variable 
Return on Equity (ROE) Financial Performance, Hypothesis 3 
Source: Symbiotics (ed.), 2012a, 30. 
ROA, ROE and OSS were used to measure the financial return of MFIs and to test the 
third Hypothesis. ROA and ROE are measures widely used for the performance of 
banks and companies as well as microfinance institutions (Ledgerwood, 1999, 221). 
ROA puts return in relation to total assets and ROE defines the relationship between 
return and equity. OSS reflects the performance of institutions before subsidies. Subsi-
dies are usually provided in the form of grants or loans at interest rates below market 
rates. It is likely that some institutions would not be able to maintain their performance 
without subsidies (Rosenberg, 2009, 9). OSS measures the degree to which operational 
income covers expenses (operating expenses, financial expenses plus impairment loss-
es) and is therefore not affected by subsidies.  
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10.2.2 SOCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
I analyse social return using depth of outreach, which is measured in two ways: the 
percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and the average loan size in relation to GNI 
per capita (ALB_GNI). These two variables are chosen for different reasons. Depth of 
outreach instead of breadth captures more of the social attitude of MFIs (Conning, 
1999, 52). Nevertheless, breadth of outreach is used in an additional analysis in Chapter 
10.5.4.5 to cover the whole spectrum of outreach to the poor. I use female borrowers as 
a proxy for depth of outreach because women usually have less access to financial ser-
vices (GPFI / IFC (ed.), 2011, 18). Furthermore, women have been traditionally some-
what excluded from decisions related to finance at the household level and they often 
lack access to financial services (Ledgerwood, 1999, 226). Still, the percentage of female 
clients is not the perfect measure of outreach, as reasons other than a more socially con-
scious attitude could force or motivate an institution to serve more or less women. For 
example, the religious or ethical context could play a role, as in some regions women 
might not have the right to obtain a loan (Urgeghe, 2010, 75). However, I continue to 
use the percentage of female borrowers as a proxy for outreach, because so far no other 
more relevant indicators for social return have been elaborated. To ensure a broader 
picture of outreach, I also measure the average loan size. 
Among investors and donors, the size of the loans distributed is commonly used as a 
proxy for a MFI’s outreach to the poor (Mersland / Strom, 2010, 29). ALB in relation to 
GNI per capita provides a better and stronger measure than does ALB alone (as de-
scribed in Chapter 8.3.2). Nevertheless, the average loan balance is an often-criticised 
measure as it is not comparable for all loans, being influenced by term to maturity, re-
payment frequency and the size and number of instalments. For example a two-year 
loan that is paid back in one instalment yields on average the same as the amount dis-
bursed. However, a loan that is repaid in equal monthly instalments over the two years 
yields on average slightly more than the amount disbursed (Schreiner, 2001, 34). Ex-
perts criticise quantitative approaches in general on the grounds of biases that result 
from the failure to take all the cultural and social factors into account (Paxton, 2003, 4; 
Ledgerwood, 1999, 225). 
140 10. Econometric Analysis: Social versus Financial Return 
Another factor that is sometimes used to indicate the depth of outreach is the propor-
tion of rural customers. Unfortunately these data are not available either in the data file 
that is used or in other large-scale datasets. Likewise, more detailed measures of depth 
of outreach, such as education, ethnicity, housing, access to public services of custom-
ers etc. are not publicly captured. Therefore, to date it is not possible to focus on quan-
titative measures of outreach to the poor other than the percentage of female borrowers 
and average loan balance. (See other approaches to measure social return in 3.3).  
Nevertheless, average loan balance per borrower seems to be an efficient proxy for 
depth of outreach as Quayes (2011) finds a strong positive correlation between the in-
come level of clients and loan size, meaning that poorer clients obtain smaller loans 
(Quayes, 2011, 3424). Furthermore, most previous research studies also use either fe-
male clients and average loan balance or only one of the two measures to capture the 
social performance of MFIs (see literature review in Chapter 4.4.2). 
To conclude, two measures to capture outreach are used: outreach increases with the 
percentage of female clients and decreases with higher average amounts of loans dis-
tributed. 
10.3 REFINEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Using the above-specified variables for the measurement of financial and social per-
formance, the following refinements to the Hypotheses elaborated earlier are made: 
 H1a: The more female clients served (FEMALE), the higher the portfolio yield on a nom-
inal and a real base (YIELD / YIELDR); 
 H1b: The lower the average loan balances in relation to GNI per capita (ALB_GNI), the 
higher the portfolio yield on a nominal and a real base (YIELD / YIELDR); 
 H2a: The more female clients served (FEMALE), the higher the operating expenses 
(OPEXP); 
 H2b: The lower the average loan balances in relation to GNI per capita (ALB_GNI), the 
higher the operating expenses (OPEXP); 
 H3a: The percentage of female clients  (FEMALE) has no impact on financial return 
(ROA / ROE / OSS); 
 H3b: The average loan balance in relation to GNI per capita (ALB_GNI) has no impact 
on financial return (ROA / ROE / OSS). 
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10.4 EMPIRICAL METHOD 
To estimate the model, cross-sectional data on MFIs is pooled for the years 2004 to 
2010. The result is an unbalanced panel dataset112, while all MFIs reporting to MIX dur-
ing the seven-year period are included. 
The multivariate analysis is based on an Ordinary Least Square (OLS)-regression. The 
relevant variables are defined and their functional interaction assessed. In the next step, 
the regression is estimated by identifying the coefficients based on the available data-
base. The values, the sign and the significance of the different coefficients are then test-
ed. A discussion of the results based on the Hypotheses is followed by the validation of 
the regression model applying several tests. 
As the sample includes more than one observation per institution (over several years) 
the standard errors may be correlated. Therefore, heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by MFI are included.113 Furthermore, time-effects are controlled by the 
inclusion of dummy variables for each year because an unobservable incident in a spe-
cific year could have influenced the observations.  
10.5 ESTIMATION OF THE REGRESSION  
10.5.1 REGRESSION MODELS 
To test the three Hypotheses developed in Chapter 10.3 the following three regression 
models are estimated: 
Model 1: 
ܻܫܧܮܦ௜௧/ܻܫܧܮܦܴ௜௧
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܧܯܣܮܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܣܮܤ_ܩܰܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܣܩܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܲܣܴ30௜௧
൅ ߚ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻ିଵଵܮܧܩܣܮ௧ ൅ ߚଵଶିଵ଺ܴܧܩܫܱܰ௧ ൅ ߚଵ଻ିଶଶܻܧܣܴ௧൅ߝ௜௧ 
Model 2: 
ܱܲܧܺ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܧܯܣܮܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܣܮܤ_ܩܰܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܣܩܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܲܣܴ30௜௧
൅ ߚ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻ିଵଵ െ ܮܧܩܣܮ௧ ൅ ߚଵଶିଵ଺ܴܧܩܫܱ ௧ܰ ൅ ߚଵ଻ିଶଶܻܧܣܴ௧൅ߝ௜௧ 
                                                 
112  Using an unbalanced dataset rather than a balanced one has the advantage of representing the market 
more effectively by including all MFIs and preventing survivorship bias (see Baum, 2006, 47). 
113  So-called Roger’s standard errors, which are White standard errors, adjusted for potential correlation 
within clusters (see Petersen, 2009, 436). 
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Model 3: 
ܴܱܣ௜௧/ܴܱܧ௜௧/ܱܵ ௜ܵ௧
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܧܯܣܮܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܣܮܤ_ܩܰܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܣܩܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܲܣܴ30௜௧
൅ ߚ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻ିଵଵܮܧܩܣܮ௧ ൅ ߚଵଶିଵ଺ܴܧܩܫܱ ௧ܰ ൅ ߚଵ଻ିଶଶܻܧܣܴ௧൅ߝ௜௧ 
where: 
Dependent Variables 
YIELD = Gross yield on portfolio (nominal) (%) 
Gross measure capturing the interest reve-
nues earned by the institutions in relation to 
the portfolio (nominal) 
YIELDR = Gross yield on portfolio (real) (%) 
Gross measure capturing the interest reve-
nues earned by the institutions in relation to 
the portfolio (real) 
OPEXP = Operating expenses of MFI (%) Operating expenses in relation to total assets 
ROA = Return on assets (%) Return divided by total assets 
ROE = Return on equity (%) Return divided by equity 
OSS = Operational self-sufficiency (%) Degree to which operational income covers expenses 
Explanatory Variables 
FEMALE = Percentage of female clients (%) Percentage of females that are served by MFI 
ALB_GNI = Average loan balance (%) Average loan in relation to GNI per Capita Average loan balance distributed by MFI 
Control Variables 
SIZE =Size of the MFI Natural logarithm of total assets of MFI 
AGE =Age of the MFI Years since foundation of the MFI 
PAR30 =Portfolio at risk, 30 days (%) Percentage of loans overdue more than 30 days 
LEVERAGE =Leverage of the MFI Debt to equity ratio divided by 100 
LEGAL =Legal Status of the MFI 
Vector of dummy variables indicating legal 
status of the MFI: Bank (BANK), credit union / 
cooperative (COOP), non-governmental organ-
isation (NGO), other (OTHER), rural bank 
(RURBANK), non-banking financial institution 
(NBFI, excluded as base) 
REGION =Regional location of the MFI 
Vector of dummy variables indicating regional 
location of the MFI: Africa (AFRICA), Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North-
ern Africa (MENA), East Asia and the Pacific 
(EAP, excluded as base) 
YEAR =Year fixed effects Dummy variable for each year from 2005 to 2010, taking 2004 as base 
and i = MFI, t = Year 
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The three different models are used for the three sets of Hypotheses, as the relevant 
dependent and independent variables used and the predicted sign of the coefficients 
differ (see an overview in Table 10.2).114 
Table 10.2 Summary of the Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIS         REGRESSION 
MODEL USED 
FINANCIAL RETURN 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
OUTREACH 
(INDEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
PREDICTED SIGN 
Hypothesis 1a MODEL 1 YIELD/YIELDR FEMALE POSITIVE 
Hypothesis 1b MODEL 1 YIELD/YIELDR ALB_GNI NEGATIVE 
Hypothesis 2a MODEL 2 OPEXP FEMALE POSITIVE 
Hypothesis 2b MODEL 2 OPEXP ALB_GNI NEGATIVE 
Hypothesis 3a MODEL 3 ROA/ROE/OSS FEMALE INSIGNIFICANT 
Hypothesis 3b MODEL 3 ROA/ROE/OSS ALB_GNI INSIGNIFICANT 
Source: own research. 
To test for other effects that might influence the relationship between social and finan-
cial return, I include several control variables. These are defined by referring to the pre-
vious research and results elaborated in Chapter 8 (legal status and region).  
SIZE and AGE of an institution have often been found to correlate with performance 
measures (Cull et al., 2007, F113; Barnett / Salomon, 2006, 1115; Zacharias, 2008, 14). 
Therefore, controlling for AGE and SIZE ensures that any relationship between out-
reach and financial performance is not affected by differences in the size or age of the 
MFIs. It has been found before that the age of a MFI might have a positive impact on its 
efficiency (Caudill et al., 2009, 662). Moreover, larger MFIs have often been found to 
have lower costs per borrower and lower costs per dollar lent. This relationship may be 
explained either by scale or by a learning curve effect, as larger MFIs are likely to be 
older (González, 2011, 3). For SIZE, I use the natural logarithm of total assets of a MFI 
                                                 
114  To assure an easy understanding of the regression analysis, it is important to keep in mind, that out-
reach is measured here using two variables (female and average loan balance in relation to GNI), 
whereas the two expected effects are opposite. The reason for this is that the variable female is posi-
tively related to outreach (increases outreach), while average loan is negatively related. 
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(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007, 62). AGE refers to the number of years an institution has 
been active using the year of inception as the starting point.  
I include PAR30 to control for different risk structures by measuring the portion of the 
portfolio with payments overdue by more than 30 days.115 The debt to equity ratio, 
LEVERAGE, is included as a control for different financing structures that could influ-
ence financial performance (Conning, 1999, 75). The leverage of MFIs varies depending 
on the amount of their subsidies or financing by funds (debt or equity) and these large 
differences could have an impact on return. Existing research finds contradictory re-
sults on the direction of the influence (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007, 68; Quayes, 2011, 
3429). Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) uses panel data from Ghana and finds that highly 
leveraged MFIs reach out to more clients and enjoy economies of scale (68). Quayes 
(2011) in contrast finds that leverage has a negative influence on the performance of 
MFIs measured as financial sustainability (3430). To control for the structural character-
istics of MFIs, I define the following fixed effects for legal status: BANK, COOP (credit 
union / cooperative), NGO (non-governmental organisation), OTHER, RURBANK (ru-
ral bank) and NBFI (non-banking financial institution). I exclude NBFI as base for the 
dummy, and thus the effects on the other legal status variables show the differences 
versus the observations on NBFI. For regional fixed effects, I use the traditional regions 
Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle 
East and North Africa, South Asia and East Asia and Pacific (Cull et al., 2007, F118), 
excluding East Asia and Pacific as the base region. To measure differences across peri-
ods, I include yearly fixed effects for all but the base year (2004) (YEAR). The dummy 
variable for each year takes the value 1 for the corresponding year and 0 otherwise.  
The consideration of multiple dummy variables (LEGAL, REGION, YEAR) results in 
different intercepts for each observation, controlling for the various fixed effects of the 
particular variables (Wooldridge, 2003, 438). 
10.5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The MFIs in the database report an average nominal portfolio yield of 33.94% and an 
average real portfolio yield of 25.38% (see Table 10.3). Real yield demonstrates (with a 
                                                 
115  I also included the write-off ratio as a control, but the results remain stable and as the focus here is 
not on risk measures, I only include PAR30. 
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minimum of -22.40%) that when inflation is high, some MFIs realise a loss rather than a 
gain from interest revenues in real terms. For both nominal and real yield the mean is 
higher than the median, indicating a positively skewed distribution. The mean operat-
ing expenses in relation to assets is 17.60% with a maximum of 109.16%. 
The distribution of ROE shows a large range from -1,286.19% to 1,791.28%. These large 
positive and negative levels can be explained by very small MFIs with a minor equity 
base. Nevertheless, these values are exceptions, as the average ROE is at 12.68%. In ad-
dition to the KPIs in As a proxy for costs (Hypothesis 2), I use operating expenses di-
vided by assets (OPEXP), as they have been found to be the most important driver of 
differences in total costs between institutions (Cull et al., 2009, 183). In the dataset used, 
operating expenses and total expenses strongly correlate (coefficient of 0.92, significant 
at the 1% level). Results therefore only differ marginally if including total expenses in 
the analysis instead of operating expenses. Operating expenses are the best indicator 
for the efficiency of the MFI’s lending operations (Ledgerwood, 1999, 214) and are 
therefore an appropriate measure. 
Table 10.1, I include ROA in the analysis. ROE could be misleading and show positive 
results for MFIs exhibiting negative equity and negative return at the same time. With a 
mean of 3.06% and a median of 3.07%, ROA is approximately symmetrically skewed 
and distributed within a smaller range between -101.26% and 35.97%. Average values 
for ROA are rather low, caused by a large number of MFIs showing clearly negative 
performance results (250 of the 1,508 observations of ROA are below zero). The mean 
value of OSS is 122.47%, ranging from a minimum of 13.32% to a maximum of 833.88%. 
This means that at the maximum, operational income covers expenses by a factor of 
eight. 
The average percentage of female clients is 62.52% and the distribution ranges from 1% 
to 100%. The median of 59.67% almost corresponds with the mean. The average loan 
balance is strongly positively skewed, as the mean (USD 1,165.45) is much larger than 
the median (USD 637.54). This means that a larger fraction of loans is small. The distri-
bution of ALB in relation to GNI per capita ranges from a minimum of 0.28% to a max-
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imum of 773.33%.116 The logarithm of total assets leads to a mean value for size of USD 
16.41. The age varies from 2 to 50 years with a mean of 16.80 years. Risk, measured as 
PAR30, is 4.47% on average with a range from 0.00% to 73.47%. PAR30 is strongly posi-
tively skewed as a large fraction of the observations shows a level of PAR30 below 5% 
(1,098 among the 1,508 observations). The mean leverage amounts to 5.09, which is the 
result of some MFIs being almost exclusively funded by debt. Again, the large maxi-
mum (302.56) is most probably driven by institutions with very small equity bases. 
Table 10.3 Summary Statistics for the Main Sample 2004-2010 
VARIABLE OBS. MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
YIELD 1,508 33.94% 30.36% 16.36% 4.40% 188.36% 
YIELDR 1,508 25.38% 22.17% 16.48% -22.40% 178.89% 
OPEXP 1,508 17.60% 14.40% 11.16% 2.11% 109.16% 
ROA 1,508 3.06% 3.07% 7.67% -101.26% 35.97% 
ROE 1,508 12.68% 11.76% 94.65% -1286.19% 1791.28% 
OSS 1,508 122.47% 117.67% 39.24% 13.32% 833.88% 
FEMALE 1,508 62.52% 59.67% 24.42% 1.00% 100.00% 
ALB 1,508 1165.45 637.54 1723.61 5.01 36954.30 
ALB_GNI 1,508 58.92% 33.04% 77.13% 0.28% 773.33% 
SIZE 1,508 16.41 16.26 1.67 12.07 21.77 
AGE 1,508 16.80 15.00 7.18 2.00 50.00 
PAR30 1,508 4.47% 2.52% 6.69% 0.00% 73.47% 
LEVERAGE 1,508 5.09 2.79 13.98 0.00 302.56 
This Table displays summary statistics for the sample of 1,508 MFI observations, retrieved from MIX in 
2012. The variables are defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
Source: own analysis, data from MIX (2012). 
10.5.3 RESULTS 
10.5.3.1 RESULTS IN RELATION TO THE HYPOTHESES 
The constant of the first model (columns (1) and (2) in Table 10.4) is positive and re-
flects the YIELD / YIELDR of a MFI if all other variables take the value zero 
(Wooldridge, 2003, 75).  
Evidence is found to support the first Hypothesis, which states that yield on portfolio is 
positively correlated to outreach (columns (1) and (2) in Table 10.4). The variable 
FEMALE shows a positive coefficient for both nominal (YIELD) and real yield 
                                                 
116  This seems like a very large value but it can be explained using the example of a MFI offering average 
loans of USD 7,730 in a country that has a GNI per capita of USD 1,000. 
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(YIELDR) confirming Hypothesis 1a. The coefficients for both measures are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level (indicated by three stars), representing a margin of 
error of less than 1%. This means that the more women served by a MFI, the higher the 
portfolio yield. The value of the coefficient (0.16) means that institutions serving only 
female clients request interest rates that are on average one standard deviation higher 
(both real and nominal) than the rates that institutions serving only males charge. One 
reason for this could be that women accept higher prices for loans because they face 
more difficulties with regard to financial access in general. 
Evidence is also found to support Hypothesis 1b because the coefficient of ALB_GNI 
(average loan balance divided by GNI per capita) in relation to YIELD and YIELDR is 
significantly negative at the 1% level. Therefore, the lower the average loan size divid-
ed by GNI per capita (i.e. the more outreach is achieved), the higher the portfolio yield 
for a given MFI. The value of the coefficient is rather small though, indicating that a 
100% increase in average loan balance in relation to GNI leads to a reduction of the 
yield by a quarter standard deviation. This means that, on average, higher prices are 
charged on smaller loans, which could indicate the intention of MFIs to cover the high-
er costs incurred by smaller loans. It therefore seems that cross subsidisation between 
smaller and larger loans does not happen to a significant extent. 
The results for the second Hypothesis are calculated for OPEXP as the dependent vari-
able (see column (3) of Table 10.4). The significantly positive coefficient for FEMALE 
and the significantly negative coefficient for ALB_GNI indicate confirmation of Hypoth-
eses 2a and 2b. The results are again strongly significant at the 1% level, illustrating a 
low probability of error. More outreach thus comes at higher operating expenses. The 
coefficient is higher for the variable FEMALE than for ALB_GNI, similar to the results 
regarding Hypothesis 1. It therefore seems to be more costly to increase outreach by 
targeting female clients than by reducing the average loan sizes. Possible explanations 
for higher costs for female clients would be increased marketing efforts to target them 
or the development of group-building techniques in order to meet their special re-
quirements. 
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Table 10.4 OLS Regression: Hypotheses 1-3 using Data from 2004 to 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
FEMALE 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.108*** 0.010 0.081 -0.043 
 (3.87) (3.98) (4.57) (0.74) (1.28) (-0.68) 
ALB_GNI -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.020*** -0.005 -0.014 -0.006 
 (-3.49) (-3.91) (-3.75) (-1.28) (-0.60) (-0.28) 
SIZE -0.012** -0.004 -0.024*** 0.008** 0.061 0.034*** 
 (-2.08) (-0.78) (-5.38) (2.18) (1.44) (3.32) 
AGE -0.003* -0.003** -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.94) (-2.33) (-1.40) (0.71) (0.34) (-0.24) 
PAR30 -0.078 -0.019 0.022 -0.312*** -0.392 -1.219*** 
 (-0.73) (-0.18) (0.40) (-6.41) (-1.22) (-6.38) 
LEVERAGE -0.027 -0.004 0.015 -0.066* 0.716 -0.210** 
 (-1.17) (-0.17) (0.47) (-1.73) (0.60) (-2.28) 
BANK 0.031 0.001 0.021 -0.007 0.023 -0.057 
 (0.86) (0.04) (1.47) (-0.67) (0.27) (-1.13) 
COOP -0.116*** -0.083*** -0.066*** 0.000 0.050 -0.018 
 (-4.21) (-3.16) (-4.48) (0.02) (0.76) (-0.42) 
NGO -0.025 -0.018 -0.017 0.018* 0.107 0.072 
 (-1.20) (-0.90) (-1.16) (1.86) (1.04) (1.64) 
OTHER 0.054* 0.065** 0.056*** 0.026* 0.022 0.143** 
 (1.76) (2.16) (2.96) (1.93) (0.24) (2.23) 
RURBANK -0.098 -0.092 -0.164*** 0.041** 0.251 0.126 
 (-1.13) (-1.11) (-4.64) (2.06) (1.26) (1.60) 
AFRICA 0.080** 0.049 0.076*** -0.021* -0.113* -0.122 
 (2.10) (1.25) (2.73) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.59) 
ECA 0.014 -0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.038 -0.009 
 (0.47) (-0.06) (0.25) (0.64) (-0.68) (-0.12) 
LAC 0.056* 0.073** 0.047** -0.005 -0.075 -0.091 
 (1.76) (2.20) (2.05) (-0.44) (-1.27) (-1.26) 
MENA -0.002 0.009 -0.003 -0.001 -0.139 -0.033 
 (-0.07) (0.27) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-1.37) (-0.40) 
SA -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.060** -0.041* 0.005 -0.149* 
 (-4.15) (-4.44) (-2.02) (-1.85) (0.02) (-1.83) 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.515*** 0.336*** 0.515*** -0.083 -0.563 0.861*** 
 (5.45) (3.61) (6.81) (-1.35) (-0.82) (5.04) 
       
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 
R-squared 0.278 0.276 0.352 0.164 0.038 0.095 
t-statistics in parentheses, calculated based on robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. The two most important explan-
atory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and 
the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI, in %). All other explanatory varia-
bles are defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
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The third Hypothesis is also confirmed, as I find no significant relationship between 
ROA, ROE and OSS and FEMALE or ALB_GNI (see columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 
10.4). The effect on the return variables (ROA and ROE) is similar to the one on the 
yields as the coefficient for female is positive and the one for ALB_GNI is negative; 
however, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. OSS is negatively 
influenced by both measures. Outreach measures therefore show a tendency to be 
slightly negatively correlated with returns. However, the effects on ROA, ROE and OSS 
are very small and not significantly different from zero. The significant outcomes there-
fore indicate the acceptance of all three Hypotheses for this data set. 117 
When including all MFIs in the analysis, without controlling for the number of dia-
monds, the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 remain significant.118 The regression estima-
tion contains 4,454 observations and leads to similar coefficients, significant at the 1% 
level. The results are shown in the Appendix (Table 12.6). Regarding ROE and OSS, 
small differences result when all diamonds are included. ROE is positively influenced 
by FEMALE, significant at the 5% level, and OSS is positively connected to ALB_GNI 
(significant at the 5% level), indicating that lower outreach involves higher values of 
OSS. However, as stated before, some MFIs with low diamond scores report implausi-
ble results and these scarcely significant results are therefore probably not valid. This is 
the reason why for most of the analyses, I restricted the data set to MFIs with five dia-
monds. 
The results lead to the suggestion that some of the previous studies have not focused 
on the best choice of variables, or have used an incomplete set of variables. Return fig-
ures are influenced by both costs and yield at the same time (controversially), and these 
both rise with depth of outreach. Most previous papers look at OSS, FSS, ROA or ROE 
and costs in relation to outreach. OSS is calculated by dividing operating revenue by 
operating expenses plus financial expenses and impairment losses. FSS measures 
whether MFIs are able to cover their costs (considering certain analytical adjustments) 
and is calculated by dividing adjusted financial revenue by total expenses adjusted for 
example, for subsidies and inflation (Rosenberg, 2009, 10). ROA and ROE are calculat-
                                                 
117  I additionally estimate the base regression using ALB instead of ALB_GNI and find the same results 
with respect to all three Hypotheses (see Table 12.5 in the Appendix). 
118  Number of diamonds classifies data and disclosure quality (see Chapter 7.4). 
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ed by dividing return by assets or equity, while return is calculated by subtracting costs 
from earnings (simplified). This means that all four measures are influenced positively 
by yield (earnings) and negatively by costs. Supposing that outreach has a positive im-
pact on yield (argued by Conning (1999) and reinforced by the present study) and a 
negative impact on costs (supported by Hermes et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2007; and Con-
ning, 1999 as well as by the present study) the net result is zero or a very weak effect on 
return measures. This could explain the weak and rather contradictory results found on 
the relationship between social and financial return in microfinance (see present study 
as well as Cull et al., 2007 and Quayes, 2011). 
The results on YIELD and YIELDR and their relation to outreach raise the question as 
to how MFIs decide on the level of the interest rates charged. Di Bella (2011) analyses 
factors influencing interest rates in an empirical investigation using MFI data from the 
MIX. He shows that interest rate levels are positively influenced by the MFI’s borrow-
ing rates and confirms the results found here, that interest rates are inversely related to 
the average loan size and the age of the MFI (Di Bella, 2011, 29).  
Interestingly, both FEMALE and ALB_GNI are twofold variables as they capture out-
reach and are also expected to have a direct influence on financial return by reducing 
default rates.  
Other studies have looked at this by analysing the relationship between variables that 
are all used as independent factors in the present OLS regression. The studies analys-
ing different data sets show for example that more female clients result in lower portfo-
lio-at-risk, loan-loss ratio and write-offs as well as provisions, especially for NGOs with 
individual lending strategies and MFIs offering services other than loans (D’Espallier et 
al., 2009, 27). Existing research also reports that women usually ask for smaller loans 
and are more often involved in village lending and group lending (Hermes et al., 2011, 
943). Assuming that village and group lending techniques lead to lower default rates, 
these two results both point to the fact that the involvement of more female borrowers 
comes with lower risk. Quayes furthermore argues that smaller loans are more likely to 
be repaid, leading to lower default rates and higher financial sustainability (Quayes, 
2011, 3429). ResponsAbility reports the same results for their specific set of MFIs, stat-
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ing that MFIs with a good score on their rADER119 scale of social performance exhibit 
low default rates (responsAbility (ed.), 2011b, 11). They conclude that more social MFIs 
incur less financial risk. 
To cross-check these results from literature, I analyse the effect of social factors on 
PAR30, the write-off ratio and the loan loss rate in my data set. I also find a significant-
ly inverse relationship of FEMALE to all three factors (see Table 10.5, the same controls 
are used as in the basic regression). This means that the more female clients are served, 
the lower the measure of credit risk.  
For the other outreach measure, ALB_GNI, however, the results were contradictory 
with a significantly inverse relationship to write-offs and the loan loss rate, meaning 
that larger loans come with lower write-offs and loan loss ratios. This result would im-
ply that larger loans, probably distributed to somewhat wealthier clients, are repaid 
more reliably. Therefore, my findings are not aligned with findings from the literature 
with respect to loan size.  
Table 10.5 OLS Regression Analysing Risk Measures (2004-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PAR30 WRITEOFF LOANLOSS RATE 
    
FEMALE -0.046*** -0.017*** -0.013** 
 (-3.50) (-3.09) (-2.59) 
ALB_GNI 0.004 -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (1.22) (-3.52) (-4.09) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Constant 0.115*** 0.035* 0.015 
 (3.86) (1.88) (0.90) 
    
Observations 1,508 1,493 1,507 
R-squared 0.122 0.070 0.064 
t-statistics in parentheses, calculated based on robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variables in this Table: PAR30 is the percentage of the total portfolio that is more than 30 
days overdue, WRITEOFF is the percentage of the portfolio that is written off and LOANLOSS RATE is 
defaults in relation to portfolio. The two explanatory variables are the percentage of female borrowers 
(FEMALE) and the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All controls from 
the basic regression (Table 10.4) are included and defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
  
                                                 
119  For more information on rADER refer to Chapter 6.2. 
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Nevertheless, as causality is not clear here, the relationship could be vice versa, mean-
ing that institutions facing higher risks distribute smaller loans (see also Mersland / 
Strom, 2010, 31). Therefore, results presented in existing literature and in Table 10.5 
need to be interpreted with some caution.  
Note that this analysis leads to the assumption that multicollinearity might be an issue 
in the main regression in Table 10.5; however, this issue is addressed below (Chapter 
10.5.4.3). 
10.5.3.2 CONTROL VARIABLES 
SIZE exhibits a significantly negative impact on YIELD (at the 5% significance level) 
and OPEXP (at the 1% significance level) (see Table 10.4). In contrast, ROA and OSS are 
positively affected by SIZE. This means that small MFIs have higher costs but at the 
same time charge their customers higher interest rates. The net effect is a positive and 
significant influence on ROA and OSS. AGE shows a negative effect on YIELDR and 
YIELD, and a negative but insignificant influence on costs. The result for SIZE is in line 
with the outcomes of Cull et al. (2007), who find a positive relationship between AGE / 
SIZE and financial performance measures, such as ROA, FSS and OSS. One possible 
explanation for the negative interaction between YIELD and AGE / SIZE is that older 
and larger MFIs are able to reduce their operating expenses (by realising economies of 
scale) and thus allow lower interest rates. 
Risk measured using PAR30 reveals a significantly negative effect (1% significance lev-
el) on ROA and OSS. PAR30 does not significantly influence YIELD / YIELDR which is 
because YIELD(R) captures gross interest revenues rather than the interest rate realised 
on the portfolio. Therefore, late payments do not influence portfolio yield. Operating 
costs are not influenced by late payments either; the significant effect on return 
measures is probably caused instead by higher provisioning motivated by rising 
PAR30 figures. The coefficient for LEVERAGE reveals a significant influence only on 
ROA and OSS, both negative. This means that higher leverage negatively affects per-
formance, supporting the results of Quayes (2011). This might be caused by the high 
price for debt in the field of microfinance. For ROE the inverse relationship is intuitive 
as higher leverage comes at lower equity, which leads to a positive effect on ROE. Nev-
ertheless, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
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Regarding legal status, there is no significant difference between banks and the base 
variable NBFI. COOP shows a significantly lower yield accompanied by lower costs in 
relation to NBFIs. Lower costs are not surprising as voluntary work is in the nature of 
this type of institution. Results indicate that credit unions / cooperatives also use these 
lower costs to charge their clients less than the banks do. NGOs do not differ signifi-
cantly from NBFIs in this regression analysis even though one might have expected 
NGOs to charge lower interest rates and realise lower returns. Other institutions per-
form better on yield, but worse on costs. However, there are only three observations for 
other institutions, so this result is not meaningful. Concerning different regions, Africa 
shows lower levels of return and higher levels of YIELD and OPEXP in comparison to 
East Asia and the Pacific, as expected based on the analysis in Chapter 8.2. Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean has higher levels of yield and costs than East Asia and the Pacif-
ic, and South Asia lower yield and lower costs as well as lower levels of ROA and OSS. 
The outcomes on legal status and region confirm the results described in Chapter 8.2 
and 8.3, as the same database is used. 
10.5.3.3 INVESTOR VIEW 
In the present analysis, the focus is on the investor’s view and therefore, the intention is 
to capture the financial measures that influence the return to the investor effectively. To 
identify the best measure, the correlation between several financial performance 
measures and the interest rates paid to the funders is analysed. The focus is on interest 
rates because the majority of funds still invest in MFIs by means of debt. For equity 
funds, of course, there are other factors that have an important influence on the valua-
tion of MFIs. The correlation between the six financial measures used above and the 
interest rates paid to the funds is compared. Not all MFIs disclose funding information, 
and the MIX only started to collect this information in 2007, leading to a sample of 775 
observations (see Table 10.6). 
Portfolio yield is found to have the most significant relationship to interest rates paid to 
investors. The correlation coefficient of 0.307 is highly significant at the 1% level. The 
relationship of real yield to interest is also highly significant but less strong (0.224), 
which could be an indication that MFIs are not passing inflation effects on to the funds. 
Nevertheless, the causality of the relationship between interest rates charged by MFIs 
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and rates paid to funders is not clear. Di Bella (2011) for example argues that higher 
founding rates positively influence interest rates charged by MFIs (Di Bella, 2011, 28). 
The interest rate is positively related to ROE and inversely related to ROA; however, 
the relationship is not significant. As a matter of completeness, I continue to use ROE 
and ROA as proxies for financial performance, because ROE in particular is considered 
to be the most common financial KPI for the evaluation of bank performance (Europe-
an Central Bank (ed.), 2010, 5). OSS is inversely related to interest rates, although again 
not significantly. 
The analysis also shows that operating expenses (OPEXP) are linked to the interest rate 
paid to the funds (see Table 10.6). This positive relationship means that higher costs are 
reflected in higher interest rates paid by MFIs to the funds and is rather counter-
intuitive. Nevertheless, the relationships of YIELD and OPEXP to INTEREST remain 
statistically significant if each year (2007-2010) is analysed separately. 
In summary, both the positive correlation of YIELD / YIELDR and OPEXP to 
INTEREST show that social performance comes at higher interest rates for the investor 
through higher portfolio yield and higher costs, both positively influencing interest 
rates.  
Table 10.6 Pearson Correlation  Coefficients: Interest Rates to Funders (2007-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES INTEREST INTEREST INTEREST INTEREST INTEREST INTEREST 
       
YIELD 0.307***      
 (0.00)      
YIELDREAL  0.224***     
  (0.00)     
ROE   0.033    
   (0.36)    
ROA    -0.032   
    (0.38)   
OPEXP     0.204***  
     (0.00)  
OSS      -0.005 
      (0.19) 
P-Values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
INTEREST stands for the interest rate that MFIs pay to funders. All other variables are the dependent 
variables used in the basic regression (Table 10.4). 
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10.5.4 REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 
10.5.4.1 PANEL DATA 
The variables for the analysis are collected at different points in time (panel data) and 
therefore, more than one observation per MFI is included. As a result, the assumptions 
on the underlying OLS-estimators may not be met, which may lead to inconsistent es-
timators (Green, 2012, 349 ff.). One way to control for biased observations is the ran-
dom effects model, which is based on the assumption that the observations for one MFI 
would tend to be related to each other over time to a greater extent than the observa-
tions for different MFIs would be related to each other (Kohler / Kreuter, 2008, 255). 
This means that unobserved individual heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the variables that are included. 
Another way to handle panel data is to use of the fixed effects model. Using fixed ef-
fects makes sense when it is expected that an effect will vary over time and therefore 
needs to be estimated using dummy variables (measuring a group-specific constant 
term) (Green, 2012, 346 Wooldridge, 2003, 473). To decide which of the two models to 
use, a Hausman test is run (Green, 2012, 379) (see Table 12.7 in the Appendix). The null 
hypothesis states that the random effects model is preferred, while the alternative hy-
pothesis favours the fixed effects model. This means that the null hypothesis does not 
expect the unique errors to be correlated with the regressors. In this study, the null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected so I use the random effects model to test the robustness of 
the OLS-regression (see Table 10.7). 
The results of the random effects regression analysis do not differ from the standard 
OLS-regression using equal control variables. The significance and the sign of the coef-
ficients do not change meaningfully. However, the coefficients for FEMALE decrease 
slightly when using the random effects model. The coefficients for ALB_GNI remain 
almost at the same level. As before, no significant relationship is found between ROA, 
ROE and OSS and the measures of outreach. This means that the OLS-regression led to 
meaningful results, even though longitudinal data is used. 
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Table 10.7 Results of the Random Effects Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
FEMALE 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.072*** 0.015 0.076 -0.010 
 (4.882) (4.05) (5.23) (1.16) (0.46) (-0.15) 
ALB_GNI -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.006 0.008 
 (-6.412) (-5.342) (-4.51) (-0.71) (-0.13) (0.44) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.640*** 0.656*** 0.622*** -0.0847** -0.467 0.869*** 
 (10.22) (9.76) (15.37) (-2.46) (-1.05) (4.98) 
       
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 
Number of MFIs 327 327 327 327 327 327 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. The two most important explan-
atory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and 
the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All controls from the basic regres-
sion (Table 10.4) are included and defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
10.5.4.2 OMITTED VARIABLES 
In order to test for variables possibly omitted, I use a form of a fixed effects model. A 
dummy variable is included for each institution (MFI) to allow different intercepts 
(Wooldridge, 2003, 473). Although I include several control variables in the model, it is 
possible that some correlated variables are omitted. Specific characteristics of MFIs in-
fluencing both financial and social return at the same time would erase the relationship 
between financial and social factors analysed here and therefore lead to biased test re-
sults. One example would be that MFIs located in rural areas serve poorer clients while 
charging higher interest rates. This would mean that both variables are influenced by 
the regional allocation of the institution. Other than that, the mission of a particular 
MFI or the obligations imposed by donors or investors could lead to the service of 
poorer clients at higher prices. Also the management quality or the quality of human 
resources might influence both the dependent and the independent variables at the 
same time. To control for all possibilities of endogeneity, 326 dummy variables are in-
cluded in the fixed effects regression accounting for all MFIs and using one as a refer-
ence group (see Table 10.8). The dummy variables control for all the time-constant, un-
observable characteristics of the MFIs that could possibly affect the dependent variable 
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by monitoring the unobserved heterogeneity between MFIs (Wooldridge, 2003, 439). 
This is a very strong test, which controls for all the characteristics of the single MFIs 
that could possibly influence the relationship between the independent and the de-
pendent variables.  
With regard to the Hypothesis 1a (YIELD as dependent variable), the value of both co-
efficients decreases when including institutional fixed effects, with the one for 
FEMALE decreasing from 0.162 to 0.090 and the size of the coefficient for ALB_GNI 
decreasing from -0.042 to -0.031. This means that a part of the relationship between 
YIELD and the two outreach measures is eliminated by institution-specific factors in-
fluencing both of the variables. Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that the positive 
relationship between social performance and nominal yield persists with strong statis-
tical significance at the 1% level even after the inclusion of fixed effects. 
The effect for the real yield is only weakly significant on the 10% level in the fixed ef-
fects model for the variable FEMALE while the coefficient for ALB_GNI remains signif-
icant. However, the coefficients of outreach for real yield were already smaller than for 
nominal yield in the standard OLS-regression. The effect of outreach is stronger on 
nominal yield and therefore also persists in the fixed effects model. This could indicate 
that if MFIs adjust interest rates according to the characteristics of the client or the loan 
size, they do it on a nominal level, meaning they neglect the development of the na-
tional price level.  
Regarding OPEXP, the significant effect of social return remains statistically significant 
for both outreach variables. Both coefficients decrease for OPEXP as well, with 
FEMALE decreasing from 0.108 to 0.071 and ALB_GNI from 0.020 to 0.012, indicating 
that some institution specific variables influence both the explanatory factors and the 
dependent variable OPEXP at the same time.  
The coefficients of outreach and ROA, ROE and OSS remain statistically insignificant as 
in my original OLS model, meaning that Hypothesis 3 is again confirmed, even when 
taking unobservable effects into account.  
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Table 10.8 Fixed Effects Regression Using Dummy Variables for Each Institution 
(2004-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
Institution Fixed 
Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
FEMALE 0.090*** 0.052* 0.071*** 0.023 -0.045 0.086 
 (3.61) (1.77) (4.39) (1.20) (-0.14) (0.70) 
ALB_GNI -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.012*** -0.005 -0.005 0.020 
 (-5.38) (-4.22) (-3.11) (-1.04) (-0.07) (0.69) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.337** 0.546*** 1.023*** -0.676*** -1.737 -0.790 
 (2.48) (3.42) (11.56) (-6.38) (-0.98) (-1.17) 
       
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 
R-squared 0.881 0.839 0.892 0.673 0.392 0.494 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. The two most important explan-
atory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and 
the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All other explanatory variables are 
defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
Not surprisingly, the R-squared increased strongly to between 80 and 90% as the inclu-
sion of dummies for each MFI allows much of the variation of the dependent variable 
to be captured (columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 10.8). 
To conclude, all the Hypotheses are confirmed with strong significance, even when 
controlling for all institution-specific factors by including institution fixed effects. 
10.5.4.3 MULTICOLLINEARITY 
The definition of multicollinearity is a high degree of correlation between two or more 
independent variables in a regression model (Wooldridge, 2003, 97). To test for multi-
collinearity, I use a correlation matrix showing Pearson correlation coefficients between 
all the independent variables (see Table 10.9).  
Correlations between the independent variables are rather low (below 0.5) indicating 
that no multicollinearity is present. The strong interaction of ALB_GNI and ALB is in-
tuitive as both measures are based on the same values; however, I never use both fac-
tors in the same estimation. I find the highest correlation between female and average 
loan balance, the two social measures. The two variables interact negatively indicating 
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that female clients usually receive lower loans (supporting the results of Hermes et al., 
2011, 943). The third rather strong correlation is between SIZE and AGE, which is not 
surprising, as institutions tend to grow with age. 
Table 10.9 Pearson Correlation Coefficients and VIF to Test for Multicollinearity 
 FEMALE ALB ALB_GNI SIZE AGE PAR30 LEVERAGE 
FEMALE 1.000***       
ALB -0.389*** 1.000***      
ALB_GNI -0.400*** 0.586*** 1.000***     
SIZE -0.225*** 0.189*** 0.213*** 1.000***    
AGE -0.086*** 0.085*** 0.180*** 0.299*** 1.000***   
PAR30 -0.141*** 0.071*** 0.083*** -0.011*** 0.152*** 1.000***  
LEVERAGE 0.076** -0.031 -0.017 0.010 -0.020 -0.001 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
VIF Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
 YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
FEMALE 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
ALB_GNI 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 
SIZE 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 
AGE 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
PAR30 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 
LEVERAGE 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
MEAN 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 
In general, high correlations between control variables do not influence the result for 
the important variables (here social performance measures) (Wooldridge, 2003, 99). 
However, to ensure that these correlations do not influence the quality of the model, I 
calculate the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the variables in addition (see Table 
10.9).120 VIF values higher than 10 indicate multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 2009, 99). In 
the present regression study, the highest value of all VIFs is 1.25 indicating that multi-
collinearity is not an issue. 
10.5.4.4 OUTLIERS 
To assure that outliers in the data set do not distort the results, I conduct a specific re-
gression analysis controlling for outliers. An outlier is, by definition, an observation 
that yields a strong change in the OLS-estimators if it is omitted (Wooldridge, 2003, 
312). STATA121 offers an automatic service to control for outliers in regression analyses 
by using iteratively-weighted least squares. This means that the more extreme an outli-
                                                 
120  The VIF is the inverse of 1-R2, where R2 is based on the regression of one independent variable on the 
other independent variables. Therefore, a higher R2 leads to a higher VIF indicating multicollinearity 
(Bossow-Thies/Panten, 2009, 374 ff.). 
121  STATA is the data analysis tool / statistical software used. 
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er is, the less weight is attributed to it, and very extreme values are even dropped. The 
results are presented in the Appendix (see Table 12.8). For the regression that uses ROE 
as dependent variable, one observation is excluded altogether while in all regressions 
some observations have been attributed less weight. However, the six interesting corre-
lation effects between social return (FEMALE and ALB_GNI) and YIELD, YIELDR and 
OPEXP remain statistically significant and for ROA, ROE and OSS there is still no sig-
nificant effect.  
10.5.4.5 BREADTH OF OUTREACH 
For completeness, I also conduct the same analysis using the number of active borrow-
ers (BORROWERS) served by the MFIs as a proxy for social return (breadth of out-
reach). For this purpose, I take the natural logarithm of the number of borrowers as the 
independent variable. The effect of the number of borrowers is significantly positive for 
YIELD and YIELDR, similar to the earlier identified effect regarding depth of outreach 
(see Table 10.10). OPEXP is positively related to the number of borrowers, also signifi-
cant at the 1% level. This means that average yield and average operating costs rise 
with the number of borrowers and therefore again, outreach comes at higher revenues 
and higher operating expenses at the same time. The positive effect of BORROWERS 
remains for ROA providing an indication that institutions serving more clients are 
more profitable. The results therefore indicate that when looking at the number of bor-
rowers as a proxy for outreach, Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be accepted, too. Hypothesis 3 
in turn is rejected, as ROA is positively related to the number of borrowers. Neverthe-
less, all studies discussed earlier look at depth of outreach rather than breadth, and, 
therefore, the results reported in section 10.5.3 seem more important. 
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Table 10.10 Regression Analysis Using Breadth of Outreach 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
BORROWERS 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.039*** 0.012** 0.036 0.007 
 (6.618) (5.734) (6.507) (2.274) (0.898) (0.254) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Ef-
fects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.887*** 0.684*** 0.748*** -0.042 -0.377 0.822*** 
 (10.764) (8.038) (11.499) (-0.804) (-0.620) (5.173) 
       
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 
R-squared 0.274 0.250 0.350 0.174 0.038 0.095 
t-statistics in parentheses, calculated based on robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. Breath of outreach is measured 
as the number of borrowers served by an institution (BORROWERS). All other explanatory variables are 
defined in Chapter 10.5.1.  
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11. CONCLUSION 
11.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Overall low transparency in the microfinance industry makes data collection and com-
parability of microfinance investment vehicles difficult. To obtain a comprehensive pic-
ture of the sector, I combine information on microfinance investment funds collected 
by means of a survey with MIX data on microfinance institutions. A method for classi-
fying microfinance investment funds is presented to compare and evaluate investment 
possibilities in microfinance. The results show that the funds vary in their structure, 
their special characteristics and the underlying portfolios. I apply classification infor-
mation to generate an index including comparable funds to be used for benchmarking 
purposes. The degree of commercialisation, the regional focus and the risk exposure of 
a fund are the most important factors from an investor’s perspective, and therefore 
these criteria would need to be addressed when more funds disclose performance 
measures. 
From an investor’s point of view, two aspects of microfinance are interesting: first, the 
possible diversification effects on existing portfolios, and second the social return and 
its potential relationship to financial return. 
In order to investigate the first aspect, I calculate an index representing the micro-
finance universe using December 2003 as starting point. The analysis is based on 
monthly performance data collected by means of a survey and includes 19 funds in 
total. The data allows the calculation of one US Dollar index and one Euro index for 
funds mainly invested in debt. For each currency, an index applying an equally 
weighted approach and one using an asset-weighting technique is calculated. Both 
types of indexes show a steady positive development between 2004 and 2011, not in-
fluenced by the financial crisis starting in 2008. Both indexes grow in every month, 
with the exception of two months, when the USD MF index experiences a decline. 
The comparison of the MF indexes with traditional and socially responsible indexes of 
the corresponding currency shows major differences in volatility and performance de-
velopment. The debt MF indexes present lower levels of volatility (standard deviation) 
and they do not exhibit any correlation with socially responsible or traditional equity 
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indexes. Interestingly, the analysis of the emerging market debt index (JP EMBI) leads 
to similar results. However, the JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index shows 
comparable performance patterns over recent years, while the monthly performances 
are positively but insignificantly linked to the MF index. Still, there is something of a 
relationship between the two indexes, as, unlike all the other indexes analysed, neither 
is affected by the financial crisis. The fact that, to date, the performance of the funds has 
not been seriously affected by the crisis is interesting, and it reflects favourably on mi-
crofinance investments. However, the results should be viewed with caution, as there 
remains the possibility of a lagged impact of the crisis.  
To investigate the second aspect, I conduct a comprehensive empirical regression on 
the relationship between the social and financial returns of microfinance institutions. 
Results strongly indicate that social return measured as outreach to the poor is posi-
tively related to financial return from an investor’s perspective. Interest rates paid to 
funders and investors rise with depth of outreach caused by the MFIs’ higher portfolio 
yield. Institutions seem to charge higher interest rates to poorer clients (measured us-
ing average loan size and percentage of female clients). Because operational expenses 
increase at the same time, the total influence on return measures (such as ROA, ROE 
and OSS) is very small and not statistically significant. Previous studies mostly focus 
on return figures. As returns are influenced by both yield and costs at the same time 
(controversially), the relationship to depth of outreach is (partially) erased. 
Fund managers still do not put strong emphasis on including social factors in their in-
vestment decision processes. Several impediments are identified, including the belief 
that microfinance is social “per se”, the existing lack of standardisation in the meas-
urement of social performance, and lax regulation (Urgeghe, 2012, 18). However, in 
view of increased commercialisation of the industry and crises hitting several regions, 
the focus on social factors has gained importance.  
The present study indicates that considering socially responsible elements in invest-
ment decisions might lead to increased financial performance, as the expected trade-off 
between social and financial factors does not seem to exist from an investor’s point of 
view. Although charging poorer clients higher interest rates is not in tune with the so-
cial nature of the microfinance institutions, it appears to be necessary in order to cover 
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higher costs and to satisfy investors. Furthermore, a focus on social factors is important 
to ensure the future responsibility of the microfinance sector. Besides serving poor cli-
ents, funds can emphasise their social approach by signing social investment principles 
and informing investors about social performance. Profitable funds also have the pos-
sibility to favour the sustainable growth of institutions and thus the emergence of fur-
ther investment options by providing capacity building and technical assistance to 
MFIs.  
11.2 LIMITATIONS 
Potential limitations to the current study are presented to guarantee an appropriate 
interpretation of the findings and to provide suggestions for future work. 
For the index calculation and the classification of the funds, I use data collected by 
means of a survey filled in by fund managers. The possibility exists that some fund 
managers overstate their results or do not disclose certain important information. Be-
cause of a lack of existing databases, it is not possible to test for mistakes in the data 
file. I conducted some random tests for funds that provide information online or in 
Bloomberg and did not find disparities. However, it is unlikely that a fund that already 
provides information somewhere else would offer different data in the survey. 
The index that is calculated and used for comparison with SRI and traditional indexes 
is limited to the survey respondents. A broader picture of the market would of course 
be useful. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that only the rather commercial debt funds 
were willing to disclose financial information on a monthly basis. This could result in a 
biased picture of the market, as commercial funds tend to be broadly diversified across 
countries and might be better prepared for potential crises. 
Although index calculation on a monthly basis is appropriate, more frequent data col-
lection might lead to more meaningful results, especially with regard to the compari-
son with other indexes. 
I base the analysis of the interaction between financial and social return on MFI-level 
data in order to overcome data limitations. However, an investigation at fund level, 
reflecting the perspective of investors, could be even more significant from an inves-
tor’s perspective.  
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Regarding data quality, using a database always entails possible inefficiencies or er-
rors. Particularly in the used MIX data file, where MFIs report their data themselves, it 
is possible that data are overvalued or negative information is not reported. I address 
this potential for bias by including only MFIs that receive 5 diamonds by MIX in the 
main regression analysis. 
11.3 OUTLOOK 
As microfinance is a rather new field, there are still many opportunities for research. In 
particular, little has been done on the subject of microfinance investments.  
Both of the special attributes of microfinance investments (diversification possibilities 
and the relationship between financial and social return) could be analysed in more 
detail. Diversification potentials could be examined at the fund level, as it is possible 
that different fund structures enable diverse degrees of diversification effect. It is as-
sumed that less commercial investment funds facilitate even greater levels of diversifi-
cation in comparison with other asset classes due to the special nature of the invest-
ment, which is strongly linked to other alternative asset classes.  
As soon as processes are more standardised and (it is hoped) regulated, data from 
MFIFs should be comparable and it will be possible to analyse social return measures 
at the fund level.  The definition of social performance aspects at the fund level is an 
approach that might entail the fund managers’ readiness to focus on sustainability. Be-
side investment in social MFIs, funds can underline their social engagement by becom-
ing signatories to social responsibility principles, or by providing technical support to 
MFIs. In order to emphasise the special nature of microfinance investments regarding 
social return, funds need to communicate and disclose social performance information 
to investors in a comparable and intuitive manner. The elaboration of tools to compare 
fund-level social performance and potentially link it to financial performance within a 
combined index must be the aim of future research projects in academics as well as in 
practice. Succeeding in helping the industry to become more transparent and encour-
aging the participants’ willingness to disclose data lies at the root of future growth. 
At the MFI level, a further topic for research is the definition and measurement of as-
pects of social return. Several approaches exist to provide a proxy for social return us-
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ing wide ranges of MFI characteristics (e.g. using performance data by Microfinanza 
Rating, see Hoepner et al. (2012)).  
Another issue raised by the current analysis that should be investigated further is that 
more socially orientated MFIs (from an outreach perspective,) seem to charge higher 
interest rates. This practice is understandable, as MFIs need to compensate for the po-
tential default of such very poor clients and the higher than average costs. Such a re-
search project could be based on theoretical work by Stiglitz / Weiss (1981) that ana-
lyse the equilibrium of credit markets and argue that the augmentation of interest rates 
could squeeze low-risk clients out of the markets. Furthermore, the fact that the poorest 
clients have to pay most would indicate a somewhat “unsocial” strategy. Additional 
analyses on the loan policies of MFIs might explain whether they actually adjust inter-
est rates based on clients’ profiles and loan sizes. 
It will be interesting to observe and analyse the proceedings of the microfinance indus-
try regarding return assessment and benchmarking methodologies of investments. In 
particular, the relationship between social return and financial factors and the influence 
of social factors on investors’ satisfaction and interest in the topic will affect the indus-
try and should be the subject of future research. 
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12. APPENDIX 
Table 12.1 Client Protection Principles 
Appropriate product design and delivery 
Prevention of over-indebtedness 
Transparency 
Responsible pricing 
Fair and respectful treatment of clients 
Privacy of client data 
Mechanisms for complaint resolution 
Source: http://www.smartcampaign.org/about-the-campaign/smart-microfinance-and-the-client-
protection-principles (as of 13.08.2012). 
Table 12.2 UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) 
1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision making  
processes 
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies 
and practices 
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we in-
vest 
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the principles within the  
investment industry 
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the princi-
ples 
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the  
principles 
Source: http://www.unpri.org/principles/ (as of 13.08.2012). 
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Table 12.3 Oneway Anova Analyses: Legal Status (2004-2010) Using 5,341 
Observations 
YIELD BANK COOP NBFI NGO 
COOP -0.057***    
 0.000    
NBFI 0.059*** 0.116***   
 0.000 0.000   
NGO 0.054*** 0.111*** -0.005  
 0.000 0.000 1.000  
RURBANK -0.006 0.051*** -0.065*** -0.060*** 
 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OPEXP BANK COOP NBFI NGO 
COOP -0.027    
 0.492    
NBFI 0.053*** 0.080***   
 0.000 0.000   
NGO 0.084*** 0.111*** 0.031***  
 0.000 0.000 0.000  
RURBANK -0.027 0.000 -0.079*** -0.111*** 
 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA BANK COOP NBFI NGO 
COOP -0.001    
 1.000    
NBFI 0.001 0.002   
 1.000 1.000   
NGO -0.013 -0.012 -0.014**  
 0.449 0.246 0.006  
RURBANK 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.031*** 
 0.536 0.219 0.219 0.000 
PAR30 BANK COOP NBFI NGO 
COOP 0.018*    
 0.043    
NBFI 0.000 -0.018**   
 1.000 0.001   
NGO 0.010 -0.008 0.010*  
 0.605 0.871 0.019  
RURBANK 0.060*** 0.042*** 0.060*** 0.049*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ALB_GNI BANK COOP NBFI NGO 
COOP -0.9146***    
 0.000    
NBFI -1.142*** -0.227***   
 0.000 0.000   
NGO -1.480*** -0.566*** -0.339***  
 0.000 0.000 0.000  
RURBANK -1.268*** -0.353*** -0.126 0.213* 
 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.052 
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FEMALE BANK COOP NBFI NGO 
COOP -0.022    
 1.000    
NBFI 0.091*** 0.114***   
 0.000 0.000   
NGO 0.217*** 0.240*** 0.126***  
 0.000 0.000 0.000  
RURBANK -0.015 0.007 -0.107*** -0.233*** 
 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Anova analyses are calculated regarding the statistical significance of the differences in means (multiple 
comparisons using one-way Anova analyses) using all observations (all diamonds) between 2004 and 
2010. The following legal forms are differentiated: BANK (bank), COOP (credit unions / cooperatives), 
NBFI (non-banking financial institution), NGO (non-governmental organisation) and RURBANK (rural 
bank). 
Table 12.4 Oneway Anova Analyses: Region  (2004-2010) Using 8,482 Observations 
YIELD AFRICA EAP ECA LAC MENA 
EAP -.0394***     
 0.000     
ECA -.0657*** -.0263**    
 0.000 0.028    
LAC -.0196 .020 .046***   
 0.116 0.167 0.000   
MENA -.075*** -.036* -.009 -.056***  
 0.000 0.056 1.000 0.000  
SA -.1466*** -.107*** -.081*** -.127*** -.071*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OPEXP AFRICA EAP ECA LAC MENA 
EAP -0.052***     
 0.000     
ECA -0.079*** -0.027*    
 0.000 0.075    
LAC -0.001 0.051*** 0.078***   
 1.000 0.000 0.000   
MENA -0.075*** -0.023 0.004 -0.074***  
 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000  
SA -0.105*** -0.053*** -0.026* -0.103*** -.0297 
 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.471 
ROA AFRICA EAP ECA LAC MENA 
EAP 0.041***     
 0.000     
ECA 0.062*** 0.021*    
 0.000 0.011    
LAC 0.027*** -0.015 -0.035***   
 0.000 0.171 0.000   
MENA 0.055*** 0.013 -0.007 0.028*  
 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.011  
SA 0.013 -0.028*** -0.049*** -0.014 -.042*** 
 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000 
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PAR30 AFRICA EAP ECA LAC MENA 
EAP -0.025**     
 0.001     
ECA -0.052*** -0.028***    
 0.000 0.000    
LAC -0.027*** -0.003 0.025***   
 0.000 1.000 0.000   
MENA -0.037*** -0.012 0.016 -0.009  
 0.000 1.000 0.759 1.000  
SA -0.038* -0.013* 0.015* -0.010 -.000902 
 -0.038 0.505 0.072 0.594 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Anova analyses are calculated regarding the statistical significance of the differences in means (multiple 
comparisons using one-way Anova analyses) using all observations (all diamonds) between 2004 and 
2010. The following regions are analysed: EAP (East Asia and Pacific), ECA (Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia), LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), MENA (Middle East and North Africa), SA (South Asia) 
and AFRICA (Africa). 
Figure 12.1 Comparison of MF Debt with SRI and Commercial Indexes EUR 
 
Source: own research and Bloomberg, 29.2.2012.  
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Table 12.5 OLS Regression using Average Loan Balance Instead of ALB Divided 
by GNI per Capita (2004-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
FEMALE 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.114*** 0.009 0.092 -0.041 
 (4.26) (4.44) (4.78) (0.66) (1.44) (-0.61) 
ALB -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (-3.05) (-3.48) (-2.91) (-1.66) (-0.10) (-0.10) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.487*** 0.308*** 0.502*** -0.086 -0.570 0.857*** 
 (5.06) (3.27) (6.65) (-1.40) (-0.82) (4.96) 
       
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 
R-squared 0.267 0.262 0.348 0.167 0.038 0.095 
t-statistics in parentheses, calculated based on robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. The two most important explan-
atory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and 
the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All other explanatory variables are 
defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
Table 12.6 OLS Regression: All Observations (all Levels of Diamonds) (2004-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
FEMALE 0.170*** 0.160*** 0.084*** 0.016 0.311** -0.043 
 (8.70) (8.77) (5.59) (1.30) (2.32) (-0.63) 
ALB_GNI -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.010*** 0.001 0.015 0.023** 
 (-2.69) (-2.79) (-2.79) (1.19) (0.99) (2.03) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.583*** 0.427*** 0.666*** -0.150*** -0.759 0.862*** 
 (12.04) (9.40) (8.450) (-3.803) (-1.64) (5.70) 
       
Observations 4,454 4,454 4,454 4,454 4,454 4,454 
R-squared 0.259 0.258 0.127 0.067 0.032 0.041 
t-statistics in parentheses, calculated based on robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. The two most important explan-
atory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and 
the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All other explanatory variables are 
defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
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Table 12.7 Hausman Fixed Random 
 Coefficients   
VARIABLES (b) (B) (b-B)  
 fixed random Difference S.E. 
FEMALE 0.0896349 0.1028247 -0.0131898 0.0133225 
ALB_GNI -0.0310991 -0.0331338 0.0020347 0.0026627 
SIZE -0.0184711 -0.0179053 -0.0005658 0.0011118 
PAR 30 -0.0418316 -0.0507644 0.0089328 0.0100792 
LEVERAGE -0.0000246 -0.0000253 7.00E-07 2.64E-06 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5)  =  (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 = 3.14 
Prob>chi2  = 0.6791 
 
 
Table 12.8 OLS Regression Using Iteratively Weighted Technique for Outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES YIELD YIELDR OPEXP ROA ROE OSS 
       
FEMALE 0.122*** 0.105*** 0.078*** 0.004 0.003 -0.031 
 (8.42) (7.13) (9.07) (0.70) (0.18) (-1.04) 
ALB_GNI -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.010** -0.001 
 (-7.98) (-8.37) (-5.61) (-1.06) (-2.07) (-0.11) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.589*** 0.453*** 0.470*** 0.045*** -0.201*** 0.987*** 
 (14.449) (10.931) (19.364) (2.923) (-4.090) (11.662) 
       
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,507 1,508 
R-squared 0.340 0.326 0.386 0.288 0.230 0.265 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: Yield on portfolio nominal / real is the interest 
and fee income divided by average loan portfolio, OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets, 
ROA and ROE are return in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational self-
sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses. The two most important explan-
atory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and 
the average loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All other explanatory variables are 
defined in Chapter 10.5.1. 
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Figure 12.2 Print Screens Questionnaire 
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